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Abstract 
The rule of law is a cornerstone of the UK legal order, it states that we are all subject to, and ruled in 
accordance with, the law.  Under Bingham’s analysis, the rule of law is made up of eight separate 
elements. Element one has four aspects, these are that legislation ought to be accessible, intelligible, 
clear and predictable.   
Legislative drafting means turning policy ideas into legislation fit for the statute book – it is literally 
writing the law.  It is best described as phronesis, the subjective application of wisdom. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that legislative drafting principles can be derived from element one of 
Bingham’s definition of the rule of law, and that these drafting principles facilitate the drafting of 
legislation in accordance with the rule of law.  The methodology is deductive reasoning, meaning 
that each aspect of element one is examined, and from each aspect, drafting principles are derived.  
The principles therefore flow directly from the rule of law. 
In Chapter 2 the rule of law requirement of accessibility is dissected.  Accessibility means that 
citizens have access to the law.  This leads to the conclusions that legislation ought to be drafted so 
as to be available (citizens can physically read it), navigable (citizens can find their way around it, 
particularly to the portion which directly affects them) and inclusive (containing all the relevant legal 
information). 
In Chapter 3 the rule of law requirement of predictability is analysed.  Predictability means that 
citizens can predict the legal consequences of their actions by reference to the legislation, or in 
other words, that the law is fixed and certain.  Drafting principles are then derived from this.  These 
are that legislation is prospective (it has effect in the future, not the past), that it is determinate 
(certain, unambiguous and precise), stable (not changing all the time),  it must have a clear start and 
stop date, it must be consistent (within individual statutes and more generally across the statute 
book), that it must apply in the real world, that it must be capable of being implemented, and that 
there must be constraints on the discretion given to officials by legislation. 
Chapter 4 deals with intelligibility – that the law must be capable of being understood by citizens.  
This means that the drafter must consider the characteristics of the individual who is most likely to 
be using the legislation, that both amending legislation and the legislation as amended must be 
comprehensible, that excessive interconnectedness must be avoided, that plain language, 
easification and good writing techniques must be used and finally that the legislation contain 
examples where appropriate to aid understanding. 
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The conclusion is that the hypothesis has been proved and that it is built on sound foundations of 
the importance of the rule of law, the importance of legislation and the key role of legislative 
drafters in the process of making legislation.  Drafters are already guardians of the statute book who 
are already under an obligation to protect the rule of law.  The hypothesis supports observance of 
rules, fairness, respect for human autonomy, certainty and provides a constitutional check on 
power.  It can be extended to other jurisdictions which have a similar approach to the rule of law. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Legislative drafting is the discipline of turning the policy ideas of legislators into law fit for the 
statute book.  Although legislative drafters have written about it from a practitioner’s viewpoint,1 
until recently it has received relatively little academic attention.2 Xanthaki describes legislative 
drafting as neither art nor science but phronesis – the practical application of wisdom.3     
The rule of law is a fundamental legal principle that everyone is subject to the law and that we are 
governed in accordance with law.  It has also come to represent the ideal characteristics that a legal 
system ought to possess.  By contrast with the study of legislative drafting, the rule of law has been 
written about extensively. 4 Tom Bingham was a respected English judge who wrote a well-regarded 
book on the rule of law.5  He conceived of the rule of law as having 8 different elements.  Element 
one is that law should be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable.  This thesis examines the 
intersection between the rule of law and legislative drafting. 
 
1.2 Hypothesis and methodology 
The hypothesis is 
Legislative drafting principles can be derived from element one of Bingham’s definition of 
the rule of law (that law should be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable) that 
facilitate the drafting of legislation in accordance with the rule of law. 
Specifically, the drafting principles derived are: 
 Availability 
 Navigability 
 Inclusivity 
 Prospectivity 
                                                          
1 See The Loophole – The Journal of the Commonwealth Association of Legislative Counsel. 
2 See Statute Law Review (mainly focusing on the UK) and Theory and Practice of Legislation. 
3 Helen Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regulation (1 edition, Hart Publishing 
2014). 
4 For a recent summary, see Venice Commission, ‘Report on the Rule of Law’ (2011). 
5 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin UK 2011). 
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 Determinacy 
 Stability 
 Clear commencement 
 Consistency 
 Application in the real world 
 Implementability 
 Constraints on discretion 
 Focus on characteristics of the user 
 Use of examples 
 ‘Good writing’ techniques 
 ‘Plain language’ techniques 
 Easification 
 Intelligibility of amending legislation and of legislation as amended 
 Avoiding excessive interconnectedness 
This thesis is original because it is the first systematic attempt to link drafting principles with the rule 
of law.  Much has been written about the rule of law already.  This thesis does not attempt to offer a 
fresh definition of the rule of law or justify its existence.  Instead it accepts that there is such a thing 
as the rule of law and that it is a good thing.  It does contain justification for using Bingham’s 
definition of the rule of law.  By comparison, not much has been written about legislative drafting.  
The focus in the literature is on the nature of legislative drafting and the meaning of quality 
legislation.   Although it is possible to find statements that legislation must be in accordance with the 
rule of law, there has been no systematic effort to delve deeper.  The originality of this thesis is the 
focus on the nexus of drafting and the rule of law. 
This thesis only covers element one of Bingham’s definition of the rule of law.  This is for two 
reasons.  Firstly, expanding it out to include the other seven elements would dilute the scope of the 
inquiry and cause a loss of focus.  Secondly, element one deals with the form of legislation, whereas 
the other elements deal more with the substance of the legislation.  It is in the form of legislation 
that legislative drafters have the greatest opportunity to give effect to the rule of law.  This is 
because drafters determine the form of legislation and others (politicians, civil servants) determine 
the content. 
Drafters can indirectly influence the content of legislation by advising those who have requested the 
legislation.  This is part of the role of a legislative counsel.  However, they can directly influence the 
way that the legislation is constructed, as it is they who are doing the constructing.  Since the focus 
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of this thesis is on legislative drafting principles, the thesis is directed towards those elements of the 
rule of law which are more concerned with the form of legislation not its substance.  
The methodology is innovative as well as being straight-forward.  I examine each aspect in element 
one of Bingham’s definition of the rule of law - accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable (this is 
done in Part 1 of each Chapter).   From each aspect I derive legislative drafting principles which give 
effect to it (this is done in Part 2 of each Chapter).  I use deductive reasoning to do so.  That is to say, 
I start with each aspect of element one as my  premise, and reason out from that what drafting 
principles are needed in order that legislation is enacted which is in accordance with that aspect. 
Once I have set out the drafting principles I develop them, both by reference to practical examples 
and also by reference to the works of others who have written about drafting.  I use the views of 
others to (a) demonstrate that the conclusions of my deductive reasoning accord with the 
conclusions that others have reached and (b) to develop more fully the drafting principles I have 
postulated.  Nothing is new under the sun, so the drafting principles that I derive often replicate 
drafting principles which others have put forward. 
I also examine the views of other key writers on the rule of law as they relate to element one of 
Bingham’s definition.  This is for several reasons.  Firstly, as a check on the soundness of my 
methodology, to ensure that what Bingham includes as an element is not at variance with what 
others have said.  Secondly, to provide more detail on the rule of law, since Bingham doesn’t set out 
in great detail the reasoning behind his elements.  Greater detail on the nature of element one helps 
with deriving the drafting principles from it.  These other writers are Fuller6 and Raz7 for all aspects 
of element one, and also Locke8 and Bentham9 where they are writing on a subject relevant to 
element one. 
The focus is very much on the rule of law and legislative drafting in the UK.  However some examples 
of legislation from other jurisdictions are also used where apposite. 
Some drafting principles are relevant to more than one aspect of element one (or are even relevant 
to one of the other seven elements of Bingham’s definition).  In those cases, I deal with them under 
                                                          
6 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law: Revised Edition (Revised, Yale University Press 1969). 
7 Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford 
University Press 1979). 
8 John Locke, Locke: Two Treatises of Government Student Edition (Peter Laslett ed, 3rd Student Manual/Study 
Guide, Cambridge University Press 1988). 
9 Bentham’s writing on legislation is voluminous.  The main works of Bentham’s I have looked at are Jeremy 
Bentham, Legislator of the World: Writings on Codification, Law, and Education (Clarendon Press ; Oxford 
University Press 1998); Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation (CK Ogden ed, Routledge 1950); Jeremy 
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation (JH Burns and HLA Hart eds, Clarendon 
Press). 
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one aspect, and simply mention or refer to them in another aspect.  For example, the drafting 
principle of consistency promotes both predictability and intelligibility, but I deal with it only in 
Chapter 3 under the heading of predictability. 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 1 sets out the hypothesis and methodology. It then analyses the two concepts contained 
within the thesis – the rule of law and legislative drafting.  It concludes by looking at some existing 
principles for legislative drafting.  This chapter lays out the necessary groundwork for what is to 
follow. 
Chapter 2 examines accessibility of legislation.  Part 1 investigates what accessibility meant to 
Bingham and to others as well as the arguments around accessible legislation in the UK.  Part 2 is the 
main part of the chapter, it derives and expounds upon the drafting principles of availability, 
navigability and inclusivity. 
Chapter 3 examines predictability of legislation.  Part 1 looks at what predictability means – that the 
legal effect of our actions are predictable by reference to legislation.  Part 2 derives the drafting 
principles of: prospectivity, determinacy, stability, clear commencement, consistency, application in 
the real world, implementability and constraints on discretion. 
Chapter 4 combines the analysis of both intelligibility and clarity.  Part 1 looks at what these 
concepts mean to Bingham and others.  Part 2 looks at the drafting principles derived from them. 
These are that we must focus on the user we want to make the legislation intelligible to, the 
difficulties in making amending legislation intelligible, excessive interconnectedness, the use of plain 
language, easification, the use of examples, and good writing styles. 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion. 
1.4 The Rule of Law 
There is a duality to the rule of law.10  At one level, the rule of law is a basic principle that we are all 
subject to the law.  At another level, the rule of law is the ideal of the values that a legal system 
ought to possess. This section gives an overview of competing theories of the rule of law. 
Bingham gave the following definition of the rule of law: 
                                                          
10 Much of what follows will be published in Theory and Practice of Legislation (2017) in an article entitled 
“What has legislation got to do with the rule of law?”.  
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All persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by 
and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and 
publicly administered in the courts.11  
One of the strengths of his analysis is that it reflects the duality of the rule of law.  He sets out the 
basic principle of the rule of law – that everyone is subject to the law.  But he then goes further and 
sets out the ideal of the rule of law, the values that legal systems should reflect.  These are his eight 
elements of the rule of law: 
1. Law should be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable 
2. Questions of legal right and liability to be resolved by law, not by exercise of discretion 
3. Law should apply equally to all 
4. Government should exercise powers in good faith 
5. Law must protect fundamental human rights 
6. Courts must be able to resolve legal disputes 
7. Adjudicative procedure of the state must be fair 
8. States must comply with international legal obligations as well as domestic ones 
1.4.1 Rule of law as a principle  
At its very simplest, the rule of law is the notion that everyone, both state and citizen, is bound by 
the law. Turning firstly to the state, the state makes the rules and is expected to follow the rules.  
Even though it may make the law, the state is not itself above the law.  Bingham describes this as the 
‘duty to govern in accordance with law’.12   So, the executive doesn’t have an untrammelled power 
to lock people up.13   As the Supreme Court reiterated, ‘If the rule of law is to mean anything, 
decisions as to what is necessary or expedient in this context cannot be left to the uncontrolled 
judgment of the executive’.14    
Turning secondly to the citizen, the basic principle includes an obligation upon the citizen to obey 
the law.   There may be several reasons for this: the law is morally good and ought to be obeyed for 
this reason, the law is backed up by sanctions and citizens will be penalised if they fail to obey, and 
                                                          
11 Bingham (n 5) 8. 
12 Tom Bingham, ‘The Case of Liversidge v Anderson : The Rule of Law Amid the Clash of Arms’ (2009) 43 The 
International Lawyer 33, 38.  . 
13 In Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206, the core of the dissenting judgement was that the executive had to 
rule in accordance with the law.  Even in times of war, the courts could not simply accept without question the 
executive’s view of what was reasonable.  So, the executive couldn’t lock up a person without evidence 
because they thought it was necessary, they had to at least be able to justify this in a court to be in accordance 
with the law. 
14 Ahmet and others v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2 at para. 45 
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pragmatically, society works better if everyone follows the rules.  The Bible advances a further 
argument for obeying the rules, that they contain sound advice on how best to live your life ‘your 
statutes are my delight, they are my counsellors’.15  Cooter argues that citizens should obey the law 
out of respect as the law conforms to their view of morality, but that if people obey the law out of 
fear, this can be characterised as rule of state law.16  This is too simplistic, there can be many valid 
reasons why citizens obey the law. For Hart, this disconnect between law and morality means that 
law is better for lawyers than it is for ordinary citizens.17  Seidman approaches this issue from the 
other direction, he accepts that people ought to obey the law, but his focus is on why they obey it in 
practice.18 
This basic principle has been around for a very long time.  It has existed in one form or another since 
at least the time of Plato, long before the term “rule of law” was itself thought of.  Plato wrote that 
‘if the law is the master of government and the government its slave, then the situation is full of 
promise and men enjoy all the blessings all the gods shower on a state’.19  Aristotle stated that ‘It is 
better for the law to rule than one of the citizens’.20  It is clearly not simply a UK concept, in Germany 
it is called rechtsstaat which could be translated as ‘state governed by law’ according to Zamboni.21 
In the Case of Prohibitions (1607) 12 Co Rep 63, Coke quotes Bracton in stating that ‘the King ought 
not to be under any man, but under God and the law’.  Coke ruled in that case that the King cannot 
sit in judgements in cases before the court, but that cases ought to be judged according to the laws 
of England.  In the same era, James Harrington argued for an ‘empire of laws, not of men’.22  
According to Corwin, Harrington himself ascribed the idea back to Aristotle.23   The idea was picked 
up by the American revolutionaries.  For example, the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Massachusetts Constitution 1780 includes references to a government of laws, not of men and 
                                                          
15 Psalm 119, Verse 24.  Most of Psalm 119 is a paean to statutes, uplifting reading for depressed drafters! 
16 Robert Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the Legal Foundations 
of Development (Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996 1997). 
17 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1997). 
18 Robert Seidman, ‘Drafting for the Rule of Law: Maintaining Legality in Developing Countries’ (1987) 12 Yale 
Journal of International Law 84, 97. 
19 Plato, Laws, Book IV, 715d. 
20 John Warrington (tr), Aristotle’s Politics and the Athenian Constitution (JM Dent 1959).  Book III, s. 1287, p. 
97.  Counter views did also exist in antiquity, for example the Roman maxim ‘princeps legibus solutus’ means 
that the prince is free of laws, see for example the discussion in Gaines Post, ‘Bracton on Kingship’ (1967) 42 
Tulane Law Review 519. 
21 Mauro Zamboni, ‘Rechtsstaat: What Is It That Swedish Development Assistance Organisations Export’ (2002) 
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according to Mason the concept is a fundamental part of the US constitutional structure.24   This is 
what Thomas Paine meant when he said that in the US there was no king, but that the law was 
king.25    
AV Dicey is usually regarded as the first theorist to coin the phrase ‘the rule of law’ in 1885.26   For 
Dicey, the second component of the rule of law was that all persons are subject to the ordinary laws 
and the ordinary courts.  Using Bingham’s colourful example, if you maltreat a penguin in London 
Zoo, it doesn’t matter if you are the Archbishop of Canterbury, you will still be prosecuted.27   Dicey 
also developed the theory of sovereignty of Parliament - the idea that Parliament was the supreme 
power in the land and could make any law on any subject without any constraint.  Although this is a 
fundamental tenet of English constitutional law, it does not sit well with the rule of law notion that 
there are limits to what legislation can do.  If Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can 
pass any law it wishes then, as Lane asks ‘if the rule of law is the foundation of the State, then how 
can Parliament claim a power not bound by any legal restrictions’.28  
Friedrich Hayek defined the rule of law as follows 
Government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which 
make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers 
in given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. 29 
Hayek was more of an economist and philosopher rather than a lawyer.  Indeed, in The Road to 
Serfdom, the rule of law is discussed in the context of state planning.  His approach was that laws 
stifled individual freedom and that therefore laws should be as minimalist and as unobtrusive as 
possible.  Laws should be pieces of functional or instrumental machinery which give certainty and 
stability rather than directing individuals towards a particular course of action.  The rule of law 
means that laws should be predictable and general and apply equally.   
In the modern era, the key theorists on the rule of law agree with this basic principle.  For Cass, the 
core concept of the rule of law is a government of laws.30   Raz argues simply that people should be 
ruled by the law and obey it.31   Waldron argues that the rule of law means that law stands above 
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every other authority in the land.32  The definition of the rule of law by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations begins ‘the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws’.33   
Therefore it can be said that, at the level of the basic principle, everyone is in agreement, the rule of 
law means that everyone is bound by the law. 
This may have been sufficient at one point in time, or where there are checks and balances built into 
constitutions.  Magna Carta, the 1215 motherlode of our notions of the rule of law states that no-
one could be imprisoned, save by the law of the land.34  The law (or legislation) was the bulwark 
against the seizure of liberty.  The King couldn’t simply arrest whoever he wanted, it had to be first 
authorised by law.  In modern constitutional theory, this translates into the Executive being 
constrained by the Legislature, which must first pass the law authorising the Executive, that law 
being enforced through, and interpreted by, the Courts.  But what happens when the legislature and 
the executive start to merge (as they do in the UK)?  Then one isn’t constaining the other.  Instead of 
King John being constrained by the Magna Carta Barons, they collude together to enact a law 
authorising the ‘bad’ thing.  Then imprisonment without trial (or exile, or seizure of goods etc.) is ‘in 
accordance with law’.   
If the rule of law is limited to the principle that everyone is subject to the law, then it is impossible 
for legislation to be against the rule of law, because if the legislation authorised it, then it is done in 
accordance with the law.  Therefore, there must be more to the rule of law than the basic principle 
that everyone is subject to the law.  If this is all that it is, then it doesn’t really do very much, and is 
undeserving of its central status in our legal systems. 
1.4.2 Rule of law as an ideal 
Many writers argue that their particular version of the ideal is derived from the basic principle, but 
each writer who extrapolates from the principle to the ideal seems to derive a slightly different set 
of values that the legal system ought to possess.  For example Raz doesn’t include human rights 
within the ideal of the rule of law,35 but for Allan, it does include the principal civil liberties.36   Other 
writers don’t even seek to derive the ideal from the principle, but rather decide that a particular 
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legal value is morally good and that it ought therefore to form part of the concept of the rule of law.  
For example the Declaration of Delhi stated that the rule of law required us ‘to establish social, 
economic, educational and cultural conditions under which [people’s] legitimate aspirations and 
dignity may be realized’. 
Waldron calls this ‘constellation theory’ as it confuses the individual stars (rule of law, justice, 
democracy etc.) with the overall constellation of a good legal system.37   Echoing this, Drinóczi 
includes ‘rule of law’ in a list of other general principles of European states, including democracy, 
participation, legal hierarchy, legislative competence and constitutional review of legal norms.38  
McWhinney views the rule of law not as a unified set of principles but rather ‘a distillation of English 
common law legal history  from the great constitutional battles of the seventeenth century 
onwards’.39    
Another taxonomy is the ‘thick’ versus ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law.40   The thin conception is 
tightly tied to the basic principle and characterises a legal system as conforming to the rule of law if 
it satisfies some requirements relating to the form of the legal system.  The thick conception is 
broader and requires that the content of the legal system reflects certain substantive values.   
A slight variation on thick and thin approaches is Dworkin’s distinction between a rule book 
approach and a rights based approach.  The rule book conception is about form and procedure – if 
laws are made in accordance with set rules then the rule of law is satisfied.  The rights conception 
goes further and argues that not only must the rules be obeyed, but the content of the law must 
reflect moral and political rights of the citizen.41  Jowell argues that the rule of law in the UK does 
contain respect for substantial rights (although not extending as far as democratic rights)42 and 
Wade43 and de Smith and Brazier44 agree.  
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Yet another variant taxonomy of the rule of law is the distinction between formal and substantive 
versions of the rule of law. Craig summarises this taxonomy as follows.45   Formal versions of the rule 
of law are concerned with the manner in which the law was made and its form and structure (or 
what laws look like46).   Substantive versions are concerned also with the content of the law, i.e. does 
it reflect certain legal values seen as important. 
The indeterminacy of the rule of law as an ideal has led many to question whether it has any value at 
all as a concept.  Although Waldron doesn’t agree with this argument, he does see a sense in which 
the rule of law simply means ‘hooray for our side’.47   In the same way Tamanaha argues that 
everyone is for the rule of law, but no-one knows exactly what it is.48   For Shklar, it is simply a self-
congratulatory device, ruling class chatter.49   In a similar vein, Finnis has argued that the rule of law 
simply means that a legal system is in good shape.50   With respect to all these esteemed writers, I 
disagree for two reasons.  Firstly, I adopt Bingham’s argument that the ubiquity of an obligation to 
respect the rule of law in domestic and international legal instruments, case law, legal history and 
political pronouncements means that it cannot simply be ignored.51   Secondly, even though there 
may be disagreements about the outer edges of the definition of the rule of law, there is a surprising 
amount of agreement about both the basic principle of the rule of law and many of the elements 
that make up the ideal of the rule of law. 
Fuller wrote about what he termed the morality of the law rather than the rule of law.52   However, 
the substance of the morality of the law is what I have termed the ideal of a good legal system under 
the rule of law.  He began by distinguishing between the morality of duty (a minimum standard that 
all must adhere to) and the morality of aspiration (an ideal standard to which all must aspire).  He 
set out eight ways in which a system of law could fail - ‘a total failure in any of these eight directions 
does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a 
legal system at all’.53   This conforms to his morality of duty.  He then set out eight desiderata, things 
which legal systems are exhorted to possess.  This conforms to his morality of aspiration. 
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Fuller did not derive his eight desiderata from the basic principle that everyone is subject to the law.  
Instead he made a normative judgement about what was good and bad about a system of law.  His 
rationale is a practical one - what would the populace think of as elements of a good legal system.  
Although the content of his eight desiderata is sound, they can be criticised for not flowing from a 
single logical source.  His desiderata are mainly about the form of the law rather than its content.  
They are as follows.   
1. There should be general laws by which society is regulated.   
2. Laws should be promulgated. 
3. Laws should generally not be retroactive 
4. Laws should be clear. 
5. Laws should not contradict themselves. 
6. Laws should not require the impossible. 
7. Laws should be relatively constant over time. 
8. There must be congruence between official actions and declared rules. 
For Raz, the basic idea of the rule of law is that ‘people should obey the law and be ruled by it’ and 
that ‘government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it’.54   The rationale behind this is so that 
law is capable of guiding human decisions.  The strength of Raz’s analysis is in his logical derivation of 
principles from this basic idea of the rule of law.  These principles are similar in many ways to Fuller’s 
desiderata, in fact Raz acknowledges the merit of many of Fuller’s desiderata.  His principles are: 
1. Laws should be prospective, open and clear. 
2. Laws should be relatively stable. 
3. Making of laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules. 
4. Independent judiciary. 
5. Observe principles of natural justice in judicial process. 
6. Courts can review implementation of these principles 
7. Courts should be accessible 
8. Independence of police and prosecutors 
Raz is at the ‘thin’ end of the spectrum of conceptions of the rule of law.  He eschews substantive 
rights being included as part of the rule of law.  In fact he says that the rule of law can be 
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‘compatible with gross violations of human rights’.55   It is at this point that I disagree with him for 
two reasons.  Firstly, it seriously devalues the aspirational side of the rule of law if we can point to a 
country like apartheid-era South Africa and say that it is a rule of law compliant country.  Why 
should we aspire to having the rule of law in the UK if it places the UK legal system at the same level 
as a system that grossly violates human rights?  Secondly, the rationale that Raz gives for admiring 
the rule of law is that it respects the ability of humans to make their own decisions.  He says that 
‘respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their 
future’.56   However a legal system that authorises gross human rights violations does not respect 
human dignity.  Taking the South African situation again, a law prohibiting black people from voting 
did not allow them to plan and plot their future save in the farcical way of them ‘deciding’ not to 
vote. Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of South Africa addressed this very question.  He 
argued that, contrary to Raz’s view, apartheid South Africa was not a rule of law state, ‘without a 
substantive content there would be no answer to the criticism, sometimes voiced, that the rule of 
law is “an empty vessel into which law could be poured” ’.57   It is noteworthy that the new South 
African Constitution is founded upon the ‘Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law’ in 
Clause 1. 
1.4.3 Bingham and the rule of law 
Tom Bingham was a leading British judge who acted as Master of the Rolls, Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales and Lord of Appeal in Ordinary.  He died in 2010.   As a judge in the House of 
Lords he gave several key decisions on the rule of law, human rights and the validity of legislation.58  
After retirement as a judge he lectured and wrote on the rule of law and human rights.  The Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, was 
established in his honour. 
Bingham’s theory of the rule of law was set out in his book, The Rule of Law in 2011.59  One of the 
strengths of his analysis is that it reflects the duality of the rule of law.  He sets out the basic 
principle of the rule of law, that everyone is subject to the law.  He then goes further and sets out 
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the ideal of the rule of law, the values that legal systems should reflect.  His selection of eight 
elements comprising the rule of law was derived from legislative and case law precedent, the works 
of other writers, and his own personal choice.  His definition of the rule of law tends more towards 
the thick end of the spectrum and the influences of Fuller, Raz and Dicey (amongst others) are 
obvious. 
There are three reasons why Bingham has been chosen as the cornerstone for this analysis of the 
interaction of the rule of law with legislative drafting.  Firstly, he was a judge as well as being a 
writer.  He had first-hand experience of the importance of legislation, the value of human rights, and 
the practical impact both had upon government and citizens.  He gave several judgements upon the 
content of the rule of law.  Secondly, he wasn’t just any judge, he was one of the most pre-eminent 
judges of his generation.  According to an obituary by Philippe Sands QC he ‘was widely recognised 
as the greatest English judge since the second world war’.60  In the same obituary, Louis Blom-
Cooper agreed that he was the greatest judge of our time and Martin Kettle wrote that he was 
arguably one of the greatest living Englishmen.  Andenas edited a 900 page liber amicorum in his 
honour.61 
Thirdly, the content of his definition of the rule of law is clear and compelling.  It acknowledges the 
duality of the rule of law.  He very effectively synthesized many previous definitions and persuasively 
argued his case.  It is a modern and up to date definition.  His book was aimed at those  
who have heard references to the rule of law, who are inclined to think it sounds like a good 
thing rather than a bad thing, who wonder if it may not be rather important, but who are 
not quite sure what it is all about and would like to make up their minds.62 
The validity of his argument has been recognised by others.  The book itself won the Orwell Prize 
2011 for the best political writing of the year.  In awarding the prize, judge James Naughtie said that 
‘its brilliantly done but perfectly straightforward, and makes its case extraordinarily powerfully’ and 
the other judges said that it was ‘incisive, wise and clear’.63  Its book reviews were consistently 
laudatory.64 
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1.5 Legislative Drafting 
1.5.1 Legislative drafting: turning policy into legislation 
The drafter writes down the words that, upon being enacted by the legislature, become the law.  
Although legislation represents the will of the legislature, it is the drafter who gives that will form 
and shape. Drafters play a key role in what Zamboni calls ‘legalization of politics’, that is ‘the 
subordination of the political discourse to the domain of the legal discourse, and, in particular, its 
legislative format’.65   Legislative drafting involves taking the policy ideas of another and turning 
them into law fit for the statute book.  Drafters are the translators of policy into legislation.  For 
Thornton ‘the proper role of a legislative drafter is to convert a developed legislative policy to 
legislative shape’.66  Although the thrust of this is correct, it is too broad, for ‘legislative shape’ 
simply substitute ‘legislation’.  Jamieson speaks of the ‘transcendental endeavour to translate policy 
into law’ as the essence of drafting legislation.67  Ismail makes the same point saying that drafters 
must express their clients meaning.68  Daintith and Page say that the drafter’s skill lies in ‘translating 
the government’s intentions into legislative form’.69  Carter says that drafters ‘translate the 
Government’s policy into legislation’.70  Bowman drilled deeper into this when he said that ‘the 
drafter’s main and most valuable function is to subject policy ideas to a rigorous intellectual 
analysis’.71  For Bowman, before translating the policy into law, it is necessary to first properly 
analyse the policy.  Lord Thring, the very first First Parliamentary Counsel in the UK took the same 
view over 100 years ago.  His advice was that the Minister should decide on what the principles of 
the Act were, and then instruct the drafter to prepare the Bill in accordance with those principles.72 
The practice in the UK reflects this theory.  In Wales, the job description for the Office of the 
Legislative Counsel states ‘our primary purpose is to give effect to Welsh Government policies by 
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drafting Assembly Acts’.73  The UK drafting office (Office of the Parliamentary Counsel) state that ‘we 
work closely with Departments to translate policy into clear, effective and readable law’.74  In an 
analysis of the work of the OPC, Page finds strong evidence of the role of the drafter in the policy 
process.75  The First Scottish Parliamentary Counsel has said that ‘it is the counsel’s job to draft a Bill 
that meets the policy’.76  The job description for the Office of the Legislative Counsel in Northern 
Ireland simply states that the job is to draft legislation.77 This practice is not peculiar to the UK, for 
example, in New Zealand the policy to law function is also clearly set out: ‘the drafter’s job is to 
produce a draft that gives effect to government policy’.78 
1.5.2 Thornton’s five stages of the drafting process 
Thornton’s five stages of the drafting process79 remains the classic analysis of legislative drafting. 80  
1. Understand the policy proposal 
2. Legally analyse the proposal 
3. Design a legislative plan 
4. Composition and development of the draft law 
5. Scrutiny and development of the draft law 
Drafting ought also to be seen in the larger context of the legislative process.  Before the drafting 
process begins, there will be the policy development process.81  Afterwards, there will be the 
parliamentary process as the Bill goes through the legislature.  For drafters, there are no clear lines 
marking the limits of their functions in the broader process.  They will most likely be involved in 
some fashion in the policy development process, and they will definitely be involved in the 
parliamentary process, amending Bills as they pass through the legislature. 
                                                          
73 Welsh Government, ‘Senior Legislative Counsel (Deputy Director) Welsh Government Job Description and 
Person Specification’. 
74 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-the-parliamentary-counsel> accessed 11/9/2013. 
75 Edward Page, ‘Their Word Is Law: Parliamentary Counsel and Creative Policy Analysis’ [2009] Public Law 790. 
See also Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, ‘Role of United Kingdom Counsel in Relation to Policy-Making’ 
[2009] CALC Newsletter 39. 
76 Colin Wilson, ‘Managing Increasing Government Expectations with Respect to Legislation While Maintaining 
Quality’ [2009] The Loophole 21, 22. 
77 Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister, ‘Candidate Information Booklet: First Legislative 
Counsel Office of the Legislative Counsel Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister’. 
78 Parliamentary Counsel Office, ‘Guide to Working with the Parliamentary Counsel Office’. 
79 Thornton and Xanthaki (n 66). 145-202. 
80 The five stages are ubiquitous in much writing about legislative drafting.  For example, in a special (2012) 
edition of the European Journal of Law Reform on legislative drafting, six out of the nine articles referred to 
Thornton, and four referred specifically to Thornton’s five stages.  
81 Comptroller and Auditor General, Modern Policy-Making: Ensuring Policies Deliver Value for Money 
(National Audit Office 2001). 
27 
 
 
1.5.3 Broader role of legislative counsel 
The essence of drafting is to convert policy into legislation, but that is not all that drafters do.  They 
have a broader role of being legislative counsel - advising on legislation.  Before exploring this, it is 
important to say what they are not. 
Crabbe argues, perhaps rather tongue in cheek that drafting has an ancient lineage and may even be 
divinely inspired.82  Schulz states that in Roman times the people who actually wrote the law (the 
drafters of that era) were called scribae.83  In modern ears, a scribe is a lowly profession, implying 
one who simply copies work from one manuscript to another.  Schulz makes it clear that the Roman 
drafters were not simply copyists (he uses the word librarii).  Crabbe makes exactly the same point 
with regards to modern drafters.  They are not simply amanuensis - persons employed to type out 
the words others dictate.84  Drafters do not simply write down what the legislature say.  They don’t 
copy text from a policy document and put ‘be it enacted’ at the top. 
A step up from being a scribe is the function of wordsmith, someone skilled in the craft of working 
with words.  Consecutive articles in The Loophole discuss whether drafters are wordsmiths.  Hull 
objects to drafters being characterised in this fashion.85  He sees this as a pejorative term to describe 
someone who merely writes out at the dictation of others.  However, Laws, a former First 
Parliamentary Counsel in the UK is happy for the function of wordsmith to be included within the 
parameters of legislative drafting - drafters are wordsmiths because they are crafters who work with 
words.86  Laws made it clear elsewhere that drafters ‘are not just wordsmiths; they are also counsel, 
who advise the instructing department on a whole range of matters’.87  McNair also argues that 
drafters are more than scribes and wordsmiths.88 
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The term that best reflects what drafters do is legislative counsel.  They don’t just draft, they also 
advise.  Carter says that ‘counsel can question and advise’.89 Jamieson’s article is entitled ‘Would a 
Parliamentary Counsel by any other name be more of a Law Draftsman?’.90  His conclusion is that 
they are both counsel and legislative draftsmen.  Legislative counsel do not simply regurgitate in 
legislative form the policy requests of their political masters.  They interrogate the policy, perhaps 
even improving upon it.  They advise on parliamentary procedure and tactics.  They question the 
need for the legislation in the first place.  Tsukahara Bokuden was famed for defeating opponents 
without drawing his sword.  He practiced munekatsu-ryu ‘the style that wins without the sword’.91  
Sometimes legislative counsel can win by not drafting legislation.  Greenberg argues that drafters 
should be paid for inactivity, not activity.92  Although he is being somewhat facetious, his point is a 
good one.  Characterising the job as simply ‘drafting’ makes the focus the volume of output.  
However as ‘counsel’ it is perfectly acceptable to advise that sometimes the best thing to do is to do 
nothing.  Carter makes the same point, arguing that we shouldn’t see it as a ‘failure’ that a Bill 
doesn’t get made, but a success in that we weed out bad laws before they get onto the statute 
book.93 
Returning to the Romans, Schulz said that the drafters sometimes referred to themselves as iuris 
prudentes.94  One translation of this is those wise in the law.  The etymological link to jurisprudence 
is clear.  Legislative counsel don’t simply draft legislation, they advise, in the fullest sense, on 
legislation. 
How hard is it to be a drafter?  According to Bentham, ‘to draw up laws is of all the literary tasks the 
easiest’.95  However, the context of this remark may show it in a light more favourable to drafters.  
Firstly, Bentham was comparing the drafting of laws with an explanation of the rationale behind the 
laws.  In his view, every single legislative provision should be directly tied to a written policy 
justification for it.  Secondly, Bentham wrote this statement in a letter to James Madison, US 
president, extolling his own virtues and proposing he (Bentham) be appointed as the drafter of a 
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complete set of US laws.  In his desire to promote his own abilities, he may have exaggerated how 
easy it is to draft.  Duxbury argued that the word ‘drafting’ indicates a rather dull and technical job.96 
Drafting is not easy.  This view is shared by Jamieson, although he perhaps exaggerates in the other 
direction to Bentham when he said ‘the vocation of parliamentary counsel requires great strength of 
personality, intellect, education, and experience besides physical stamina and health’.97  Bowman 
spoke of the ‘real effort that the job entails’.98  Ismail’s interesting conclusion was that although the 
job was difficult, it didn’t always need to be done by a lawyer.99 
1.5.4 Drafting as art, science or phronesis 
There has been a debate on how to characterise legislative drafting.  Is it an art or a science?  I have 
argued previously that this debate leads to an intellectual dead end.100  This is because the 
classification of drafting does not lead to any useful conclusions on how to carry out drafting.  
However, the debate is useful in illustrating how drafting is conceived of, and for that reason it is 
summarised here. 
In the drafting context, the traditional view is that art is subjective, creative and flexible, whereas 
science is objective, fixed and certain.  Viewed as art, drafting is innovative and should not be bound 
by stifling rules.  Watson describes artistic culture as ‘creative, imaginative, intuitive and instinctive 
knowledge’.101  Bowman entitled his article ‘The Art of Legislative Drafting’ and states that ‘the 
composition of legislation has little of the mechanical about it’.102  Viewed as science, drafting is a 
technical skill which is reducible to a body of rules.  A Canadian editorial stated that ‘statute drafting 
is a science ... intrusted [sic] to the hands of those who are skilled in such work’.103  Piris also argues 
that drafting is at least part science.104  Crabbe argued that it is a discipline.105 
Markman backs away from strait-jacketing drafting into one or another classification.  She exhorts us 
to ‘see the profession in all its dimensions’.106  Ismail blurs the boundaries by calling drafting a 
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‘technical art’.107  Karpen has a foot in both camps, he talks about legisprudence as a practical 
science which also deals with handicraft or art.108   Xanthaki also eschews an art / science dichotomy.  
She finds assistance in the Aristotelian concept of phronesis and describes drafting as ‘informed yet 
subjective application of principles on set circumstances’.109  The useful, if unsurprising conclusion 
that can be drawn from the entrails of the art / science debate is that drafting has some aspects that 
are artistic and some that are scientific.   
It is best not to be dogmatic about the precise classification of drafting.  It has both creative and 
technical aspects.  Xanthaki’s description of it as phronesis is superior as it recognises the many 
dimensions of drafting. 
1.6 Principles of legislative drafting 
The goal of this thesis is to derive legislative drafting principles from the rule of law.  These drafting 
principles are what Zamboni has called the internal quality of legislation, its technical or drafting 
qualities.110  Duprat calls these instead ‘formal legistics’ although he sees these as being the same as 
drafting techniques.111  Although principles derived from the rule of law has not been done before, 
there do exist drafting principles from other sources.  An analysis of these sets the context in which 
this thesis operates.  Furthermore, there may be an overlap between the existing drafting principles 
and those derived from the rule of law.  In fact, if there is a correlation between the principles, it 
further adds to the legitimacy of those principles as they will have been justified from more than one 
perspective. 
As with the rule of law, there are many different approaches as to what constitute the principles of 
sound legislative drafting.  As with the rule of law, there is no consensus on what the principles are.  
As with the rule of law, there is a remarkable degree of overlap between the principles put forward 
by different writers.  However, unlike the rule of law, there has been little academic discourse of the 
principles of legislative drafting.  Sitting within the general subject heading of legisprudence, 
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legislative drafting is seen more as a technical skill rather than something that deserves academic 
investigation.  One purpose of this thesis is to remedy this inattention and to provide evidence for 
Xanthaki’s assertion that we are witnessing the birth of legislative drafting as a new academic sub-
discipline.112 
Most of the principles set out below are practical and pragmatic rather than being reasoned out 
from an underlying rationale.  The principles have been put forward by drafters themselves based 
upon their own experiences.  The exception to this is Xanthaki whose principles are all derived from 
the functional rationale that legislation exists to effect social change. 
The phrase ‘principles of legislative drafting’ rather than ‘rules of legislative drafting’ is deliberate.  
Principles represent suggestions or guidance.  They are something which ought to be borne in mind, 
but not something which requires dogmatic adherence to.  Rules are something absolute which 
must not be broken.  Drafting has more of the creative than the technical to it.  Being strait-jacketed 
into rules tends to stymie drafting and retard its development.   
For a profession whose job it is to write rules, drafters in the UK are surprisingly anarchic when it 
comes to rules for their own profession. For a long time, there were no drafting manuals in the 
UK.113 However, Parliamentary Counsel Office has recently produced what it calls Drafting 
Guidance.114  According to Greenberg, ‘the only drafting matter on which it is wise to be dogmatic is 
that it is unwise to be dogmatic on any drafting matter’,115 although this advice is normally 
shortened to a statement that the first rule of legislative drafting is that there are no rules of 
legislative drafting.  Even though Thring framed ‘rules’ for drafting, he said that each rule had so 
many exceptions that the rules should instead be seen as something which assists drafters rather 
than absolute requirements.116 
1.6.1 Bentham 
Even though he is not considered a drafter, Bentham’s works offer lucid principles for legislative 
drafting.  In Ogden’s introduction to Bentham’s Theory of Legislation he stated that uniform and 
scientific methods for drafting were inspired by Bentham.117  In his letter to James Madison, 
Bentham himself wrote that when it comes to the form of law, the goal was cognoscibility – the 
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quality of being understandable.118  He delved deeper and produced a sound rationale for his 
guiding principle of cognoscibility.  This is the fundamental rationale of maximising adherence to 
the law, or as he put it ‘producing, to the greatest extent possible, in respect of number of 
observances compared with the number of non-observances’.119  This is a pragmatic approach – 
if we want the law to be obeyed then we must make it understandable. 
In a letter of 1817,120 Bentham derives some principles from his first principle of cognoscibility.  
He cites the following properties which are desirable in a body of laws: 
1. notoriety 
2. conciseness (in terms of bulk) 
3. clearness of language 
4. compactness (of form) 
5. completeness / comprehensiveness 
6. intrinsic usefulness 
7. justifiedness / manifested usefulness 
 
Bentham uses the word notoriety in the sense that the law must be well-known ‘only in so far as it 
is present to the mind, can any idea be productive of any effect’.121  The reference to 
justifiedness is a reference to his idea that each legislative provision should be accompanied by 
a statement justifying it. 
1.6.2 Xanthaki 
Xanthaki sets out a hierarchy of principles (in the form of a pyramid) for quality in legislation.122  
The top of the pyramid is the principle that the law is efficacious, by which she means that it 
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must solve the social problem that it aims at.  Zamboni123 and Mousmouti124 both echo this, 
seeing effectiveness as a key criterion of quality in legislation, by which they mean the capacity 
of the legislation to produce the social results desired by the political actors.  Efficaciousness is 
aimed more at those creating the policy rather than the drafters themselves.  Those 
constructing the policy come up with the solution to the problem: the drafter works with 
whatever solution they have decided upon and puts that solution into legislative form.   
The next level down is that the law must be effective in that it gives full effect to the intended 
policy.  This is within the bailiwick of the drafter’s responsibilities.  It flows from the function of 
the drafter of converting policy into legislation.  The next level down contains three entries: the 
law must be clear, precise and unambiguous.  Clarity means that citizens can easily understand 
the law.  Precision means that the law is exact rather than vague.  Unambiguity means that the 
law can only admit to one meaning.  The bottom level contains two entries.  The first is that the 
law must be written in gender neutral terms i.e. that it doesn’t refer to any particular gender.  
The second is that the law is written in accordance with the principles of the plain language 
movement.  Each level in Xanthaki’s hierarchy is subservient to the level above it.  Thus, if there 
is a clash between using plain language and being precise, then precision wins out. 
Xanthaki’s analysis has three main strengths.  Firstly, like Bentham, there is a rationale 
underpinning it.  She proceeds on the logical basis that the purpose of legislation is to effect 
social change, ‘a good law is simply a law that is capable of achieving the regulatory reform that 
it was released to effectuate or support’.125  She puts this another way saying that  
A good law is one that is capable of leading to efficacy of regulation.  There is nothing 
technical at this level of qualitative functionality: what counts is the ability of the law to 
achieve the reforms requested by the policy officers.126   
From this can be derived drafting principles that make it more likely that social change will be 
effected.  Her principles flow from this initial proposition.  This is soundly rooted in both practice 
and principle.  Legislation is not simply window-dressing; it is there to do something, to change 
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something in society.  It is eminently sensible to derive principles for evaluating quality 
legislation from the rationale behind that legislation. 
Secondly, her hierarchy is simple, coherent and comprehensive.   It is simple because it is easy 
to understand.  It is coherent as it makes sense as a whole.  Subject to what is said below, it is 
comprehensive as it covers the full spectrum of what amounts to quality in legislation. 
Thirdly, the individual elements making up the hierarchy are soundly rooted in what others see 
as important criteria for quality legislation.  Those who have written about quality in legislation 
in the past will find many of their individual ideas reflected in the hierarchy.  Thus, Bennion127 
and Butt128 both advocated clarity in drafting.  The Renton report argued strongly for certainty 
and precision.129  Kimble130 and Thomas131 were of the opinion that plain language should be 
used in legislation.  Schweikart132 and Petersson133 were in favour of gender neutral drafting.  
Xanthaki summarises and synthesizes much of what is already regarded as important in drafting. 
However, there is a gap in this approach as there is a lack of an express normative element 
which is exogenous to legislative drafting.  So Xanthaki does see efficaciousness as a moral 
virtue, but this is an endogenous virtue as it relates to drafting itself.  Most of what she says is 
about the form of laws, without much focus on their content.  Carter has a similar view, arguing 
that a law can still be of a high quality even if it implements a defective policy.134 I disagree and 
see this as a criticism which could be levelled generally at any functional approach.  A law 
imposing the death penalty for parking offences may ‘work’ in the sense that it stops people 
from parking where they shouldn’t park, but its disproportionality makes it morally wrong.  
Xanthaki’s drafting principles do not require, for example, that laws be constitutional, or protect 
human rights, or be in accordance with the rule of law (although this could be seen as implicit 
within the notion of effectiveness).  The only normative aspiration is gender equality under 
gender neutral drafting.  It seems odd that drafting should promote gender equality, but not 
other sorts of equality.  The functional approach lacks a moral dimension, it doesn’t matter to 
what purpose the law is directed, only that it is effective in fulfilling that purpose.  A knife which 
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is sharp is a good knife, regardless of whether it is used to chop vegetables or stab people.  A 
law which is effective is a good law, regardless of whether it remedies some social ill or is an 
instrument of oppression. 
This normative lacuna is analogous to the ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law.  In my view, both 
these approaches are missing something as they fail to include a moral dimension within the 
law. 
1.6.3 UK drafters 
It would be wrong to say that there is an agreed single set of drafting principles to which all UK 
drafters adhere.  Instead, individual drafters (and drafting offices) have on occasion set down 
some suggestions on how drafters should draft and what qualities legislation should aspire to. 
Henry Thring, the first First Parliamentary Counsel in the UK offered guidance to drafters in his 
book Practical Legislation.135  As its title suggests, this is a practical rather than a theoretical 
work.  Thring does not set out general principles underlying the concept of drafting, instead he 
gives concrete advice on how to construct legislation.  However, by closely analysing his 
concrete suggestions, it is possible to derive some more general principles.  Thus, he says that 
legislation must be concise,136 that it must be clear,137 brief138 and uniform.139  He quotes with 
approval a comment made by Mr Justice Stephen 
it is not enough to attain to a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith 
can understand; but it is necessary to attain, if possible, to a degree of precision which a 
person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand.140 
His more specific and concrete advice was: 
 Separate provisions declaring the law from administrative provisions. 
 Simpler provisions should precede more complex ones. 
 Separate principal provisions from subordinate ones. 
 Local or temporary provisions should be separated and placed at the end. 
 Procedural issues and points of detail should be contained in a schedule. 
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Thring notes the influence of Coode on his work.  Coode’s book expresses similar advice on the 
construction of legislation, without delving much into general principles.141 
Bowman, a much more recent First Parliamentary Counsel in the UK set out his approach to 
drafting.142  He summed up his drafting philosophy very simply: first decide what you want to say, 
second, say it. He also was of the opinion that legislation should be precise, clear and simple.  He 
made some general observations: consider the target audience for the legislation, use short 
sentences, express things in the positive not negative, use active not passive voice etc.  However, he 
was adamant that these were not rules and that their application was a matter of judgement and 
degree. 
The Good Law initiative is an attempt by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to improve the 
quality of legislation in the UK.  According to its website, good law is law which is necessary, clear, 
coherent, effective and accessible.143  In its report on complexity in legislation, OPC set out a few 
additional matters which could be regarded as criteria for quality in legislation, for example that it is 
in harmony with other legislation, or that it achieves political, social or legal objectives.144 
In Scotland, the First Parliamentary Counsel spoke of the need for the ‘logical and principled 
development of the law’145 and the ‘coherence of the statute book’.146  He also argued that 
legislation should be clear, unambiguous and accessible.147  On its website, the Office of the Scottish 
Parliamentary Counsel reiterates these points calling for effective, clearly-drafted and accessible 
law.148 
There is a clear overlap between these principles espoused by UK drafters.  The same principles re-
appear: clarity, brevity, accessibility, precision etc.  These principles also mirror those espoused by 
Bentham and Xanthaki. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the groundwork for the rest of the thesis.  The rule of law is both the principle 
that we are all subject to the law, as well as being the ideal set of values which a legal system ought 
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to possess.  Legislative drafting is turning policy into legislation.  The goal is to derive principles of 
legislative drafting from element one of Bingham’s definition of the rule of law.  Our starting point, 
from Bingham, is that legislation ought to be accessible, predictable, intelligible and clear.  The 
following chapters address each of these aspects of element one in turn.   
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Chapter 2 Accessibility 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 set out the hypothesis and methodology.  This is the first substantive chapter and applies 
the methodology to the first aspect of Bingham’s element one of the rule of law.  Element one 
states: 
Law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable. 
This chapter examines accessibility of the law. Accessibility means the citizen can physically get the 
legislation, can find it, can read it.149  Accessibility can also be taken to include the ability to 
understand the thing being accessed, but I consider this under the separate heading of intelligibility 
in Chapter 4.   
Part 1 examines more closely what Bingham said and compares this with the views of other writers 
on the rule of law.  Part 2 looks to see the drafting principles that we can derive from the starting 
point of a need for accessibility.  Three main principles are derived.  Firstly, that legislation must be 
available to users.  Secondly, that legislation must be navigable in the sense that the users can easily 
find their way around the statute book.  Thirdly, that legislation must be inclusive of all important 
relevant material. 
Part 1 The Theory of Accessibility 
2.1 The Importance of Accessibility 
Bingham argued that all law (including case law and legislation) must be accessible to citizens.  He 
didn’t deconstruct “accessibility” into its component parts; he simply used it in its ordinary sense of 
citizens being able to get their hands on the law.  He advanced three reasons why law should be 
accessible.150  Firstly, you need to know in advance what the criminal law is in order to avoid being 
prosecuted for your actions.  Secondly, in the civil field, you cannot claim rights or perform 
obligations if you don’t know what these rights and obligations are. Thirdly, a successful commercial 
environment is enhanced if there are accessible legal rules governing commercial relations.  Roznai 
argued that accessibility ‘inherently derives from the rule of law’.151 
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In Locke’s Commonwealth, it is vital that laws are promulgated.  By this he meant that they should 
be officially made, proclaimed and disseminated to citizens. So, he says that the supreme authority 
‘cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense 
justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorised 
judges’.152  He reiterates this point by stating that there must be ‘declared laws’, 153 ‘settled standing 
laws’,154 ‘declared and received laws’155 and ‘established and promulgated laws’.156  As justification 
for this he advanced Bingham’s argument ‘that both people may know their duty, and be safe and 
secure within the limits of the law’.157   
Although Locke published this in 1689, even then, this principle was not new.  Allen stated that 30 
years earlier, Thomas Hobbes ‘waxed indignant at the difficulties which confronted the layman in 
ascertaining the law, and he contended that there ought to be as many copies of statutes abroad as 
the Bible’.158   
Desideratum 2 for Fuller is ‘a formalized standard of promulgation’159 of laws.  This is the only one of 
Fuller’s desiderata where the morality of duty is the same as the morality of aspiration – i.e. the 
minimum standard is that all laws must be promulgated.  Fuller stated that there ought to be a legal 
duty to publish law in a specified manner in a specified time frame.  Fuller was a realist and stated 
that ‘the requirement that laws be published does not rest on any such absurdity as an expectation 
that the dutiful citizen will sit down and read them all’.160  Even though most citizens won’t read 
legislation, Fuller argued that the ones most directly affected by it (or the opinion formers) will read 
it.   
Raz dealt with this point very briefly in his principles about the rule of law.  Under principle 1 he 
stated that ‘the law must be open and adequately publicised’.161  This is for the rather obvious 
reason that if the law isn’t accessible, it can’t guide human behaviour. 
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The World Justice Report requires law to be ‘clear, publicised, stable and fair’162 and this is tied 
directly to assessing how well a country is heeding the rule of law.  Waldron states that law should 
be promulgated,163 although for Roznai access means more than simply promulgating the law.164 For 
Upham, in order for the law to be effective, people need to be able to understand it and it must be 
accessible.165  Stevenson included accessibility as one of the ‘vital components of legal systems and 
of substantive laws for centuries’.166  In the course of examining European approaches to legislation, 
Donelan stated that ‘for a legal system to be credible, legislation must be accessible’.167  The SIGMA 
initiative reinforces this point for Europe – ‘a principal aim of legislation is to enable those affected 
by it to organise and regulate their activities in accordance with its normative requirements … ready 
access to that legislation is a necessary concomitant’.168  Cass argued that if a legal rule was 
applicable to persons it must be ‘reasonably accessible to those persons’.169  The European Court of 
Human Rights stated that ‘the law must be adequately accessible’.170 
The Venice Commission took the view that in order to attain legal certainty ‘the state must make the 
text of the law easily accessible’.171 Relating accessibility directly to the rule of law, Greenberg stated 
that ‘accessibility is at the heart of the efficacy of the rule of law’.172  Duprat stated that formal 
legistics (meaning legislative drafting techniques) ‘aims to make legislation more accessible to the 
public’.173 
Marsh-Smith, writing as a legislative drafter in the Isle of Man stated that ‘access to the law is a basic 
right’174 – this was in the context of creating a new system for electronic access to legislation.  The 
courts in Canada take the same view ‘to bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has no 
means of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny’.175   Canadian drafter Keyes agrees, ‘if the law is to 
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command respect and function as it is intended, it must be adequately promulgated’.176  Bing also 
argues in favour of free access to law and cites yet more writers who back this proposition.177 In 
Australia, Lord Justice Brooke called for ‘access to all, free of charge, to our case law and statutes’.178  
The New Zealand Law Commission stated that ‘one aspect of the rule of law is to ensure Acts of 
Parliament are accessible and available’.179 
If even Hobbes is seen as too modern, then consider what has been said about Caligula.  Millennia 
ago Suetonius wrote the following of Caligula’s laws 
These taxes being imposed, but the act by which they were levied never submitted to public 
inspection, great grievances were experienced from the want of sufficient knowledge of the 
law.  At length, on the urgent demands of the Roman people, he published the law, but it 
was written in a very small hand and posted up in a corner so that no one could make a copy 
of it.180  
2.1.1 Accessibility in the UK 
In the UK there is a slightly schizophrenic attitude to accessibility of legislation.  On the positive side, 
certainly in modern times, it is strongly endorsed.  On the negative side, legislation which is difficult 
or even impossible to access is still valid. 
Dealing with the positive side first, the Welsh drafters regard accessibility as crucial with Hughes and 
Davies strongly supporting additional resources being made available in order that the public may 
have access to up to date versions of Welsh legislation.181  The head of Legislation Services in the UK 
government has directly quoted Bingham’s element 1 before going on to state that ‘the principle of 
free public access to the law underpins legislation.gov.uk and the work of the Legislation Services 
team at The National Archives.’182  The High Court has spoken of the ‘constitutional imperative that 
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statute law be made known.’183  The courts have directly tied this requirement to the rule of law ‘the 
acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before committing 
himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences 
that will flow from it’.184  Lord Renton produced the highly influential Report on the Preparation of 
Legislation in 1975.185  In Chapter XVI Renton discussed how computers would help and in that 
context made some recommendations about access to legislation.  He was in favour of a searchable 
database of legislation which contained copies of the law as enacted and the law as amended.    
Greenberg says that ‘it is of enormous importance that laws are made accessible to the public as 
soon as possible’.186  The Law Commission considered the importance of access to legislation in its 
report on post-legislative scrutiny.187  After discussing the difficulty with reading out of date 
legislation, particularly subordinate legislation, they made two recommendations. Firstly, that 
consolidated subordinate legislation be available rather than requiring users to try to manually piece 
together amendments themselves.188  Secondly, ‘that steps should be taken to ensure that the 
related provisions of primary and secondary legislation should be capable of being accessed in a 
coherent fashion by a straightforward and freely available electronic search’.189 
The government’s response came in 2008.190  They saw the benefit of consolidation, but were 
concerned about the cost. With regards to electronic access, they discussed the Statute Law 
Database (the forerunner of the system now provided by The National Archives). They went on to 
say ‘the aim has been to present legislation in the most accessible and useable way, whilst 
maintaining the traditional strengths of immediacy and accuracy’.191 
Within Parliament, the critical importance of access to legislation has not been gainsaid. The House 
of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee carried out an inquiry into the quality of 
legislation.  In the course of giving evidence to that Committee, Sir David Lloyd Jones stated that ‘it is 
fundamental that legislation, that the law in general, should be accessible and intelligible’.192  One of 
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the Committee’s recommendations was a Draft Code of Legislative Standards.193  One element of 
this Code was that legislation should be accessible. The Leader of the House of Lords has stated that, 
 All Acts are published simultaneously on the Internet and in print as soon as possible after 
Royal Assent. It is important to ensure that an accurate approved text is published and that 
all users have access at the same time to the same text.194  
The Select Committee on European Scrutiny, in its Fifteenth Report welcomed ‘access to legislation 
in a variety of databases’ (although this was in terms of European legislation).195  In a memorandum 
to the Select Committee on the Constitution, Michael Ryle, former Clerk of Committees and 
Secretary of the Hansard Society Commission said that the publication of statute law and the Statute 
Law Database were constitutionally significant. 196 
However, the negative side is highlighted by two rules.  The first is that, in the UK, ignorance of the 
law is no defence.  The fact that a citizen doesn’t know the law is not an excuse for failing to observe 
the law (this principle is common in many jurisdictions).  The second is that legislation is valid (and 
may therefore be binding) as soon as it is made.  Therefore a person may be liable under an Act 
which has not yet been published, an Act which it would be impossible for the citizen to access.  The 
justification for this rather unfair rule is set out by Austin.  It is that every citizen is present in 
Parliament by dint of being represented there by their Member of Parliament. So, the printing of the 
statute isn’t telling a citizen something new, it merely refreshes the citizen’s memory.  Thus ‘for 
before an Act is printed, and whether it is printed or not, it is a statute and is legally binding’.197  The 
Court of Appeal found itself bound to hold this statement to be true, ruling that ‘it is beyond 
argument that an Act of Parliament takes legal effect on the giving of Royal Assent, irrespective of 
publication’.198  Allen ‘doubted whether many substantial hardships result from this’.199  This is 
because ‘most people become acquainted with the elements of the statutory or Common Law which 
affect them specially in their particular vocation or circumstance’.200 
Very rarely, legislation comes into operation in advance of publication. One recent example is the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.  It received Royal Assent on 7 November 2002 and s. 
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115 of that Act came into force immediately.  However, it wasn’t actually printed until 28 November 
2002.  The Court of Appeal, with considerable unease, ruled that s. 115 applied from the 7 
November 2002. 201 Contrast this with the decision by the European Court in Skoma-Lux sro v Celní 
ředitelství Olomouc202  that EU legislation is only enforceable against individuals if it has been 
properly published.   
Cabinet Office guidance is that an Act must be published online ‘immediately after the approved text 
has been received from the Lords Public Bill Office’. 203 However,  
Where an Act cannot be published before it takes practical effect, the department should 
seek to disseminate the final text of the relevant sections to those most interested, or their 
representatives.204  
Although this makes a gesture towards accessibility, the quality of that access will invariably be poor. 
2.1.2 Accessibility in the UK – Prerogative Legislation 
I have previously considered accessibility of a very particular subset of UK legislation – legislation 
made under the Royal Prerogative.205   In investigating prerogative legislation relating to British 
Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), I concluded that, despite the views set out above on the importance 
of access, this legislation was not accessible.  Tomkins criticised it as ‘unaccountable, indeed wholly 
secret rule-making’.206   
It could be thought that the lack of official promulgation of BIOT legislation is accidental.  However, 
it is clear that official government policy is to make it inaccessible.  The Secretary of State sent a 
confidential telegram to the Governor of the Seychelles on the subject of some of this legislation.  In 
paragraph 3 he stated ‘our concern is that publication of Ordinance and any regulations thereunder 
should be limited to minimum by law so as to attract as little attention as possible’.207  The Governor 
responded ‘Ordinance would be published in BIOT Gazette which has only very limited circulation 
                                                          
201 ZL and VL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 25.  For an example of legislation 
which was relied upon even though it was repealed, see R v Chambers where the mistake was only caught at 
the last minute and the court complained that ‘there is no comprehensive statute law database with 
hyperlinks which would enable an intelligent person, by using a search engine, to find out all the legislation on 
a subject’, [2008] EWCA Crim 2467 [28]. 
202 ECR 2007, p. I-10841. 
203 Cabinet Office, Guide to Making Legislation (2013). 
204 ibid. 
205 Ronan Cormacain, ‘Prerogative Legislation as the Paradigm of Bad Law-Making: The Chagos Islands’ (2013) 
39 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 487.  
206 Tomkins, 573. 
207 Telegram of 22/12/1970. 
45 
 
both here and overseas after signature by Commissioner.  Publicity will therefore be minimal’.208  So, 
in limited cases in the UK, inaccessibility is a deliberate policy. 
2.2 Difficulties with providing (electronic) access to legislation209 
2.2.1 Cost 
Hicks gave a presentation designed to assist drafting offices from around the world with purchasing 
electronic legislation systems.210  The most basic system would cost between $60,000 and $120,000 
and would not include a website. In his view, a system which included a website and a way of 
updating legislation on that website would cost between $120,000 and $3,000,000. In Northern 
Ireland, the tender documentation for a system for drafting, printing and amending primary 
legislation suggested a contract price of £410,000.211 It is possible to have a cheaper system. 
According to Marsh-Smith, the Isle of Man is currently developing a system with a target budget of 
£60,000.212  Cost objections to a new legislation system can be short-sighted. A modern system can 
provide large financial benefits. The direct financial benefits can quickly recoup the cost of the 
financial outlay.  
2.2.2 Volume 
Legislation needn’t be voluminous, but the modern practice tends towards verbosity. Dhavan argued 
that part of the problem was a prolific Parliament producing too many laws.213  Margaret Thatcher 
stated that the opportunities for judges criticising prolix legislation were ‘increasingly rare’ due to 
the fulfilment of Renton’s recommendations.214   Regrettably this has turned out to be a Panglossian 
prediction. The 2011 annual volumes of UK primary legislation run to 2,789 pages. The 2008 volumes 
of secondary legislation run to 10,818 pages. The House of Commons Library prepared a briefing 
note entitled ‘Acts and Statutory Instruments: the Volume of UK legislation 1950 to 2012’.215  The 
results from this detailed statistical analysis show that the figures cited above are, if anything, below 
the average annual page output of the last 10 years. The government’s own drafters agree, citing 
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volume as a cause of complexity in legislation.216  The vast tidal wave of legislation enacted every 
year makes it difficult to access the specific legislative provision required.  Spencer refers to it as 
‘binge law-making’,217 and for Karpen one goal of legisprudence is to reduce the quantity of 
legislation.218 
2.2.3 Interconnectedness 
As the current First Parliamentary Counsel put it, we have ‘an intricate web of laws’.219   An excellent 
visual representation of this is available online which shows the legal interactions of one statute with 
other statutes.220   It is rare to find a statute that exists in a vacuum, un-connected to any other piece 
of legislation. If a new criminal offence is enacted, it presupposes the existence of a raft of other 
pieces of legislation. It requires other legislation to set out the powers of arrest for that offence, 
rules of court indicating the manner in which the offence can be prosecuted, evidential rules on 
what can be relied upon to prove the offence, sentencing guidelines, prison rules, judicial 
appointment procedures etc.  The more interconnected legislation is, the harder it is to make it fully 
accessible. 
2.2.4 Dynamic legislation 
There isn’t one tidal wave of legislation; there are fresh tidal waves every year. New law is constantly 
changing old law. So a system of accessible laws doesn’t simply have to deal with all the laws in force 
at a particular date, it has to deal with all the new laws as and when they are made. 
At the micro level, although there is a single date upon which a statute is enacted, it regularly comes 
into force on different days. Take for example the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1999: 
 Articles 1, 2, 33, 35, 44 to 47, 53 to 56, 57 (partially), 58 (partially), Sch 5 (partially), Sch 6 
(partially), Sch 7 (partially) came into force on the 25th of July 1997.221 
 Articles 3 to 22, 24 to 32, 34, 36, 37, 48 to 52, Schs 1, 2, 3 and 4 came into force on the 1st of 
January 1998.222 
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 Part III came into force on the 1st of June 1999.223 
Different commencement dates make it more difficult to meaningfully access legislation.  
2.2.5 Authority 
Legislation needs to be authentic and authoritative.  Historically this has meant that laws must be 
published in paper form, or even on vellum as described by Bennion. 224  It should be noted that 
‘paper’ is not synonymous with ‘authentic’.  The use of correction slips to remedy defects in 
published legislation shows that paper is no guarantee of accuracy. In some ways, a fully auditable 
electronic system provides more guarantees against interference with the content of legislation. 
Some jurisdictions have put electronic systems onto a statutory footing.  The EU adopted Regulation 
216/2013 on electronic publication of the EU Official Journal.  Article 1.2 provides that the Official 
Journal be published electronically and that this electronic publication is authentic and shall produce 
legal effects. As another example, the long title of the Legislation Publication Ordinance in Hong 
Kong reads: 
An Ordinance to provide for the establishment of an electronic database of legislation and 
approval of a website on which the information in the database may be published and 
accessed; to give legal status to copies of the legislation published on an approved website. 
2.2.6 Paper based process 
 The only thing that Parliament passes is the two dimensional page before it. A hypertext link is not 
part of a statute, it is an editorial addition designed to improve accessibility. Although such editorial 
additions can be extremely helpful to users, they do not have democratic legitimacy. What happens 
if a link is wrong? I submit that as Parliament has not assented to the link, it does not form part of 
the law. 
2.2.7 Bilingualism 
There is an additional factor on availability when we consider the UK as a whole – the need for 
bilingual legislation.  Acts of the Welsh Assembly are to be in both English and Welsh, and both texts 
are to be treated as being of equal standing.225  It has also been a long-standing policy goal of some 
political parties in Northern Ireland that there be an Irish Language Act which would make similar 
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provision for Northern Ireland in respect of the Irish language.226  That policy has not resulted in any 
legislation, but the possibility cannot be ignored.   
There are far reaching consequences of a requirement for bilingualism.  The most obvious one is the 
practical one of resources – having the time and personnel available to enact legislation in two 
languages.  Then there are matters of process, whether to simply translate one language into the 
other at various points in the legislative process, or whether instead to co-draft (following the 
Canadian model for French / English legislation).  Then there are the difficulties arising from words 
having different shades of meaning in different languages, meaning that a straight “translation” of 
an English word into a Welsh word may not always work.227  It is beyond the scope of this research 
to advise on the best way to draft and enact bilingual legislation, see instead the analysis of 
Watkin.228  Suffice to say that bilingualism adds another level of difficulty to making legislation 
accessible. 
Part 2 Drafting Principles that Promote Accessibility 
2.3 Availability 
The most basic requirement of accessibility is that legislation is physically available to the user.  The 
New Zealand Law Commission stated that access to legislation had three meanings: availability to 
the public, navigability and clarity.229  Carter described it in this way ‘availability involves provision to 
the public, and especially to users, of hard copies, or copies available electronically’.230  Users need 
to be able to place their hands on the actual paper of the legislation, or be able to read the actual 
words of the legislation on screen.  Availability in the general sense is not a drafting principle – 
drafters cannot themselves print, publish and disseminate legislation.  However, it is included here 
as a drafting principle for two reasons.  Firstly, as it directly touches upon what they do, it is not 
unreasonable to expect drafters to promote availability even if they can’t actually physically deliver 
it.  Secondly, as will be seen below, when availability is deconstructed, it will be seen that some 
aspects of it are actually capable of being implemented by the drafter in the drafting of legislation. 
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2.3.1 Electronic or non-electronic availability  
The primary focus in this chapter is on electronic availability of legislation.  Hard copies of legislation 
remain useful, but electronic availability is more important for several reasons.  Firstly, the hard-
copy can swiftly become out of date as the law is amended.  Secondly, in the information age, 
information is increasingly consumed not just electronically, but online.  Having said this, there is no 
guarantee that electronic is more accurate (or will last) as long as hard copies. 
Gee, Deputy Librarian at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, provides some evidence of this 
second point as it relates to law.  He carried out a study of law libraries from around the world.231  
One of his findings was that the top ambition for university law libraries was to develop and enhance 
their electronic and digital resources.  The mean number of electronic databases in law libraries was 
124 databases, with Westlaw, Lexis and HeinOnline (respectively) the most popular.   
Turning specifically to the UK, Gee also carried out a survey of academic law libraries in the UK.232  
The top free website at those libraries was the website of the British and Irish Legal Information 
Institute at www.baili.org and the second most popular was the official government website on 
legislation at www.legislation.gov.uk.  Both these websites provide electronic access to legislation.  
Anecdotally, Gee states ‘My sense too is that law researchers and legal practitioners are 
overwhelmingly relying on electronic access to legislation nowadays, but I have no hard evidence for 
this.’233  According to Bertlin234 legislation.gov.uk has 2 million separate visitors per month, and 
provides more than 400,000,000 page impressions per year. 
Having said this, there are dangers if legislation is only available electronically.  There are those who, 
for economic reasons, may not be able to afford the technology necessary to look up laws online.  
There will also be those who live in places with limited electronic infrastructure to allow for online 
access.  Finally, some people may have a disability which makes electronic access more challenging. 
2.3.2 What must be available? 
I said above that the drafting principle is that legislation must be available – but what is the exact 
content of this, what is it that must be made available in order to comply with the rule of law?  In my 
view, there are six aspects of availability.  The first four aspects are what Fuller would call the 
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morality of duty – minimum requirements that must be fulfilled.  The final two are morality of 
aspiration – a summit to aim at, although the legislation will still be valid even if it doesn’t crest the 
summit.  I previously developed and published the idea of these aspects and some of the ideas in 
this section come from that article.235 
2.3.3 Aspect 1 – availability of law as enacted 
Legislation must be placed online as soon as it is made. All that is required for this aspect is a 
snapshot of the law as enacted, not how it changes over time. Dilating upon dates, it becomes 
apparent that there is an important nuance between the date a statute is made and the date it 
comes into effect. Although it is important for law to be available as soon as it is made, it is even 
more important for it to be available before it comes into force. 
For example, New Zealand has the Public Access to Legislation project. According to Anthony, the 
key outcomes of the project are:- 
 Free electronic access to up to date legislation. 
 Access to legislation as soon as possible after enactment. 
 Access to updated legislation (i.e. older Acts as amended by later Acts). 
 Access to Bills as they pass through the legislature.236 
There is a quantitative aspect to availability.  If a specific statute or the official legislation website is 
online but doesn’t appear near the top of search rankings, it is less visible to users.  A great website 
that is little known isn’t truly accessible. 
This aspect of availability is something that the drafter can encourage, for example by 
recommending that resources are devoted to the publication of legislation.  It is also something the 
drafter can have a direct effect upon by striving to ensure that commencement dates are sufficiently 
far from the date that legislation is made so that there is time for the law to be published before it 
comes into effect.   
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2.3.4 Aspect 2 – availability of law as amended 
The system needs to keep all legislation up to date (what Benedetto refers to as interventions of 
compilation and consolidation)237. This means that where new legislation amends old legislation, the 
old legislation on screen should fully reflect all those amendments. The system needs to tell users 
what the law is today, as well as what it was when it was enacted.  This is the key aspect of the 
system. If the system cannot tell the citizen what the law is, it has failed. 
There is one specific tool that can be used in this regard in the UK – the Keeling schedule.  I deal with 
the Keeling schedule in chapter 4 under the heading of intelligibility. 
This aspect is complicated by commencement provisions, or more specifically, by the practice of 
different provisions commencing at different times.  In the past, an Act was made and then a 
reasonably short period afterwards it came into force.  Now it is quite common for the 
commencement of an Act to spread out over a long period of time, with different provisions coming 
into force at different times.  This creates an extra level of complexity for users.  In addition to 
tracking what legislation has been enacted over time, they must also track what legislation has been 
brought into force over time. For a bad example, see the Public Services Ombudsperson (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2016.  In section 64 of that Act:  
 subsection (1) lists the provisions coming into force on 1 April 2016,  
 subsection (2) lists provisions coming into force on the day after Royal Assent,  
 subsection (3) lists provisions coming into force on 1 October 2016,  
 subsection (4) the provisions coming into force on 1 April 2017,  
 subsection (5) the provisions coming into force on 1 April 2018 and  
 subsection (6) gives the government the power to commence other provisions on 
different dates. 
 
Each of these subsections is complicated in its own right.  How much simpler for the user (and those 
trying to organise the statute book) if there was a simple statement that “This Act comes into 
operation on 1 April 2016”. 
There are several drafting techniques to address these problems.  Firstly, the drafter can seek to 
confirm that a legislative power sought will actually be used.  There is no point in clogging up the 
statute book with a provision that the government are not sure will ever be brought into force.  For 
example, the Easter Act 1928 has never been commenced.  Secondly, the drafter can encourage a 
simple commencement provision that commences the entire Act in one fell swoop, rather than 
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having it commenced in fits and starts.  Thirdly, the drafter can insert the commencement date on 
the face of the Act. This way the reader will at least know, from reading the Act, when it comes into 
force.  This tool is less necessary as there is now a power to amend legislation to include the actual 
commencement date on the face of it.238  Fourthly, where the government seeks a power to 
commence an Act by future subordinate legislation, a limited rather than extensive power can be 
drafted. For example a power to commence the Act, rather than a power to commence different 
provisions of the Act on different days.  Unfortunately, these are mainly matters of substance of 
legislation and the drafter may not have much power to actually make the final determination on 
these points. 
One problematic issue here is where defective legislation is corrected judicially on the principles set 
out in Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution.239  Although drafting mistakes are obviously to be 
avoided, it is inevitable that they will occasionally occur.  Overt judicial correction of drafting 
mistakes is an established aspect of the UK legal system.  The point here is not to question the limits 
of that power to correct, but to ask what consequences it has for the availability of legislation.  
Correcting a mistake may do justice in the individual case before a judge, but will not serve the 
population as a whole unless they know that the mistake has been corrected.  The reader of the 
statute book will still see the incorrect words used in that statute and will not have an easy way of 
knowing what the judicial correction is.  There is still no indication to the reader of the statute book 
that the words in s. 18(1)(g) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 are to be read with the addition of the 
words added to it by the House of Lords in Inco.  
If a mistake is found in legislation (by a judge or by anyone else), it is incumbent upon the drafter to 
get it rectified in the statute book as soon as possible.  Although a drafter may be embarrassed 
about a long title that includes the phrase ‘An Act to rectify a mistake in [previous legislation]’240  or 
‘correcting a mistake in the repeals effected by [previous legislation]’241 it is still better to correct it 
than to let the mistake fester on the statute book. 
2.3.5 Aspect 3 – law at a point in time 
The system needs to state what the law was at a particular point in time in the past. There will be 
many situations when past legal rights and obligations will be relevant. The Historical Institutional 
Abuse Inquiry is obliged by statute to investigate child abuse in Northern Ireland between 1922 and 
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1995.242  It is a prime example of a situation where it is vital that all legislation in force between 
those times needs to be available. 
It is unrealistic to expect legislation to stay the same forever.  It needs to adapt and change as 
society changes.  In some cases there will be an ‘arms race’ as citizens take action to get around 
rules and then new rules emerge to stop this.  However, there comes a point where frequent 
changes to rules make it virtually impossible to know what the rules are at any point in time.  
Consider the Immigration Rules in the UK.  The table below sets out how many times they have been 
amended in the last 3 full years. 
Year Rules amended on … 
2014 16 October 
 10 July 
 10 June 
 1 April 
 13 March 
 10 March 
2013 18 December 
 10 December 
 9 December 
 ? November (actual date not specified on government website) 
 6 September 
 10 June 
 ? April (actual date not specified on government website) 
 14 March 
 11 March 
 7 February 
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Year Rules amended on … 
 30 January 
2012 20 December 
 12 December 
 22 November 
 5 September 
 9 July 
 ? July (actual date not specified on government website) 
 ? June (actual date not specified on government website) 
 ? April (actual date not specified on government website) 
 15 March 
 19 January 
 
These rules have changed 27 times in three years.  They changed on the 9th, 10th and 18th December 
2013.  This makes it extremely difficult for an ordinary user to know what the law is at a particular 
point in time.  The entire thrust of Yeo’s analysis of immigration legislation is that it doesn’t comply 
with the rule of law.243 
The drafter does have a role to play here.  The drafter cannot simply acquiesce in drafting legislation 
which is so volatile that it makes a mockery out of any attempt by the citizen (or in this case the 
immigrant) to having meaningful access to the legislation.  There comes a point when incontinent 
legislative changes undermine the rule of law and the drafter has to at the very least counsel that 
there needs to be more stability.  Lord Justice Beatson expressed concern over the Immigration 
Rules on this very point.  He stated 
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The detail, the number of documents that have to be consulted, the number of changes in 
rules and policy guidance, and the difficulty advisers face in ascertaining which previous 
version of the rule or guidance applies and obtaining it are real obstacles to achieving 
predictable consistency and restoring public trust in the system, particularly in an area of law 
that lay people and people whose first language is not English need to understand.244 
2.3.6 Aspect 4 – law in a particular geographical area 
The legal jurisdictions in the UK are:  
 England and Wales 
 Scotland 
 Northern Ireland 
 
(This excludes consideration of the Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories.)  Even 
though England and Wales are a single jurisdiction, it is possible to have different laws for England 
and Wales.  Watkin explains this as follows ‘The laws made by the National Assembly extend to 
England and Wales, even though they can apply only in relation to Wales’.245   So the most accurate 
geographical division of legislation in the UK is: 
 
 Law of England and Wales as it applies in England and Wales 
 Law of England and Wales as it applies in Wales 
 Law of England and Wales as it applies in England 
 Law of Scotland 
 Law of Northern Ireland 
 
The rise of devolution has increased the degree of divergence of legislation between these areas.  
This is not simply in terms of where they apply, but also the way in which they apply.  As Watkin 
points out, the devolution statutes are ‘inevitably silent as to how the style of the legislation made at 
Holyrood and Stormont or in Cardiff Bay is to relate to that enacted at Westminster and as to how 
the approach to the drafting of legislation for the devolved legislatures is to develop’.246 This means 
that we have three jurisdictions and five geographical areas in which law can apply.  This does not 
consider experimental / trial legislation.  It also does not consider the expired jurisdictions such as 
legislation that applied throughout the island of Ireland before Northern Ireland was established.247 
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When the procedures for enacting legislation are considered, this becomes even more confusing.  
The Westminster Parliament can pass legislation for all, or any part of the UK.  The Northern Ireland 
Assembly can only pass legislation for Northern Ireland.248  As part of this, for matters within its 
legislative competence, it can amend any UK legislation in so far as it applies in Northern Ireland.  
The National Assembly for Wales can pass legislation for Wales. 249   As part of this, for matters 
within its legislative competence, it can amend any UK legislation in so far as it applies in Wales. For 
matters within its legislative competence, it can also amend the law of England and Wales as it 
applies in England, if that is incidental to amending the law of England and Wales as it applies in 
Wales.250  The Scottish Parliament can only pass legislation for Scotland.251  As part of this, for 
matters within its legislative competence, it can amend any UK legislation in so far as it applies in 
Scotland. 
There is an additional level of complication.  The Secretary of State (for Wales) can make secondary 
legislation, in consequence of legislation made by the National Assembly for Wales, which amends 
the law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (but not Scotland).252  The Queen, by order in 
council, (in effect the Secretary of State (for Northern Ireland)) can make secondary legislation, in 
consequence of legislation made by the Northern Ireland Assembly, which amends the law of any 
part of the UK.253  The Queen, by order in council or a Minister of the Crown can make secondary 
legislation in consequence of legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament (presumably amending 
the law of any part of the UK although this isn’t explicit).254 
The net result of this is that it is hard to ascertain the geographical extent of UK laws.  They may 
apply (or extend) to one or more parts of the UK.  Sometimes they will, on their face, amend the law 
of the UK, but the effect is only to amend the law of the UK in so far as it applies to one particular 
part of the UK.   For example, the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support 
for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 inserted s. 36(9)(d) into the Criminal Justice Act 1988.  
However, even though the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is a UK wide Act, the insertion only exists in 
Northern Ireland.  In England, Scotland and Wales, section 36(9) stops at paragraph (c), only in 
Northern Ireland does it continue to paragraph (d). 
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What does this all mean?  It means that there is no universal text of legislation.  Unlike the speed of 
light, which is constant to all observers, legislation varies depending upon where the observer is 
standing.  Take for example s. 105 of the Children Act 1989.  There is no universal text of s. 105.  In 
fact, it is meaningless to talk of s. 105, there is no such thing.  Instead, there is s. 105 as it applies in 
England, s. 105 as it applies in Scotland and S. 105 as it applies in Wales, but no s. 105 as it applies in 
Northern Ireland.  (Everyone obviously knows that that Children Act 1989 doesn’t extend to 
Northern Ireland, except for the bits which do extend as listed in s. 108(12), and that the relevant 
Northern Ireland legislation is the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995.)  This complication is 
exacerbated by a particular focus on Westminster legislation which leads to consideration of 
devolved legislation being marginalised.255 
A good system of legislation needs to specify to users what the law is in a particular area.  As well as 
the temporal division in aspects 1 to 3, there is also the spatial division in aspect 4. 
At present, there are two main tools used by drafters to demarcate the geographical boundaries of 
legislation: the extent section and the territorial limits of devolved legislatures. 
The extent section is the section in a (Westminster) Act setting out to what parts of the UK the Act 
applies.  Section 60 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides a standard example.  It provides that: 
 Parts 1, 2 and 5 of the Act extend to England and Wales only 
 Section 35 extends to England and Wales only 
 Section 36 extends to Scotland only 
 Section 37 extends to Northern Ireland only 
 Parts 6 and 7 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland256 
 
Each devolved jurisdiction has the territorial limit on its legislative competence set out above.  So for 
example, the Northern Ireland Assembly can only enact legislation for Northern Ireland.  It has no 
competence to enact legislation for any other part of the UK.  This territorial limitation is contained 
in the legislation establishing the devolved legislatures, but it is not stated in the legislation that they 
enact.  So, legislation of devolved legislatures will include “Northern Ireland”, “Scotland” or “Wales” 
in the title, but will not contain an express statement anywhere “this Act only extends to Northern 
Ireland / Scotland / Wales”.    It could therefore be thought that if the geographical name appears in 
the title, the reader will know that the legislation only extends to that area.  Unfortunately, this is 
not so.  An Act may be UK wide even if a particular name appears in the title.  For example, the 
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Corporation Tax (Northern Ireland) Act 2015 forms part of the law of England and Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (it was passed by the Westminster Parliament).  But the Air Passenger Duty 
(Setting of Rate) Act (Northern Ireland) 2012 only forms part of the law of Northern Ireland (it was 
passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly). 
This is all very confusing for the reader.  In order to know if a statute applies in the area they are 
situated in, they need to know about extent clauses, which legislature made the statute and the 
territorial limitations of that legislature.  These are not pieces of information that the casual reader 
of statutes would have access to. 
Two solutions are suggested to remedy this: a presentational one and a drafting one.  The 
presentational solution is one already adopted by the official government website on legislation.  
This is that the legislation is displayed with additional information set out along side it setting out 
geographical extent. This way the reader can see at a glance to which part of the UK it applies.  
Subscription databases such as Westlaw also provide this service. 
The drafting solution is to expressly include the geographical extent of legislation in section, chapter 
or part titles. For example, s. 26ZB of the Children Act 1989 is entitled ‘Representations: further 
consideration (Wales)’ and the cross head before section 79N of that Act is entitled ‘Inspection: 
England’.  This immediately tells the reader what geographical area the legislation is relevant to. 
2.3.7 Aspect 5 – legislation in context 
The system needs to be able to cite these legal provisions in context. If another piece of information 
(legislative or otherwise) would help the reader to understand a law, it would be helpful if the reader 
were made aware of that information. The Interim Woolf Report expressed this aspect as follows: 
Eventually, fully integrated legal information systems will combine legislation, case law and 
specialist commentary, all structured in such a way that users will be able to find their way 
more easily through these materials.257 
There are several elements to this.  Firstly, it means internal links within a statute to other relevant 
parts of that statute. For example, if a rule in s. 5 refers to an exception in s. 10, there could be a 
hypertext link within s. 5 to s. 10. The National Archives and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
carried out research in 2012 /3013 on how users interacted with The National Archives website. 
Bertlin has summarised some of the results of this258  and some of them have been referred to by 
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the Cabinet Office.259  One finding was that users are not familiar with the structure of legislation, for 
example division into sections and schedules. Internal links help overcome lack of familiarity with 
legislative structure.  So if a section refers to a schedule then at a very basic level there could be a 
hypertext link to that schedule. 
Secondly, there could be external links to other statutes that are relevant to the statute being used. 
Most obviously, where primary legislation grants a power to make secondary legislation, there could 
be a link to each statutory instrument made under that power. Also obvious is that where a statute 
refers to another statute, there could be a link to that other statute. External legislative links are 
easier to conceive of where there is a direct textual reference to the provisions of another Act. They 
are much more difficult if there is no textual reference to the other statute but that other statute 
remains fundamentally relevant. 
Take the example of section 203 of the Planning Act (NI) 2011. That section provides for the 
establishment of the Planning Appeals Commission. If the government were to wait until s. 203 
comes into force before appointing members, then there would be a long delay before the 
Commission could hear cases. It might be useful to appoint members in advance, before the section 
becomes operative. The power to make appointments in advance of an enactment coming into force 
already exists and is contained in s. 16 of the Interpretation Act (NI) 1954. Therefore, s. 16 of the 
1954 Act is relevant to s. 203 of the 2011 Act, even though there is no direct textual reference 
connecting the two provisions. 
This requires a certain amount of subjective judgement and is less easy to satisfy automatically. For 
example, if one legislative provision establishes a new legal entity, is it necessary to link it to every 
other section setting out the powers of that entity? 
Thirdly, the legislation could have external links to non-legislative information which is relevant to 
the statute being used. Explanatory Notes are designed to assist the reader in understanding 
legislation, but do not form part of the legislation themselves. Jenkins, former First Parliamentary 
Counsel in the UK, recommended that ‘to make [Explanatory Notes] as widely accessible as possible, 
they would be made available on the internet alongside the Bill and subsequently the Act’.260 
In addition to the non-legislative information suggested by Woolf above, there could also be links to 
Parliamentary debates, official forms, Departmental guidance, House of Commons Library Briefing 
Papers on Bills, etc. Irresberger states that if legislation allows for ‘acceptable means of compliance’, 
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then those means must also be included or linked in some way to the legislation, otherwise 
accessibility is incomplete.261 Watkin lauded the inclusion of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child within a Welsh statute as ‘a reader of the Measure would be able to discover what had been 
incorporated without having to seek out the text of the Convention and Protocols from another 
source’.262  Occasionally, during a debate on a Bill, a Minister won’t be able to answer a point raised 
by a legislator and undertakes to answer the point in a letter at a later date.  Greenberg points out 
that although the promise to write will be contained in the Hansard report, the actual letter won’t. 
He argues that this letter should also be linked, in some way, to the proceedings in Parliament. 263 
There is the potential for different levels of access to this information, i.e. some items restricted for 
internal government use.  
There are two methods for generating these links.  The traditional way is the top-down approach 
where civil servants think through what they consider relevant to an Act and then create the links.  
The more innovative (and riskier) way is to use some Big Data concepts and allow links to be 
influenced by the choices previously made by users.  For example, if people who look at the 
Companies Act 2006 also usually look at the Insolvency Act 1986, then the system could 
automatically suggest that a reader of one also may find the other useful. 
This desirability of making contextual information available is increasingly important with the rise of 
quasi-legislation.264  Quasi legislation is difficult to define, but it is essentially something that can 
have a legal effect without being itself legislation.  Codes of practice, administrative rules, official 
guidance, memorandums of understanding, these are all examples of quasi legislation.  Sometimes 
these may have statutory authority or be referred to in legislation.  They can have a critical effect.  
For example, the codes of practice referred to in the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013 set 
out guidance on how to handle family disputes in cases of organ donation after death.  Accessibility 
of legislation extends to access to this type of relevant material also. 
The court has recognised the importance of additional contextually relevant material. It stated in R 
(Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273 (Admin) that 
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it is in general inconsistent with the constitutional imperative that statute law be made 
known for the government to withhold information about its policy relating to the exercise 
of a power conferred by statute. 
How far this extends is a question of degree.  Official guidance drawn up by government in 
accordance with a statute does seem like precisely the kind of information that should be accessible 
alongside the legislation.  However, what about guidance drawn up by private bodies which is 
referred to in the legislation?  This issue arose in the Dutch Copyright Act.  The Dutch Supreme Court 
ruled that this guidance did not constitute ‘legislation’ and was therefore not subject to the 
copyright provisions that ordinarily applied to legislation.265  Although this decision may be correct in 
the narrow sense that guidance produced by a private body is not legislation, it is submitted that it is 
incorrect if it leads to such guidance being inaccessible.  If it is directly relevant to the law, if it 
colours the way the law is applied, then it ought to be accessible alongside the law. 
Another example is the memorandum of understanding on the role of regulators of financial services 
industry.  Section 3E of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 obliges regulators to prepare a 
memorandum of understanding setting out their role.  This must be given to the Treasury and laid 
before Parliament.  It is clearly an important document, referred to in primary legislation, but it is 
not available alongside that legislation.  This goes against the rule of law requirement of accessibility. 
2.3.8 Aspect 6 – findability 
Morville defined findability in 2005 as follows: 
 The quality of being locatable or navigable. 
 The degree to which a particular object is easy to discover or locate. 
 The degree to which a system or environment supports navigation and retrieval.266 
Lavery used the word in a legal context a long time ago, considering a lawyer with a legal question, 
'somewhere in that vast storehouse of the law is the answer to his problem, but he cannot find it'.267  
For Lavery the problem was the volume of law piling up, making it harder to find the desired nugget 
of legal information. 
This requirement is the hardest to satisfy – the user ought to be able to retrieve the legislative 
answer to their question from the database, even if the user does not know which piece of 
legislation contains the answer. If we start from the proposition that the user knows which section in 
which Act contains the answer to the question, it is relatively easy to design a legislation database 
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which can quickly point to that section in that Act. However, the user may not always know the 
relevant section or indeed the relevant Act. The electronic system needs to facilitate easy access to 
help find the answer. For example, if the police arrest a child in Northern Ireland and decide not to 
release the child on bail, where must the child be placed in detention? The answer is contained in 
Article 39(8) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989. For the system to be effective, it 
must be able to display an accurate and up to date version of Article 39(8). But it must also be able 
to indicate to the user that the answer is contained within Article 39(8). 
Findability flows into the drafting principle of navigability.  Findability means the ability to find a 
particular piece of information whereas navigability relates to the ease of moving around the statute 
book.  The drafting principles assisting findability are discussed below in relation to navigability.  The 
basic concept for the drafter to bear in mind is to make it as easy as possible for the reader to find 
the information they are looking for. 
2.3.9 A fully electronic system? 
The six aspects listed here all have the basic assumption that a human is looking at legislation on the 
official government website.  However, there is the potential for more advanced, computer-assisted 
methods of interaction.  Computers could scan the website for relevant legislative information, 
process it and present it in a different format away from the website.  For example, a business 
providing company formation services could mine companies legislation for relevant provisions to 
reproduce on its own expert advice systems.  This ability would be enhanced by a logical and 
coherent addressing mechanism for storing legislation on the official government website. 
I hesitate before setting this out as aspect 7 – that a legislative system must be fully machine 
readable. However, it is likely to become an increasingly important dimension of electronic access to 
legislation.  The European Union has made recommendations on this point in Council Conclusions 
Inviting the Introduction of the European Legislation Identifier.268   The problem identified by the EU 
is a diversity of electronic legislation systems across the EU – ‘this hampers the interoperability 
between the information systems of national and European institutions’.269  The solution is the 
European Legislation Identifier (ELI), a standardised ‘code’ for referring to legislation.  It attempts to 
standardise Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for legislation.  URIs are essentially methods of 
creating addresses for web pages.  In principle a sound URI taxonomy, combined with adoption of 
ELIs, means that both humans and computers will find it easier to access and use online legislation. 
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2.4 Navigability 
Legislation is more accessible if it is navigable.  By navigable, I mean that the user can easily move 
around legislation, can easily get from one part of it to another.  Thornton sees the benefit if users 
can ‘find their way around the statute without difficulty’.270  (Spencer objects to the premise on 
which this is based – that different criminal law provisions are ‘scattered’ around the statute book 
rather than being in the same place.271)  This is related to findability (the ability to find a relevant 
provision) but also has to do with the structure, the architecture of the legislation.  The closest 
analogy is of mapped and unmapped terrain.  If there is no map, no signposts, no roads, it is very 
difficult for the traveller to get around, or to know the terrain.  By contrast, with a map, good 
signposts and roads, the traveller can easily reach a destination.  Well mapped legislation is more 
navigable and therefore more accessible, it allows ‘users to find their way more easily around the 
statute’.272  Navigability relates to individual statutes as well as to the statute book as a whole, so the 
users must be able to find the statutes they are looking for, as well as the individual provisions 
within those statutes.  In fact, a former First Parliamentary Counsel has adopted this language of 
navigability: 
our legislation, complex as it is, needs a map. Lawyers have been trained in a sort of 
informal, passed-down map that lets you surf the wonderful web that is the statute book. 
But what about non-lawyers?273 
2.4.1 Short titles 
The short title of an Act contributes to the navigability of the statute book by  
a) indicating the content of an Act, and  
b) assisting in the logical ordering of the statute book.   
A title conveys meaning by being short and descriptive. It assists in the arrangement of the statute 
book by tessellation – fitting in harmoniously with what is already there. 
The descriptive aspect of titling legislation is under threat.  The trend seems to be a movement from 
pure description, through to rhetoric as a way of persuading legislators to vote for a Bill, to bare-
faced political sloganeering.  The best short title (in terms of navigability) is the one which is 
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politically neutral and best encapsulates the content of the Act in as pithy a way as possible. Duprat 
calls it ‘a tool indicating the main issue under regulation’.274  Orr charts how in Australian titles have 
become more and more tendentious, observing ‘a loss of descriptiveness in titling in favour of an 
image-conscious and rather cynical form of political rhetoric’.275 The classic US example is the USA 
PATRIOT ACT, which is actually an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.  It is a political argument 
masquerading as a piece of legislation.  Another argument against propagandist titles is that they 
clamp down on proper political debate – how can a true patriot vote against the USA PATRIOT Act?  
Strause sees this as a problem with naming conventions in American statutes, that they bring ‘the 
law, and perhaps the lawmakers, into contempt by seeming too narrowly partisan’.276 
This affliction of propagandist titles is global.  In Australia there was the Roads to Recovery Act 2000 
which is about funding expenditure on roads.  The title was chosen to align with a political slogan 
and is criticised by Orr for being a ‘corny pun’.  In Canada there is the Standing up for Victims of 
White Collar Crime Act which amends the criminal law in respect of sentencing for fraud.  The Roads 
(Funding) Act and the Fraud (Sentencing) Act may have been more appropriate.  In Uganda, 
legislators didn’t like the title of the Marriage and Divorce Bill for religious and moral reasons.  A 
leading daily paper called for it to be renamed the Marriage and Family Relations Bill.277  Thankfully 
the drafters were successful in arguing that if it was about divorce, then divorce should be in the 
title. 
But is this criticism too harsh?  Drafters live in the real world, and in the real world, legislation must 
pass (as razors must sell).278  In order to pass, a Bill must be politically persuasive.  After all, 
legislation also represents political vision turned into law.  The Criminal Justice Act (No. 2) 2003 may 
not inspire political interest, but the Hang Child Killers Act 2003 will.  Jones has carried out some 
fascinating empirical research into this, and his unsurprising findings where that people are more 
likely to be in favour of a Bill if it has an ‘evocative’ title rather than a ‘descriptive / technical’ title.279 
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However, in my view, this is precisely where the legislative drafter should have a role.  Protecting the 
rule of law is more important than a transient political slogan.280  Drafters should seek to resist 
government ‘spin’ in the wording of legislation.281  A slogan may help an Act to pass, but this is only 
one instance in the life-cycle of an Act.  For years to come, readers will have to struggle to navigate 
badly titled law. 
The UK is doing quite well in this regard.  Although there is always a political desire towards catchy 
names, by and large short titles here are relatively straightforward. In fact, in Scotland, the guidance 
expressly refers to this, stating that the text of a Bill ‘including both the short and long titles – should 
be in neutral terms and should not contain material intended to promote or justify the policy behind 
the Bill, or to explain its effect.’282  According to Erskine May ‘the short title must describe the 
content of the bill in a straightforwardly factual manner.  An argumentative title or a slogan is not 
permitted’.283 
Being neutral doesn’t necessarily mean being boring.  Contrast approaches in Hong Kong and 
Australia to the same problem of junk emails.  In Hong Kong the legislation is the Unsolicited 
Electronic Messages Ordinance, whereas in Australia it is the Spam Act.  Both are good and accurate 
titles, but the Hong Kong one is more legalistic and perhaps stuffy.  The Australian one is much more 
quotidian and instantly tells all readers what it is about. 
The tessellation argument is not one that is often made in the context of legislation.  Tessellation 
means that the individual pieces of a mosaic fit together without gap or overlap.  In the context of 
the statute book it means that the statute book fits together as a whole, that it is coherent.  To assist 
in the logical ordering of the statute book, titles must follow an agreed format.  They must make it 
easy to fit a particular statute within the general scheme of the statute book.  This will help any 
indexing or referencing system as well as making it easy for the user to see at a glance if a particular 
statute falls within a group of statutes.  So for example, in Northern Ireland there is the: 
 Housing (NI) Order 1976 
 Housing (NI) Order 1978 
 Housing (NI) Order 1981 
 Housing (NI) Order 1986 
 Housing (NI) Order 1988 
 Housing (NI) Order 1992 
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 Housing (NI) Order 2003 
 Housing (Amendment) (NI) Order 2006 
The reader can easily identify these in an alphabetical index of statutes, as O’Brien says, ‘one of the 
main purposes of the short title is to locate the legislation in the statute book’284. The reader also 
knows that any new legislation called the Housing Order will deal with the same subject matter as 
these existing orders.  But if a new statute was called the Buildings for Residential Use Act, this 
would immediately make the statute book must less navigable.   In this context, the keyword is 
consistency.  Legislation dealing generally with the same subject matter must have generally the 
same name. 
As ever though with drafting decisions, there is a balance to be struck.  Sometimes the old name will 
be inappropriate.  For example, in Victorian times in Ireland it was acceptable to have the Lunacy 
Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871.  Now this language is seen as offensive and the modern title is the 
Mental Health (NI) Order 1986. 
Personalised names in legislative titles cause problem with this.  For example, in the US, there is the 
Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, named after a famous litigant an employment case.  Legislation can also 
be named after victims, for example Megan’s Law.  It can be named after politicians closely 
connected with it, for example the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act (Ireland) 1860 is more 
commonly called Deasey’s Act after the Irish Attorney General.  This is sometimes done 
posthumously, as a mark of respect, for example the Ronald W Reagan National Defence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.  Jim Allister MLA in discussing a Bill before the Northern 
Ireland Assembly stated ‘whereas the Bill must officially be called the Civil Service (Special Advisers) 
Bill, I trust that, in common language, it will, if passed, become known as "Ann's law"’.285  This was in 
tribute to a particular victims’ campaigner.  Jones has written about the different approaches to 
what he calls ‘humanised’ titles in the USA and the UK.286  He concludes that the UK establishment 
zealously guard the ‘neutral names’ approach.  This non-personalised approach to short titles is one 
which is in accordance with the rule of law. 
An additional problem is the overly broad and bland Act title.  We know the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 is about criminal law, but we don’t know much more than this.  We know the Northern Ireland 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 is about Northern Ireland, but we don’t have an idea about the 
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details.  There isn’t very much the drafter can do about this generally.  Sometimes an Act will deal 
with a broad subject and make lots of different amendments to different aspects of that subject.  If 
we were to list everything that the Act dealt with, it would be far too long a title.  For example, a 
more descriptive short title for the Northern Ireland Act would be the Northern Ireland (Political 
donations, Assembly membership, Justice Minister, Excepted and Reserved Matters, Electoral 
Matters etc.) Act 2013 – this is obviously far too long to be of any real use.  But sometimes we can 
be more specific, for example most legislation amending criminal justice is often  called the Criminal 
Justice Act, but we also have the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (NI) Order 2004 – as that Order only 
deals with criminal evidence, the title can be more specific.  There is no easy answer for the drafter 
here, the drafter has to balance three things: keeping the short title short, indicating its content, and 
promoting indexing of the statute book. 
2.4.2 Omnibus bills 
The section above discussed the dangers of bills dealing with a broad subject and having a bland 
title.  Much more problematic are omnibus bills – ‘a massive bulk of unrelated rules modifying 
numerous existing statutes’.287  In the UK, these are sometimes termed ‘Christmas tree bills’ as there 
is something for everyone on them.288  Popelier calls it ‘mosaic legislation’. 
An omnibus Bill makes navigation of the statute book very difficult.  The reader has no idea of what 
an omnibus Bill may contain.  Its title will not convey meaning and will not assist in the logical 
ordering of the statute book.  An omnibus Bill is there for the benefit of legislators, not of citizens.  In 
Belgium they are called ‘Programme Laws’ or ‘Law holding diverse provisions’ – how on earth is the 
user to divine content from such a broad title?  Popelier directly lists the disadvantages of mosaic 
law ‘ The Citizen’s Perspective: Accessibility of Law’.289  In Israel these are called “Arrangement Laws” 
and the Israeli Supreme Court heard objections about these been railroaded through the Knesset.290  
Although that case (as Bar-Siman-Tov points out291) was about procedural rationality in law making, 
it also illustrates the difficulty with navigability of the statute book.  The Supreme Court in Israel has 
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ruled ‘Arrangements Law’ as unconstitutional, although this is more for reasons of legislative due 
process than for navigability of legislation.292 
An example of omnibus legislation in the UK is the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.  The 
long title shows the diversity of subjects within it: 
An Act to make provision about the UK Green Investment Bank; to make provision about 
employment law; to establish and make provision about the Competition and Markets 
Authority and to abolish the Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading; to 
amend the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002; to make provision for the 
reduction of legislative burdens; to make provision about copyright and rights in 
performances; to make provision about payments to company directors; to make provision 
about redress schemes relating to lettings agency work and property management work; to 
make provision about the supply of customer data; to make provision for the protection of 
essential supplies in cases of insolvency; to make provision about certain bodies established 
by Royal Charter; to amend section 9(5) of the Equality Act 2010; and for connected 
purposes. 
The sharp-eyed reader will notice a reference to the Equality Act 2010 being amended – the 
amendment is to make ‘caste’ an element of ‘race’ for the purposes of equality legislation.  Although 
laudable, this has nothing to do with regulatory reform and is short title will therefore mislead the 
reader.  It detracts from navigability and has the appearance of a provision shoved into the first 
available Bill.  Perhaps the only time that omnibus legislation is acceptable is the Statute Law Repeal 
Act.  These Acts repeal vast swathes of legislation that are no longer of practical utility, and usually 
follow recommendations of a Law Commission.   Since these laws are generally obsolete anyway, 
citizens are not hindered by any loss of navigability. 
2.4.3 Section headings 
Short titles can assist in finding the Act sought.  Headings within the Act can assist in finding the 
exact provision sought (I use the word heading as shorthand, these have also been called marginal 
notes, titles, sidebars etc.).  For the purposes of navigability, each part, chapter, cross heading and 
section heading should clearly indicate its content.   
Unlike short titles, section headings can be longer and more specific.  Depending upon how pithily 
the heading can be expressed, it can be a ‘content-indicator’ title or a ‘rule-summary’ title.  A 
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content-indicator title gives an idea of the content of the provision, whereas a rule-summary title 
actually summarises the rule itself.  For example, when the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Bill was 
introduced into the Northern Ireland Assembly, clause 2 was entitled ‘special advisers not to have 
serious criminal conviction’.  This accurately reflected the content of the rule set out in clause 2, it 
was an abbreviated description of the rule itself.  However, as the Bill passed through the Assembly 
the content of clause 2 was changed and there was no longer an absolute prohibition on special 
advisers having a serious criminal conviction.  Therefore, upon enactment, the title of that clause 
had changed to ‘special advisers: serious criminal convictions’. The new title didn’t summarise the 
actual rule, instead it gave an indication of the subject matter of the provision.  Rule-summary titles 
are usually more difficult to set out than content-indicator titles as it is hard to condense most rules 
into one line.  However, rule-summary titles make it easier for the user to know the thrust of the 
legislation.  A combination of a well-organized table of contents and descriptive titles means that 
reading the table of contents can be like reading a condensed narrative of the legislation. 
For constitutional and historical reasons, there is a certain ambiguity about the legal status of 
headings in legislation in the UK.  In the past they have been viewed, not as part of the legislation 
enacted by the legislature, but as an editorial addition inserted by the clerks and administrative staff 
of the legislature.293  The actual practice of making legislation shows this to be nonsense – every part 
of the Bill, including all the headings, is crafted by the legislative drafter working on behalf of the 
legislator.  However, the rule of interpretation is that section headings may be used to assist in the 
interpretation of the legislation, even though they are not determinative.294  This is an eminently 
sensible canon of construction as three or four words in a heading can’t adequately describe the 
entirety of the section that follows.295  However, this rule does give the drafter an unusual 
opportunity for creativity and innovation, unburdened by the usual requirements of precision and 
legal accuracy.  The purpose of a navigable heading is to convey meaning, not to be legally precise, 
therefore the drafter is relatively free to select headings which best convey meaning. 
An example will illustrate this.  The Northern Ireland Law Commission produced a Bill to amend the 
law on bail.296  Clause 30 of the Bill is entitled ‘repeal of street bail’.  But ‘street bail’ has no legal 
meaning, the correct legal term is ‘bail at any place other than a police station’.  Street bail is the 
term used in practice, it is quicker and less cumbersome, but it is legally incorrect.  However, as a 
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title it works, the reader with a connection to the criminal justice world instantly knows what this 
provision is about.  The detail of the provision uses the legally correct terminology, as it must, but in 
crafting the title, the drafter is freer to convey meaning.  This practical example provides a partial 
answer to Heaton’s concern that titles in legislation don’t convey meaning to non-legal users.297  The 
legal lexicon (words like tort, fee simple, actionable) are familiar and relevant to lawyers, but not to 
non-lawyers.  So in section headings it is open to us to use the demotic word, not the legally precise 
word. 
A contrasting EU legislative provision shows the benefit of this more flexible UK approach.  Article 5 
of Directive 2002/58/EC is entitled ‘confidentially of these communications’ and paragraph 3 of that 
Article begins 
Member States shall ensure that the use of electronic communications networks to store 
information or to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a 
subscriber or user is only allowed on condition that the subscriber or user concerned is 
provided with clear and comprehensive information in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, 
inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to refuse such 
processing by the data controller. 
How much more navigable would this provision be if it was entitled ‘no cookies without consent’? 
Most computer users know that websites store information about these users every visit, and this 
information is colloquially known as a ‘cookie’.  The reader would instantly know the gist of the 
provision if ‘cookie’ appeared in its title.  In fact the word ‘cookie’ even appears several times in the 
recital of the Directive, how much better if had worked its way into the law itself. 
2.4.4 Structure 
An Act is more navigable if it is organized and structured298 – but what does this actually mean in 
practice? It means that users can see at a glance the general thrust of the Act and see, again at a 
glance, which provisions are relevant to them.  Voermans distinguished between ‘structure’ (division 
of legislation, referencing) and ‘superstructure’ (relation to other legislative texts, hierarchy) but I 
include both these here within my use of the word structure.299  Voermans went on to say that ‘the 
structure of an Act can act as a road map for users who want to find the relevant provisions’.300  
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Onoge also saw structure as extremely important, writing that ‘careful layout and design of 
legislation is as important as clear language’.301 
Unless an Act is extremely short, it should have a table of contents (sometimes referred to as 
arrangement of sections, or contents).  Like a short title, a table of contents gives the reader the gist 
of the Act, it also sets out the scope of the Act. So, although the Crime and Courts Act 2013 is a very 
broad title, looking at the table of contents reveals it is about the National Crime Agency, 
administration of justice, self-defence etc. 
Structure is helped immeasurably by divisions and sub-divisions of the legislation – as Duprat notes it 
is to make ‘the provisions easily seen by the public and to simplify the interpretation of 
enactments’.302  Related material should be grouped together and listed under a separate heading.  
Related headings should also be grouped together and listed under larger headings.  The UK 
taxonomy is of Parts, divided into Chapters, divided into cross headings.  It is not necessary to have 
each of these tiers in a single Act – a short Act may only have cross headings, whereas a larger one 
may have multiple Parts, Chapters and cross headings.  The more topically different provisions are, 
the higher up the tier the divisions should be.  For example, in the Water Act 2014, Part 1 deals with 
the water industry.  This is conceptually very different from provisions on flood insurance, so it is 
quite right that flood insurance is dealt with in Part 4.  Therefore the reader interested in the new 
law on flood insurance doesn’t have to wade (pun intended) through the other water provisions in 
the Act, but can jump straight to Part 4. 
Different writers have suggested different ways to structure legislation.  For example, Thring 
suggested stating the law first and then how the law was to be administered.303  He suggested 
including the standard provisions first and then the special or more complicated ones.  It is also 
possible to take a chronological approach, such as setting out in order the steps with which a user 
must comply in order to satisfy a particular administrative hurdle.  For example in Part 2 of the 
Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008, the first cross heading is ‘conditions precedent to incorporation’ 
and the second cross heading is ‘incorporation of a company’.  Bergeron suggests having permanent 
provisions first and temporary provisions later.304  This practice is followed nearly all the time in the 
UK, where transitional provisions or transitory provisions appear at the very end of a statute.  
Bentham wanted to separate the ‘imperative’ provisions (which would be short and come first) from 
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the ‘expository provisions’ which would be longer, contain more explanatory material and come 
later.305 
Xanthaki proposes an innovative approach to structure, what she calls the layered approach.306 
Under this structure, legislation is drafted in different layers, corresponding to the different users of 
it.  So Part 1 is for the lay people and sets out the basic regulatory message of the law.  Part 2 is for 
non-legal professionals and sets out a greater amount of detail that they would need to have access 
to.  Part 3 deals with issues of interpretation, application, amendments, repeals etc.  It is for those 
lawyers who need to know the precise details of every last provision. 
As with all these drafting principles, they are only guides and can be over-ridden.  For example, in 
the Telecommunications Act 1984, there is provision vesting property belonging to British 
Telecommunications in a successor company.  Normally this sort of transitional provision is relatively 
unimportant and is included as a schedule at the end of the statute.  However, as it was considered 
of crucial economic and political importance, it appeared in the body of the statute, not at the very 
end. The key point for the drafter is to choose a structure and an ordering of provisions that makes it 
as easy as possible for the reader to find their way through the statute. 
The other difficulty with maintaining a sound and coherent structure is amendments, both 
amendments to a Bill as it passes through the legislature307, and amendments to an Act after it is 
made.  These can often wreck a carefully balanced piece of legislation by forcing new provisions in to 
a structure that was not designed to accept them.  The Aristotelian idea of the perfectly structured 
statute doesn’t work when faced with the grubby realities of making political law in a political 
legislature.  One thing that the drafter can do however, is to strongly counsel that the Bill as 
introduced into Parliament is the finished product, at least from the government’s perspective.  
Introducing a Bill that even the government knows to be incomplete is a good predictor of a Bill that 
will be structurally unsound, with subsequent amendments stretching it out of shape. The more pre-
legislative scrutiny and consultation, the less likely that the introduced Bill’s structure will be 
deformed by amendments as it passes through the legislature. 
2.4.5 Parallel structures 
If an Act regulates two or more similar activities or entities in similar ways, it is made more navigable 
if it adopts parallel structures for that regulation.  A parallel structure means that the same approach 
and headings (so far as possible) are used for each entity.  This makes it easier for the user to follow, 
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and they can also quickly see where the regulation differs.  This is the approach taken in the 
Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008.  Listed below are cross headings and section headings for Part 
XXVII (Protected Cell Companies) and Part XXVIII (Incorporated Cell Companies).  This approach 
makes it easier for readers to compare and contrast these two different types of company than if the 
structure adopted had been wildly different. 
PART XXVII 
PROTECTED 
CELL COMPANIES 
 
PART XXVII 
INCORPORATED 
CELL COMPANIES 
 
Formation 
 
Formation 
437. Companies which can be protected 
cell companies 
468. Companies which can be incorporated cell 
companies 
438. Consent of Commission required 469. Consent of Commission required 
439.Determination of applications to and 
other decisions of Commission 
470.Determination of applications to and 
other decisions of Commission 
440. Appeals from determinations and 
other decisions of Commission 
471. Appeals from determinations and 
other decisions of Commission 
 472. Incorporation of incorporated cell 
  
Status 
 
Status 
 
441. Status of protected cell companies 473. Status of incorporated cell company 
442. Creation of cells 474. Status of incorporated cell 
443. Demarcation of the core  
444. Cell shares and cell share capital 
 
 
  
Assets and liabilities Separate nature of incorporated cell company 
and its incorporated cells 
445. Cellular and core assets 475. Separation of assets and liabilities 
445. Protected assets 476. Transactions 
 
In a similar way, provisions establishing a body in legislation generally take a similar approach: 
setting out how people are appointed to the body, their salary, staff, reporting arrangements, 
budgeting, pensions, procedure, status, termination of membership etc.  If a new body is set up, the 
reader would expect to see similar provisions in a similar order.  This is not an argument for blindly 
following precedent – it is an argument for assisting readers by using a structure with which they will 
be familiar. 
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2.4.6 Signposting 
A statute is a single document that only makes full sense if read as a whole.  In the same way that 
one line from a recipe doesn’t make for the meal, one section from an Act doesn’t explain the Act in 
its entirety.  In a short Act, the connection between sections is clear and obvious, and there is no 
need for any aids to make it more navigable.  But in a longer Act, there may be a gap between two 
related sections – a section may make more sense if read in conjunction with another provision 
which may be in a different part of the Act.  Take a simple example: section 10 sets out an offence 
and section 11 sets out the defence.  It is easy for the reader to navigate from one to the other.  But 
what if sections 10 to 15 set out the offences, and sections 30 to 32 set out the defences?  Suddenly 
we have reduced navigability, we have made it more difficult to readers to link together important 
information. 
There are a number of drafting solutions to this.  Firstly, there is the age-old drafting adage of 
keeping like material with like.  Thring, for example, recommends keeping provisions declaring the 
law together, and keeping them separate from provisions relating to the administration of the 
law.308  The difficulty with this is that a provision may be ‘like’ one provision in one way, but ‘like’ a 
different provision in another way.  For example, we could put all offences together because they 
are like each other, or we could put an offence relating to a particular subject next to the other 
material on that subject.  This is a zero-sum game – if we put two like sections together, we 
automatically displace another like section and push it further away.  This may be an unavoidable 
consequence of the interconnectedness of legislation.  The rules of interpretation tell us that we 
can’t read provisions in isolation, we need to read the entire Act.   
The next solution is to try to place all relevant material together in a single section.  And if material is 
relevant to more than one section, it can be repeated in each of those sections.  There are two 
problems with this.  Firstly, we will dramatically extend the length of each individual provision.  So, 
section 1 will be 10 pages long as it includes the rule, the exceptions, the defences and the 
definitions.  A 10 page section is far too long to be easily comprehensible (see further Chapter 4).  
Secondly, it can be repetitive and increase the chance of making copying errors.  For example, if the 
same definitions apply to the first five rules, it would seem silly to repeat them in each of the first 
five rules.  Even worse, we increase the risk of future drafting errors.  Say that next year we want to 
amend one of these definitions, we will have to amend it 5 times in 5 different places, and hope that 
we make exactly the same amendment in each place. 
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The third drafting solution to this is signposting – pointing the reader to where the other relevant 
provisions are.  So, section 1 could be set out as follows. 
‘1. (1) This is the rule. 
 (2) But this is subject to – 
  (a) the exceptions in section 5, and 
  (b) the defences in section 10. 
 (3) The elements of the rule set out below are defined in section 50 –  
  (a) element  A, 
  (b) element B.’ 
This puts the user on notice that there is a context to the rule, and that the rule can’t be read in 
isolation.  The reader is signposted  to further relevant provisions.  This is especially helpful for non-
lawyers, particularly those not familiar with the standard structure of legislation, including its use of 
interpretation sections for definitions or schedules.309  Signposting is a great aid to navigability. 
However, there are at least two problems with signposting.  The first is knowing where to stop.  It is 
conceivable that every provision in an Act could have a bearing on every other provision in an Act – 
does that mean that each individual section must contain a signpost to every other section?  
Extending the example above, does section 1 also need to state: 
 ‘(4) The decision to prosecute a person under the rule is to be taken by the body 
established in section 8. 
 (5) Prosecutions must be initiated within the time limits set out in section 17. 
 (6) If a person is arrested under the rule, that person must be released on bail under the 
criteria set out in section 29.’ 
This creates problems of undue length and complexity. 
The second problem concerns the nature of legislation.  If the function of legislation is to make law, 
everything extraneous to that is redundant and should be excised from legislation.  A signpost is not 
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law, it only clutters up the law.  As Bowman put it, quoting another drafter ‘excess matter in Bills, as 
in people, tends to go septic’.310 
The answer to these two problems rests in the judgement of the drafter.  Balance these two 
problems against the need to enhance navigability.  So, don’t signpost everything, just those 
provisions which are most directly relevant (or most likely to be otherwise missed).  This will 
sometimes mean shoehorning in a provision which isn’t strictly necessary from a legal perspective, 
just to make the reader aware of it.  For a good example of legislation with signposts, see the Public 
Services Ombudsperson (Northern Ireland) Act 2015: 
Power to investigate complaints made by a person aggrieved  
5. (1) The Ombudsperson may investigate a complaint, made by or on behalf of a 
member of the public who claims to have sustained an injustice (in this Act referred to as “a 
person aggrieved”), if the requirements of this section are met. 
 (2) The complaint must relate to action taken by a listed authority (see sections 
12 and 13). 
 (3) The complaint must relate to a matter which can be investigated (see 
sections 14 to 23). 
 (4) The correct procedure must have been followed (see sections 24 to 27). 
In some Australian jurisdictions, navigability is taken a stage further, by making references not just to 
different provisions within an Act, but to provisions in different Acts.  In the example below, the 
unauthorised version of the Children and Young People Act 2008 (as put online by the Australian 
Capital Territory Parliamentary Counsel’s Office) is as follows: 
356 Offence—mandatory reporting of abuse  
 (1) A person commits an offence if— 
 (a) the person is a mandated reporter; and 
 (b) the person is an adult; and 
 (c) the person believes on reasonable grounds that a child or young 
person has experienced, or is experiencing— 
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 (i) sexual abuse; or 
 (ii) non-accidental physical injury; and 
 … 
 Maximum penalty:  50 penalty units, imprisonment for 6 months or both. 
Note 1 A person who gives information honestly and without recklessness 
under this section does not breach professional ethics and is protected from 
civil liability (see s 874). 
Note 2 Giving false or misleading information to the director general is an 
offence (see Criminal Code, s 338). 
2.4.7 Discrete or parcelled ways of consuming legal information 
The classic way of thinking about legislation is the statute book – an Act written out in hard copy as 
one continuous document.  The document is a single whole, an indivisible entity.  So, when the user 
looks at section 10, they can’t help but also see section 9 and section 11.  In fact, even in flipping 
through to section 10, they will catch a glimpse of other provisions.  This has drafting implications – 
the drafter can feel safe that if section 10 sets out the offence, the defences in section 11 will easily 
be seen by the reader. 
However, this classic paradigm no longer holds true.  Most legislation is consumed electronically, 
and most provisions are consumed individually, not as part of the whole.  So the user may click to 
section 10, but not have sections 9 and 11 displayed alongside.  This was the precise finding that 
Bertlin made about how individuals interacted with legislation, they clicked directly on the provision 
in the table of contents and went straight to that provision.311  The drafter cannot rely on serendipity 
to make users aware of the other relevant provisions.  This makes it more important to show links 
between sections.  So section 10, should conclude with “But this is subject to the defences set out in 
section 11”. 
2.4.8 Highlighting defined terms  
Defined terms make legislation easier to read and understand.  So for example, rather than using the 
phrase “a person under the age of 18” throughout it, the Children Act 1989 instead uses the term 
“child” and then defines it in section 105.  This is both a useful shorthand term and a good way of 
indicating meaning to the user.  But what of the reader who doesn’t know of the existence of 
interpretation sections?  They may be struggling to know whether a 17 year old is a “child” for the 
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purposes of the Act.  This is where navigability principles can assist.  If a defined term is used in 
legislation, it can be highlighted in some way to indicate that more information is available on that 
term. For example, in Guernsey legislation, defined terms are in bold in the place where they are 
defined.  This at least draws the readers eye to the term so that they have a chance of knowing that 
this term has additional levels of meaning attached to it.  Even better would be a system whereby 
the casual reader would immediately be alerted to the fact that a particular word has a precise 
meaning, and an easy way of getting (for example via a hypertext link) to that meaning. 
2.4.9 Numbering 
In physics, a quantum is the smallest size of an entity possible.  So a photon is a single quantum of 
light, incapable of being divided any further.  However, in legislation, there no limit to how far the 
gap between two sections in a statute can be divided.  So, between sections 171 and 172 of the 
Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, there are 54 sections.  The full list is as follows: 
 
s. 171 s. 171ZG s. 171ZC s. 171ZEE s. 171ZL s. 171ZS s. 171ZZ s. 171B 
s. 171ZA  s. 171ZH s. 171ZD s. 171ZF s. 171ZM s. 171ZT s. 171ZZ1 s. 171C 
s. 171ZB s. 171ZI s. 171ZE s. 171ZG s. 171ZN s. 171ZU s. 171ZZ2 s. 171D 
s. 171ZC s. 171ZJ s. 171ZEA s. 171ZH s. 171ZO s. 171ZV s. 171ZZ3 s. 171E 
s. 171ZD s. 171ZK s. 171ZEB s. 171ZI s. 171ZP s. 171ZW s. 171ZZ4 s. 171F 
s. 171ZE s. 171ZA s. 171ZEC s. 171ZJ s. 171ZQ s. 171ZX s. 171ZZ5 s. 171G 
s. 171ZF s. 171ZB s. 171ZED s. 171ZK s. 171ZR s. 171ZY s. 171A s. 172 
 
The eagle-eyed reader may have spotted that sections 171ZA to 171ZE appear twice.  This is 
explained by Westlaw as follows:  
Existing ss 171ZA-171ZE moved directly under Part XIIZA on the repeal of the cross-heading 
"Ordinary statutory paternity pay" by Children and Families Act 2014 c. 6 Sch.7 para.11 (April 
5, 2015: substitution has effect subject to transitional provisions and savings specified in SI 
2014/1640 art.16) 
Westlaw does a better job than the official government database of legislation, legislation.gov.uk.  
That database is blithely unaware that there are any numbers between 171 and 172, stating: 
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This is the original version (as it was originally enacted). This item of legislation is currently 
only available in its original format. 
When subsections and paragraphs are factored in, this means that we have (for example) section 
171ZZ5(3)(b) of this Act.  How are end users meant to navigate through this?  How are they meant to 
know that 171ZZ1 comes after 171ZA but before 171F? Although there is reason behind it, it just 
looks like gibberish to the ordinary citizen. 
The Immigration Rules are worse.   We have: 
 Rules with a number, e.g. rule 15 is about the common travel area.   
 Rules with a number with a single letter as a suffix, e.g. rule 20A is about non-lapsing leave.  
 Rules with numbers with multiple letters as a suffix, e.g. rules 245ZZ to 245ZZE deal with tier 
4 (child) students.   
 Rules with numbers with letters as prefixes and suffixes, e.g. rules A57A – A57H deal with 
persons entering the UK for short term study. 
 Rules with multiple letter prefixes e.g. E-ECP.3.1 deals with financial requirements. 
So, in Appendix FM-SE paragraph A1 reads ‘To meet the financial requirements under paragraphs E-
ECP.3.1., E-LTRP.3.1., E-ECC.2.1. and E-LTRC.2.1. of Appendix FM, the applicant must meet’.  The 
Court of Appeal in considering Immigration Rules stated that the ‘provisions have now achieved a 
degree of complexity which even the Byzantine emperors would have envied’.312  The Supreme 
Court spoke of the difficulty for users ‘to navigate their way around the requirements’.313 
This kind of complex numbering makes legislation extremely difficult to navigate and undermines 
accessibility and the rule of law.  Although it may make things easier for government if the same 
numbers remain in place through many amendments, it does not help the reader. At some point the 
drafter has to advise that instead of the tortuous quantum fracturing of squeezing in new numbers 
where none ought to exist, there should instead be a fresh restatement of the legislation containing 
only actual numbers.  And perhaps a schoolchild can advise that there is no such number as 171ZZ5. 
2.4.10 ‘Hidden’ provisions 
Legislation is not a weapon to be used against the people, it is a tool to be used for their benefit.314 
Equally, it is not something to be ‘sneaked through’ the legislature, it is something to be enacted by 
the legislature.  A statutory provision is not navigable if it is hidden somewhere within the 
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legislation, in an unexpected place, or in a place which is out of context with its content, or with a 
misleading title.  Thring stated that provisions shouldn’t be hidden in a schedule.315  The more 
important, or revolutionary a provision is, the more prominent it should be in the legislation. Take as 
a positive example the legislation authorising the Prime Minister to initiate the procedure for leaving 
the European Union.  This fundamentally important provision is not buried in a schedule of a bill on 
restructuring government, it is section 1 of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 
2017. 
An Italian example shows the pernicious use of hidden provisions.  The Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi had lost a civil case and was obliged to pay damages totalling millions of Euro.  He wanted 
to amend articles 284 and 373 of the Civil Code so that payment of damages would be suspended 
pending appeal to the Court of Cassation. In 2011 he inserted this amendment to the Civil Code into 
a budget bill which was being fast-tracked through the Italian parliament due to the financial crisis.  
It was spotted and removed.316 Although this was clearly wrong as being inserted for the personal 
benefit of the legislator, it was also wrong as it was in the wrong place, seriously hindering 
navigability.   
 
2.5 Inclusivity 
For legislation to be accessible, the legislation must contain within it all relevant legal information.  If 
a piece of legislation only includes 90% of the information on how that law is going to be applied, 
then this undermines the values that accessibility promotes.  Spelling this out, if the statute doesn’t 
give the citizen the full picture, then the citizen can’t properly follow the law.  If the citizen is held 
liable for something which isn’t effectively disclosed within the law, this would be unfair.  Citizens 
can’t make decisions based on things outside their knowledge.  There is no certainty if the individual 
doesn’t know the rules, and it is impossible to hold parliament to account for a rule if parliament 
hasn’t fully set out the rule in the legislation.  From this is derived the drafting principle of inclusivity.  
By this I mean that the legislation must itself include a reasonably complete statement of all the 
rules and other matters which affect its application.  Nothing extraneous to the legislation should 
undermine the meaning of that legislation. 
Inclusion can be direct by means of the legislation physically containing the material, or indirect, by 
means of the legislation including a reference or pointing to the material.  The reader ought not to 
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be surprised by the legislation applying in a way that isn’t disclosed or easily inferable from the face 
of the legislation.  In fact, this is already a ground for parliament to question subordinate legislation 
– if ‘it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the statute 
under which it is made’.317 
If this happens, then the statute as it appears on screen is misleading and the legislation isn’t truly 
accessible.  This chimes with Thring’s comment over a century ago that readers ought not to ‘have to 
look beyond the four corners of the Bill in order to comprehend its meaning’.318  This drafting 
principle can be summed up as follows – it if is important, or if it will colour how the Act will be 
applied, then it should go into the Act. 
This is related to aspect 5 of availability – legislation in context. The drafter can’t make sure that 
contextually relevant material is linked to the statute as it appears on screen.  However, the drafter 
does have a role in ensuring that such material is included (either directly or indirectly) in the 
legislation.  This is a key legislative drafting principle - that the legislation ought to include all 
important relevant information.  Readers ought to have a reasonable idea of how the law will be 
applied in practice and know what other sources of information will shed light upon this application. 
Set out below are three examples of the kinds of situations where this principle is not respected. 
2.5.1 Tax legislation and extra-statutory concessions 
It is a fundamental principle of UK tax law that we can only be taxed in accordance with legislation 
laid down by Parliament.319  However, for at least 100 years, we can now be ‘untaxed’ (or excused of 
an obligation to pay tax) by an Extra-Statutory Concession granted by the government.320  As its 
name indicates, this is a situation, not provided for in legislation, where the government does not 
insist on applying the full rigour of the law, and thus reduces the tax liability of an individual.  ESCs 
have been given (sometimes begrudgingly) a seal of approval by the judges.321 
Extra-statutory rules are anathema to the general principle of the rule of law that we are all subject 
to law.  They are also anathema to the element 1 of Bingham’s definition of the rule of law as they 
aren’t accessible alongside the legislation.  Having said this, the government do publish the list, 
together with details, of all ESC annually.  The government do have a rolling program to turn some 
                                                          
317 Standing Order 151(1)(B)(vi). 
318 Thring, Practical Legislation: The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament (n 116). (3rd edition,. 25) 
319 Article 4, Bill of Rights 1689. 
320 D Williams, ‘Extra-Statutory Concessions’ [1979] British Tax Review 137. 
321 See for example R v IRC ex parte Wilkinson [2005] UKHL 30. 
82 
 
ESCs into actual legislation.  There is legislative power to give effect to ESCs, including turning them 
into statutory concessions.322 
In discussing ESCs, Freedman’s main objections were in terms of lack of certainty and clarity over the 
law.323  Tax-payers could not be sure how much they could rely upon these ESCs.  Freedman suggests 
that ‘one way forward would be for all concessions and guidance to have a statutory basis’.324  
However she sees this as a counsel of perfection and not feasible for the small, transitory and 
complex areas in which ESCs normally operate. 
From the perspective of the drafter, three recommendations can be made. Firstly, so far as possible, 
there should be nothing outside the statute book which denudes the contents of the statute book- 
the principle of inclusivity requires that concessions ought to be contained within the statute book.  
Secondly, where this is not possible, the reader ought to be alerted at the very least to the existence 
of such things as extra-statutory concessions when they are reading the tax statutes.  Thirdly, those 
ESC must be easily accessible in full. 
2.5.2 Broadly drafted legislation constrained by non-legislative indications of narrow 
application 
On occasion, legislation on its face has a broad remit, but the persons introducing the Bill into 
Parliament state that it will only be applied in narrow circumstances.  If the intention is that it will 
only be applied in narrow circumstances, then this should be stated on the face of the Bill and 
shouldn’t be reliant upon political whim.  There are two problems with these kind of extra-statutory 
statements.  Firstly, as they are not included with the legislation, they are inaccessible to the reader.  
Secondly, they are not legally binding and can be treated as flim-flam.  
As an example, consider the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001.  This was enacted in 
response to the terrorist bombings on 11 September 2001.325  When introduced, the Home 
Secretary David Blunkett used the following phrases in Parliament to describe it: 
 ‘legislative steps necessary to counter the threat from international terrorism’, 
 ‘we will reinforce action against the perpetrators of organised crime, drugs and people 
trafficking’, 
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 ‘the emergency legislation will build on the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Bill to deal 
specifically with terrorist finance through monitoring and freezing the accounts of suspected 
terrorists’.326 
From the general tenor of the debate, it was quite clear that the powers contained within this bill, in 
particular the power to freeze assets, were to be used for the purposes of defeating terrorism.  The 
actual legislation contained the following as one condition for making an order freezing assets of 
someone outside the UK: 
The first condition is that the Treasury reasonably believe that— 
(a) action to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it) has 
been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons,327 
However, during the financial crisis, there was a risk to UK money held by the Icelandic bank 
Landsbanki.  The government made an order under this provision freezing money belonging to the 
bank.  There was no suggestion of terrorist activity on the part of the Icelandic banks, instead this 
was a measure used as part of the response to the economic crisis of the time.  Although the actual 
action done may have been necessary and even laudable in economic terms, the fact remains that 
legislation with an ostensibly narrow remit (terrorism) was used for a much broader purpose.  There 
was no requirement for there to be terrorist activity under the terms of the Act in order for the 
freezing powers to be used, but the idea that it be used for purely economic reasons seems out of 
keeping with how a reasonable person would expect the legislation be used.  As Smyth stated ‘it was 
controversial because it was made under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001'.328 
Terrorist powers being used for non-terrorist purposes is the most egregious example of this kind of 
abuse.  But it can happen in other circumstances where a Minister seeks a broad power in 
legislation, but then gives an undertaking in Parliament that it will only be used for a particular 
purpose.  To make an analogy, once you give the solider a weapon he is going to use it against all 
enemies, not simply those you tell him to use it against at the start.  
This drafting principle is a matter of degree and balance.  If the drafter is aware of some important 
limitation to the way the legislation is to be applied, then that limitation ought to be contained in 
the legislation itself.  To do otherwise is to mislead users and subvert the legitimacy of the law-
making process. 
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2.5.3 Broadly drafted legislation due to the difficulty of defining exactly what is to be covered 
Sometimes it can be very difficult to draft a law in such a way that it will cover all the cases that are 
intended to be covered, while excluding all the cases which are not intended to be covered.  This 
was precisely what happened with the Sexual Offences Bill in the UK Parliament. The main thrust of 
the law was to protect children from sexual assault.  The thing that was meant to be excluded was 
children involved in natural, low-level, sexual experimentation with other children. One specific 
difficulty that exercised Parliament greatly was whether the law really ought to be criminalising 
consensual kissing or petting among 14 and 15 year olds.  The entire debate in Parliament is 
extremely interesting.  The Minister responsible for piloting the legislation through Parliament was 
David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, and he said that ‘it is extremely difficult to come up with a 
formulation’329 that includes and excludes the right activities.  He said that the government (and by 
implication the drafters) simply couldn’t craft a provision which protected those who ought to be 
protected, but wouldn’t allow for prosecutions of those who ought not to be prosecuted.  In fact he 
went on to say that he would offer ‘a flagon of champagne for anyone who comes up with a 
satisfactory answer’.330  Dominic Grieve (who later went on to become the Attorney General) stated 
that:  
I have an inherent anxiety about administrative discretion. I accept that administrative 
discretion may be the only remedy in cases where the CPS will not charge. Nevertheless, 
when such matters are put on to the statute book in such stark terms, I always fear that, at 
some point, something will not work properly and that we will end up with prosecutions that 
cause serious problems. I admit to the Secretary of State that I am not sure that I know the 
answers, and I suspect that, if he had known the answers, he would have already put them 
on the statute book.331  
One solution proposed to this problem was that the Director of Public Prosecutions would offer 
guidelines on what activities should be prosecuted and what not.  To my mind, this breaks the 
principle of inclusivity – an important limitation on the legislation is placed, not within the 
legislation, but outside it.  The person reading the legislation would come away with the misleading 
impression that if they did X they would be prosecuted, even though the defence of Y existed 
somewhere outside the statute book.  I can only agree with Sandra Gidley who said in the debate 
that ‘I feel that we need to deal with that matter in the Bill’.332 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that access to legislation is a key part of the rule of law.  
Bingham, Locke, Fuller, Raz and many others have stressed how important this is.  I have also shown 
the difficulties with making legislation accessible.  It can be very expensive, particularly as the 
volume of legislation grows.  Legislation is very interconnected, and maintaining and showing the 
links between legislation is difficult.  Legislation is constantly changing and thus has to be constantly 
kept up to date.  Legislation must also be authoritative, and the only thing that Parliament 
authorises is the paper version of the law passed by it. 
The main focus of this chapter has been on the content of accessibility and the drafting principles 
that can be derived from it.  Three key principles have been derived: availability, navigability and 
inclusivity.   
Legislation must be available to users.  This means they should be able to see the law as enacted as 
well as how it reads at various points in time and in various parts of the UK.  They must also be able 
to have access to contextually relevant information which explains the law as well as being able to 
find the provision which is relevant to them. 
They must be able to easily navigate around the statute book as a whole as well as individual 
statutes within it.  This requires short titles and individual headings within Acts to be clear, 
consistent and neutral.  The structure must be make it easy for the user to jump from provision to 
provision.  It is important to realise that users frequently don’t read legislation in order, but instead 
move directly to the provisions which look useful to them, ignoring other provisions nearby. 
Finally, legislation must be inclusive of all important information.  The reader should not be 
surprised by how the law is applied arising from something which is extraneous to the law.  If a 
certain matter is intended to colour how the legislation is applied, then that matter ought to be 
included in the statute. 
These three drafting principles all flow from the rule of law concept of accessibility.  I have set out in 
detail how these three principles can be given effect to in legislation.  These are important as 
examples of the outworking of these principles.  However, other examples and specific drafting 
techniques could be given.  The key thing is the principles themselves, principles which drafters 
should bear in mind when drafting legislation. 
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However, by itself, this is not enough.  Wagner-von Papp concluded that legislation ought to be 
“known”, but that this does not merely mean that it is published. 333   He went on to say that it must 
be clear, unequivocal, consistent and as stable as possible.  These are also rule of law values which 
are reflected by Bingham in the principle that legislation ought to be predictable. 
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Chapter 3 Predictability 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 was the first substantive chapter and derived drafting principles from the rule of law 
requirement of accessibility.  This chapter is the next substantive chapter and deals with the next 
rule of law requirement - predictability.  Bingham’s element 1 states: 
Law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable. 
Legislation is predictable if you know its effect.  More specifically, it is predictable if you can read the 
legislation and then know in advance what the legal effect of your actions will be.  For example, if 
rules on broadcasting are so vague that a broadcaster cannot predict if a particular program will be 
sanctioned for being ‘indecent’, then those rules ought not to stand.334  This means that legislation 
can be used as a guide to planning future conduct.   
Part 1 examines at the theory of predictability.  It analyses what Bingham says and compares it with 
other rule of law writers on predictability.   
Part 2 is the main part of the chapter.  It examines the drafting principles we can derive from the 
requirement of predictability.  These are as follows.  Prospectivity means that legislation generally 
takes effect in the future, although there are criteria for when it doesn’t need to do this.  
Determinacy means that the law is certain, precise and exact.  Stability means that the law doesn’t 
change too much, and when it does change, the effect of the change is ameliorated.  Clear 
commencement means that the date the law has effect from is clear.  Consistency means both that 
there are no contradictions within a statute, and also that the statute book as a whole is generally 
harmonious.  Application in the real world means that the law on the statute book is the same as the 
law as it applies in practice.  Implementation means that there are effective means for implementing 
the law within the legislation.  Constraints on discretion sets out methods of curtailing discretion and 
identifies criteria for when and how discretion is to be constrained. 
Part 1 – The Theory of Predictability 
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3.1 The Importance of Predictability 
Bingham said that laws must be, so far as possible, predictable.335 As with accessibility, he didn’t 
deconstruct this.  His reasons for predictability were subsumed into the reasons for accessibility as 
set out in chapter 2. However, unlike accessibility, predictability is not an absolute value.  Instead, it 
need only be done ‘so far as possible’.  However, Bingham does not set out any criteria for 
determining whether or not something is ‘possible’.  Developing Bingham’s argument, Laws stated 
that ‘an element of predictability and permanence is an essential contributor to the role of law in 
preserving social cohesion and doing justice.336  Xanthaki cites unambiguity and precision (two 
aspects of predictability as derived in this chapter) – ‘this promotes the rule of law’.337 
Locke didn’t use the word predictability when discussing legislation.  However, his manifesto in 
favour of the commonwealth argued for much the same thing.  He argued that citizens should be 
safe and secure in the knowledge of their duties under the law338 and that the rules ought not to be 
varied in individual cases.339 
Fuller didn’t mention predictability as a specific desideratum of good law.  However, at least three of 
his desideratum touch upon it.  The first is prospectivity.340  Fuller states that retroactive laws are a 
monstrosity.341  He states that laws are there to govern human conduct, and we can’t govern today’s 
conduct by tomorrow’s rules.  However, as with Bingham he also acknowledges that there can’t be a 
blanket ban on retroactive laws.  Criminal law ought never to be retroactive, but in other spheres, 
there can sometimes be a need for curative retroactive laws – ‘because their draftsmen commonly 
overlook the occasional need for “curative” laws, flat constitutional prohibitions of retroactive laws 
have sometimes had to be substantially rewritten by the courts.’342  As an example of a curative law, 
he cites a marriage law that was poor executed, resulting in many proper marriages being declared 
void.  A curative retroactive law would go back in time and deem all those void marriages valid. 
The next desideratum touching on this is desideratum 7 on constancy of law through time.  If laws 
are constantly changing, then it is hard for citizens to predict the legal effect of their actions.  Again, 
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this is not an absolute for Fuller as it ‘seems least suited to formalization in a constitutional 
restriction’.343  It is difficult to know how much legislative change is ‘too much’. 
The final desideratum on this point is desideratum 8, congruence between official action and 
declared rule.  Legislation gives predictable results if the state follows the actual rules in the statute 
book.  There are two aspects to this.  Firstly, the broader respect for the rule of the law in terms of 
the state obeying the law.  Secondly, a point on statutory interpretation, that the state (and judges 
and society) follow the obvious and natural meaning of the words used in a statute.  As Fuller says, 
‘if the legislative draftsman is to discharge his responsibilities he, in turn, must be able to anticipate 
rational and relatively stable modes of interpretation’.344 
Raz doesn’t say that laws should be predictable.  However, he says in principle 1 that laws should be 
prospective, as a retroactive law cannot guide behaviour.345  In principle 2 he states that laws should 
be relatively stable ‘stability is essential if people are to be guided by law in their long-term 
decisions’.346  He doesn’t see stability as an absolute value.  Bingham’s recommendation for 
predictability is therefore reflected in Raz’s own recommendations. 
3.1.1 Why is legislation sometimes not predictable? 
All the writers cited above would agree that legislation ought to be generally predictable.  This 
means that if you read the legislation, you will know how it will be applied (the two assumptions 
underlying this are that the legislation is accessible, as discussed in chapter 2, and that the legislation 
is intelligible, which will be discussed in chapter 4).    
This is the theory (or what Fuller would call the morality of aspiration).  However, why does the 
practice sometimes differ – i.e. why is the effect of legislation sometimes not predictable?  To put 
this another way, why is legislation sometimes vague, or deliberately ambiguous?  There is one very 
pragmatic reason for this.  Legislation represents difficult political choices.  Sometimes the choice 
between two alternatives is too difficult a political compromise, so rather than make that choice, it is 
‘fudged’ by the politicians, and this fudge ends up in the legislation.  Hedlund and Zamboni describe 
this as ‘initial political ambiguity’.347  VanSickle-Ward’s argument is that ‘ambiguity serves as a 
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vehicle for compromise when key participants disagree over details’.348  In the context of Brazilian 
law-making, this was the conclusion of de Paula, ‘ambiguity is a usual escape for political conflicts’.349  
Take an obvious example from international law, the UN Security Council Resolution following the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war.  The text in English calls for ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict’.350 The word ‘territories’ is ambiguous, does it mean ‘some 
of the territories’ or ‘all of the territories’?  I would suggest that the answer is politically very 
controversial, so the resolution was drafted in an ambiguous way to cover both possibilities.  In an 
example closer to home, the Downing Street Declaration (part of the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process) states that the UK has no ‘selfish strategic or economic interest’ in Northern Ireland.351  
Does ‘selfish’ qualify ‘strategic’, or are they stand alone adjectives – i.e. no selfish interest and no 
strategic interest, or no selfish strategic interest?  The phrase is ambiguous, perhaps because it 
needed to be ambiguous in order to keep the peace process going and say something which both 
sides could agree with. 
It is often forgotten that legislation is a political as well as a legal creation.  Primary legislation must 
be enacted by a legislature.  Laws states that this means that political necessities must also be borne 
in mind alongside legal ones.352 The consequences of this are as Greenberg points out ‘expressions 
that are deliberately ambiguous or vague because clarity would require coming down on one side or 
another of a politically intractable argument’.353  Xanthaki takes a practical view on this, arguing that 
sometimes it is better to have vague legislation than no legislation at all.354  Schiemann goes so far as 
to make a virtue of this when he argued that ambiguity allowed things to be done, whether that be 
the writing of a judgement of a court containing several judges, or the passing of legislation 
accommodating mutually exclusive viewpoints.355 
In my view, deliberate ambiguity in legislation is wrong.  The legal effect of legislation ought to be 
predictable, in this way it can guide human behaviour.  But if legislation is ambiguous, it cannot 
guide behaviour.  There may certainly be political difficulties in agreeing a particularly thorny point, 
but it is the job of politicians to make these agreements, and it is an abdication of responsibility if 
they pass this job to judges and ultimately to citizens to resolve. In discussing a vague American law 
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on climate change, VanSickle-Ward stated that ‘it merely moved [key disagreements] to new venues, 
agencies and the courts’.356    In the field of international law and peace processes, it may be 
justifiable to fudge matters in order to gloss over political differences.  In the field of domestic 
legislation, this is not acceptable, as domestic legislation will have a direct impact upon citizen’s 
lives. 
3.1.2 Predictability in primary legislation, or in the legal system as a whole? 
Does it make a difference where the lack of predictability is? Can a lack of predictability in primary 
legislation be cured by introducing predictability at some other point in the legal system? 
Strauss refers to this as a lack of specificity in the legislation – that the primary legislation does not 
specify precisely what course of action ought to be followed.357  He cites the case of Chevron USA v 
National Resources Defence Council where the US court stated ‘perhaps Congress was unable to 
forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances 
with the scheme devised by the agency’.358  The agency in this case was the governmental body 
responsible for implementing the primary legislation.  Strauss does accept ambiguity in primary 
legislation, but only if the legal system as a whole (including secondary legislation and administrative 
actions) is precise – ‘vagueness or a lack of clarity in modern legislation is tolerable because it exists 
within a system that does give legal obligations or restrictions more precise shape before the citizen 
is asked to act’.359   
I think that Strauss is half right.  If the primary legislation is vague (and thus its effects unpredictable) 
but the secondary legislation made under it is specific, then the citizen can read the law and predict 
its results.  However, if the specificity rests on the layer underneath, the layer of administrative 
action, then the legal effect is not predictable. The Advocate General of the European Union has 
come to the same conclusion, albeit on slightly different reasoning.  If the primary legislation gives 
too wide a power to make delegated legislation, then this will be unconstitutional as it gives an 
unwarranted power to the executive to make law: 
a legislative provision empowering an EU level implementing authority to prohibit short 
selling “where necessary”, would represent an unconstitutional conferral of excessive 
implementing powers, irrespective of whether they were conferred on the Commission or 
an agency. This reflects the general principle of the primary role of the democratic 
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legislature, recognised in the constitutions of several Member States, and in Article 290 
TFEU, to the effect that legislation may not be so vague or open-ended that essential policy 
choices or value judgements remain to be decided at the implementation phase.360 
Although the reasoning here is based on the constitutional law of the EU (van Gestel argues in 
favour of greater transparency for rule-making authorities within the EU361), I think it can equally 
rest on the quality of predictability.  A citizen cannot predict the legal effect of law if the 
implementing authority is given too wide a discretion on how the law will be used. 
3.1.3 The qualifier – so far as possible 
What then about Bingham’s qualifier that law must be predictable ‘so far as possible’?  There are 
two aspects to this. 
Firstly, there is no binary choice between legislation being “predictable” or “unpredictable”.  It is a 
matter of degree.  Unlike something like availability (either the legislation is available or it is not 
available), predictability is measured on a scale of how predictable is the legal effect of legislation.  
So, we are aiming for maximum predictability, balancing the other rule of law drafting requirements 
such as accessibility, brevity, intelligibility etc.  For example, a long and exhaustive list of how 
legislation will be applied in different circumstances may enhance predictability, but at the expense 
of intelligibility.   
The second aspect is real world political pragmatism.  If a requirement for specificity would cause a 
Bill to fail to be enacted, then it might be necessary for the drafter to swallow some pride in 
craftsmanship, and include an ambiguous provision.  There are no easy answers to this question, and 
it is arguably more of a question for politicians to answer rather than drafters. 
Part 2 Drafting Principles that Promote Predictability 
3.2 Prospectivity 
Predictability means that if you do something, you know what the legal consequences of that thing 
will be. 362  But if the legal consequences of the thing you do today will be retrospectively changed 
tomorrow, then there is no predictability.  Therefore, in order to be predictable, law needs to be 
prospective, i.e. it applies from the date it is made forwards, it does not apply backwards in time.  
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This is slightly different from the drafting principle of stability. Stability means that the law today will 
be roughly the same as the law tomorrow.  Prospectivity means that if the law changes tomorrow, 
those changes will only take effect from tomorrow.  However, this is not a strong or absolute 
principle, it is capable of being overturned if there are good reasons for doing so. 
There is a well-established legal principle that legislation should generally be prospective.363   
Bennion describes the source of this principle as lex prospicit non respicit – law looks forwards not 
backwards.364   However, on rare occasions, legislation can have a backward facing component – it 
looks back to things which happened before the legislation was made. Under the broad title ‘the rule 
of law’ the House of Lords have argued that ‘enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be 
avoided’.365 
The first thing this section does is to set out a clear, coherent and consistent taxonomy for describing 
backwards facing legislation.  I use the term ‘Janus-faced legislation’ to mean legislation that has 
both a forward and backward facing component.  Janus-faced legislation stretches into the future 
and into the past.  Janus is the Roman god of beginnings and time.  He has two faces, one that looks 
forwards to the future and one that looks back to the past.  He is the god after whom January is 
named, looking back to the old year and forward to the new one.  Janus-faced legislation can be (a) 
retroactive, (b) retrospective, or (c) can interfere with existing rights, and I will analyse the nature of 
these three sub-sets. 
Janus-faced legislation can change the legal nature of a past event.  This is frowned upon because it 
is seen as both unfair and artificial.  It is unfair because the legislature changes the rules after the 
game has been played.  It is artificial because it deems something to be that wasn’t.  There is a 
wealth of judicial opinion supporting the proposition that Janus-faced legislation is to be avoided.366   
It is ‘contrary to the general principle that legislation, by which the conduct of mankind is to be 
regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts and ought not to change 
the character of past transactions carried out upon the faith of the then existing law’.367   The 
persuasiveness of these arguments against Janus-faced legislation is reflected in the various 
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restrictions and prohibitions of this type of legislation.  The power of these restrictions is evidenced 
by the relative rarity of Janus-faced legislation.  Most constitutions expressly prohibit it.368    
The second thing this section does is to set out some criteria for determining when legislation can be 
Janus-faced.  These are human rights criteria.  The traditional arguments against Janus-faced 
legislation are based upon the rule of law.  Salembier directly links common law temporal 
presumptions to the rule of law.369  Chaturvedi sets out the parameters of his discussion on 
retrospectivity in India by reference to the rule of law.370  The rule of law provides a theoretical 
framework by which the validity of Janus-faced legislation can be evaluated and challenged.  
However, there is a relatively new prism through which Janus-faced legislation can be viewed – the 
prism of human rights.   The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) gives new tools and new 
criteria for evaluating Janus-faced legislation.  Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires all 
legislation to be read, so far as possible, in a way to give effect to the ECHR.   
Human rights jurisprudence has supplanted traditional rule of law distinctions and jurisprudence in 
determining the validity of Janus-faced legislation.  If Janus-faced legislation is to be drafted, the 
principles for drafting are no longer that of the case law developed by judges in elucidating the rule 
of law, they are the criteria set out in the ECHR and the case law flowing from it.  I have previously 
sought to prove this proposition by reference to proceedings within the legislature, and judicial 
decisions around legislation.371 
It is submitted that the move from rule of law criteria to human rights criteria is a good thing.  The 
rule of law is set at the level of general principle, it does not always provide detailed guidance.   The 
ECHR and the case law which flows from it is much more detailed and makes greater distinctions 
between different types of criteria for evaluating Janus-faced legislation in different areas of law.  In 
fact, the rule of law exhorts us to have law which is clear and precise.  Evaluating legislation under 
the clear and precise criteria set out under the ECHR satisfies that exhortation.  Moving from rule of 
law criteria to human rights criteria actually fulfils the precepts of the rule of law.  Furthermore, 
Bingham includes human rights as an element of the rule of law, so using human rights as a drafting 
guide develops the rule of law rather than ignoring it. 
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3.2.1 Three Sub-types of Janus-faced Legislation 
There three sub-types of Janus-faced legislation are retroactive legislation, retrospective legislation 
and legislation that interferes with existing rights. 
3.2.2 Retroactive Legislation 
Retroactive legislation has effect before it was actually made.  The chronological impossibility of this 
is solved by deeming it to have had effect before it was made.  It goes back in time and states that 
the law at that time is what we now say that it was.  To put this another way, the date that it comes 
into effect is earlier than the date it is made.  Retroactive legislation applies to the past and in the 
past.  It can be seen as brazenly unfair and artificial as it states something to exist when it did not 
exist.  It is the easiest type of Janus-faced legislation to recognise and often the hardest to justify.  
Perhaps for this reason, it is also the least common type of Janus-faced legislation. 
Some brief examples of retroactive legislation in the UK can be given.  The Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (NI) 2010 contained a provision that certain council contracts are 
deemed always to have had effect as if the council had power to make them.372   In the Child 
Support, Pensions and Social Security Act (NI) 2000, certain provisions were deemed always to have 
had effect.373    
The War Crimes Act was made in 1991 but criminalises actions carried out in World War 2.  Persons 
can be punished under a law that did not exist at the time they carried out the impugned acts.  
When this Act passed through Westminster, the House of Lords did raise objections based on its 
retroactive nature.  However, as Ganz pointed out, it did not cause a constitutional crisis.374  
The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is also expressly retroactive as it applies to acts committed 
from 1 January 1991 onwards.  Interestingly, the retroactive provisions were only added by way of 
amendments to the 2001 Act by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.375   
The Court of Appeal has adjudicated upon a particular instance of retroactive legislation – this is 
retroactive tax legislation that has effect from the date that the announcement about the new tax 
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law is made in Parliament, rather than the (later) date of when the tax law is actually enacted.376  
The court ruled that this particular type of retroactive legislation was in accordance with human 
rights law. 
3.2.3 Retrospective Legislation 
Retrospective legislation bases future legal consequences upon events that occurred before the 
legislation was made.  It looks back to the past and although it doesn’t apply in the past, it does 
apply future consequences to what happened in the past.  To put this another way, a provision will 
be retrospective if it is impossible to avoid the legal consequences of a past action.  The action 
carried out before the legislation is made has a binding and irreversible legal impact.  This means 
that at the time you do an action, you cannot predict its legal effect. 
In the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (Northern Ireland) Order 2007, paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 
contains a retrospective provision.  A person may be placed on the Children’s Barred List due to 
conduct the person has engaged in at any time.  No matter what actions the person does now, they 
will still be bound by the consequences of a pre-commencement action. 
Laws often set out qualifying or disqualifying conditions for the application of a particular rule.  The 
fact that these conditions may have been satisfied in the past, before the law commences, makes 
the law retrospective rather than retroactive.  Bennion put it this way: 
Changes relating to the past are objectionable only if they alter the legal nature of a past act 
or omission in itself.  A change in the law is not objectionable merely because it takes note 
that a past event has happened, and bases new legal consequences upon it. 377 
Retroactive legislation is easy to identify, as it will normally expressly state that it has effect on a 
date before it was made.  Retrospective legislation won’t necessarily make its backward facing 
component obvious on its face.  It commonly arises when past conduct determines eligibility for a 
post.  The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 provided for the election of police and 
crime commissioners.  Under s. 66(3)(c), a person is disqualified from being a commissioner if the 
person has been convicted of an imprisonable offence.  Although this provision has been criticised as 
being disproportionately harsh, it has not been criticised as being retroactive.378   The provision takes 
note of a past event and bases a current disqualification upon it.  It doesn’t retroactively change the 
legal character of that past event, but it does base future legal consequences upon it. 
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The courts considered this point in R v Field.379   The legislation in that case disqualified people from 
working with children if they had certain criminal convictions.  The convictions could have been 
incurred before the legislation commenced.  The court stated that ‘the effect of disqualification 
orders is entirely prospective, because it only affects future conduct’.  I would rephrase this slightly 
in order to fit in with the taxonomy being suggested in this section.  That legislation falls into the 
retrospective subset of Janus-faced legislation, it isn’t solely prospective as it does look back to the 
past before determining future eligibility. 
In practical terms, it makes social regulation very difficult if only conduct after and not before 
commencement of a new law can be considered.   The court in Antonelli considered whether 
convictions incurred before commencement of the Estate Agents Act 1979 would render a person 
ineligible to be an estate agent.380   The court ruled that ‘it would be quixotic to suppose that 
Parliament intended that the public should be protected from the activities of a practitioner 
convicted a week after the Act came into force, but not from those of the practitioner convicted a 
week before’.381 
3.2.4 Legislation that interferes with existing rights 
Even though legislation only takes effect in the future, it can affect historic rights, or in other words, 
interfere with rights being exercised before the legislation commences.  This type of legislation takes 
effect in the future, but may prejudice rights accrued or enjoyed in the past.  Citizens might have 
done something in reliance upon a particular law, and when a new law is made, it might affect their 
existing activities.  This can be distinguished from retrospective legislation.  If it is possible to avoid 
the legal consequences of a past action then, even though the person may suffer some 
disadvantage, it will be an interference with existing rights.   
The Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 required persons possessing a firearm to hold a firearms 
certificate.  If X possessed a firearm before commencement, then upon commencement, X has 3 
choices: (1) get rid of the firearm, (2) keep the firearm and break the law, or (3) keep the firearm and 
get a licence.  X has a choice, an opportunity to avoid the legal consequences of having a firearm 
without a certificate.  The Order interferes with existing rights, but the legal consequences are 
avoidable.  Contrast this with the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups (NI) Order 2007 – if X had 
engaged in certain conduct with a child in the past, X could not avoid the legal consequences of that 
conduct. 
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The courts have drawn a clear distinction between retroactivity and interference with existing 
rights.382   The distinction was confirmed in the Axa case by Lord Reed.  He held that  
A distinction might, however, be drawn between laws which alter prospectively the rights 
and obligations arising from pre-existing legal relationships, and laws which alter such rights 
and obligations [retroactively].383  
It is when there is an interference with an existing right combined with the interference being 
conditional upon past conduct that the blurring between the different sub-types of Janus-faced 
legislation is most pronounced.  The Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1956 contained a provision 
requiring disqualification as a solicitor’s clerk for certain offences.  A clerk had a conviction from 
1953, before the Act was made, but was nevertheless disqualified from acting under the auspices of 
the Act.  The Court of Appeal in Re A Solicitor’s Clerk ruled that the Act 
is not in truth retrospective.  It enables an order to be made disqualifying a person from 
acting as a solicitor’s clerk in the future and what happened in the past is the cause or 
reason for the making of the order, but the order has no retrospective effect.  …  This Act 
simply enables disqualification to be imposed for the future which in no way affects anything 
done by the appellant in the past.384  
In this case, the legislation was both retrospective (applying to pre-commencement acts) and 
interfered with existing rights (affecting persons currently practising as solicitor’s clerks). 
The Estate Agents Act 1979 was construed in a similar way.  It contained provisions prohibiting 
persons from being estate agents if they had certain criminal convictions.  The person in Antonelli 
was already an estate agent and already had a conviction before the Act was commenced.  
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that the Act applied to persons already acting as estate 
agents and to convictions incurred before the Act commenced. 
3.2.5 A drafting solution – transitional and savings provisions 
The perceived unfairness of interfering with existing rights is well recognised in the development of 
legislative policies.  So much so, that there is an established mechanism for dealing with it – by way 
of transitional and saving provisions.  Transitional provisions normally govern the transition from an 
old regime to a new one.  Savings are similar, and protect existing rights that may be affected by the 
new regime.  Where an existing right would be interfered with by new legislation, transitional and 
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saving provisions often soften the blow.  Even more specifically, there are ‘grandfather’ clauses – if 
your grandfather was allowed to do a thing under the old law, then you as his descendant can 
continue to do that thing. 385 
With transitional and savings provisions there are five specific drafting techniques to ameliorate the 
harshness of Janus-faced legislation. 
Firstly, the authorisation granted under the previous law for doing a thing can be treated as if it was 
an authorisation under the new law.  The Firearms (NI) Order 2004 has already been mentioned in 
the context of interference with existing rights.  There is an additional piece of legislation that 
ameliorates the position for persons already possessing firearms who held a certificate under the 
previous legislation.  The Firearms (NI) Order 2004 (Commencement and Transitional Provisions) 
Order 2005 provided that firearms certificates granted under the old regime were to be treated as if 
they had been granted under the new regime.  This is a classic example of a grandfather clause.   
Secondly, if you have previously done the thing lawfully, and no authorisation was required, then 
you can continue to do the thing lawfully under the new law, even though you don’t have an 
authorisation under the new law.  Consider a hypothetical example of a person who became a 
barrister before there was a requirement to hold a law degree.  If the law was changed and required 
all barristers to hold a law degree, a savings provisions could exempt all existing barristers.  
Thirdly, a person already doing the thing lawfully could be given additional time to comply with a 
new requirement under the new legislation. For example, if a new law prohibits a particular type of 
weapon, existing owners of that weapon could be given a six month grace period in which to dispose 
of it before they face the full rigour of the law. 
Fourthly, a person could be compensated for the law interfering with existing rights, or for depriving 
them of their property.  Unbelievable as it may seem today, when slavery was abolished, slave 
owners where ‘compensated’ for losing their slaves.  So, the Slavery Abolition Act 1833 abolished 
slavery, but then in section XXIV went on to state: 
And whereas, towards compensating the persons at present entitled to the Services of the 
Slaves to be manumitted and set free by virtue of this Act for the Loss of such Services, His 
Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal Subjects the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in 
Parliament assembled have resolved to give and grant to His Majesty the Sum of Twenty 
Million Pounds Sterling 
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The subject matter is repugnant to us today, but the principle remains the same, if legislation takes 
away your property, you are entitled to compensation for it.  A more modern example is the Civil 
Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013.  If a person lost their job as a special adviser 
because of this Act, then the Schedule to the Act provides for compensation to be paid to them. 
Fifthly, the legislation can create a separate and special regime to deal with existing cases.  Rather 
than the standard regime applying to existing cases, a separate regime could apply to them. 
3.2.6 UK terminology to describe Janus-faced legislation 
There is no consensus on the terminology used in the UK to describe Janus-faced legislation.  The 
most common term is ‘retrospective’.  Bobbett analysed terminology used in House of Lords 
judgements since 1900 and reported that ‘retrospective’ appears 826 times with ‘retroactive’ 
appearing 167 times.386   A search of the database of Northern Irish legislation reveals that 
‘retrospective’ appears in 10 statutes whereas ‘retroactive’ appears in none.387   In fact, when 
searching UK statutes as a whole, ‘retrospective’ appears in over 200 statutes whereas ‘retroactive’ 
appears in only one piece of primary legislation.388   Greenberg accurately describes the UK approach 
when he states that ‘the terms “retrospective” and “retroactive” are generally used either 
interchangeably or, at least, without clear difference’.389    
For reasons I have discussed more fully elsewhere,390 I favour the taxonomy adopted in this section, 
which follows on from the taxonomy of Driedger,391 Sullivan,392 Salembier393 and Twining and 
Miers.394 
3.2.7 Using the rule of law as a guide for drafting Janus-faced legislation 
The common law approach of the rule of law with respect to Janus-faced legislation in the UK can be 
set out as follows.395  If a provision can be classified as retroactive, it is problematic.  If it is 
retrospective or interferes with existing rights, it does not offend against the rule of law.  If it is 
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retroactive but deals with procedural matters, it is not problematic – retroactive changes to 
procedure are assumed to be of benefit to the individual.  If it is retroactive and makes a substantive 
change to the law, it is problematic.  If the substantive retroactive change is to civil law, it is less 
problematic.  If the substantive retroactive change is to criminal law, it is very problematic. This is a 
general approach, so all the preceding propositions should be read as subject to the word ‘usually’.   
This final prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation is probably the most important and deserves 
to be analysed in slightly more detail.  Mokhtar traced its roots back to ancient law.396   The 
prohibition can be divided into two related principles.  The first is nullem crimen sine lege, no crime 
without law.  The impugned act must have been a crime at the time when it was committed.  The 
second is nulla poena sine lege, no punishment without law.  A heavier penalty for a crime cannot be 
imposed than the penalty that existed at the time the crime was committed.  Since at least the time 
of the Nuremburg War Trials, this has been subject to a caveat that some things have always been 
crimes, regardless of what the domestic law says.  For a legislative example of nullem crimen, see 
paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2 to the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides that where a Minister 
makes a remedial order (remedying some human rights defect), the order cannot retroactively make 
a person guilty of an offence. 
Given the sovereignty of Parliament, the courts do not have a rule prohibiting Janus-faced primary 
legislation.  Instead, there are a series of presumptions as described by Bennion in his Codes.397  
Thus, there is a general ‘presumption against retrospective operation’ under Code 97.  This includes 
subdivisions depending on whether there is a civil law disadvantage suffered or whether there is a 
criminal law disadvantage. Code 98 sets out a different presumption where the retroactive provision 
is procedural in nature.  Code 99 sets out further presumptions where events occur over a period of 
time.  Code 100 and 101 set out more presumptions dealing with Janus-faced legislation.  Sampford 
sets out a classification of Janus-faced legislation that may make it more amenable to rule of law 
evaluation.398  
The main difficulty with using the rule of law as a drafting criteria on prospectivity, is that there is a 
binary decision about whether to classify something as ‘retrospective’ in which case it may be 
problematic, or ‘prospective’ in which case it is fine.  This does not recognise the subtleties between 
the different sub-sets of Janus-faced legislation.  Nor does it recognise that retrospective legislation 
and legislation that interferes with existing rights might sometimes be more unfair than retroactive 
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legislation.  Salembier considers this as a valid criticism of the Canadian presumption against 
retroactive legislation.399   Turatsinze argued that the theoretical differences between retroactive 
and retrospective legislation did not lead to practical differences in terms of their impact on 
individual rights.400   Consider again the estate agent in Antonelli and the solicitor’s clerk in Re A 
Solicitor’s Clerk.  They had both been in their job for a number of years.  No evidence had been 
brought of any problems this had caused to clients.  Nevertheless, as the law was characterised as 
‘prospective’, they were essentially sacked by Act of Parliament without any form of redress.  
However, this is not so much a criticism of the rule of law as a criticism of the common law 
classification of Janus-faced legislation. 
3.2.8 Using the ECHR as a guide for drafting Janus-faced legislation 
There is a specific prohibition on substantive retroactive criminal law in Article 7 of the ECHR.  
However, there is no general prohibition on Janus-faced legislation. Rather, there are specific rights 
that could in theory be infringed by such legislation. Therefore, unlike the rule of law criteria, there 
is no binary logic stating that if a provision is retroactive it is problematic, but if not, then it isn’t.  The 
key criterion for human rights jurisprudence is not the sub-type of Janus-faced legislation that a 
legislative provision falls into, rather the matter is determined by the substance of the provision 
itself and the nature of the right infringed. 
This means that there is no separate and discrete body of principles for evaluating Janus-faced 
legislation.  Rather, each case is assessed under the body of case law which has developed around 
the specific right alleged to have been infringed.  It is beyond the scope of this section to set out all 
criteria used for evaluating whether a legislative provision is compliant with the ECHR.  Instead, it 
selects the main Convention rights where Janus-faced legislation may occur and examines the 
judgements made in those cases. 
Article 6 – right to a fair trial 
Everyone is entitled to a fair trial, before an independent tribunal, in determination of their civil 
rights.  If the legislature changes the law upon which a party to a case relies, then that party may not 
get a fair trial.  According to Knight ‘where the state legislates retrospectively on a matter which 
effectively determines the substance of an existing dispute, making it pointless for proceedings to 
continue, that can be a breach of Article 6’.401   The leading case is Zielinski & others v France (2001) 
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31 EHRR 19.  The court there held that Article 6 precludes ‘any interference by the legislature – other 
than on compelling grounds of the general interest – with the administration of justice designed to 
influence the judicial determination of a dispute’.402    
Therefore, if the legislature retroactively changed the law to pre-determine the outcome of a 
particular case, that would infringe Article 6 unless there was a compelling public interest.  However, 
if a retroactive Bill incidentally affected existing cases along with future cases, the Bill would only 
infringe Article 6 if it was ‘manifestly without reasonable justification’.403   The key question is not 
where on the spectrum of Janus-faced legislation a provision lies, but the justification and fairness of 
it. 
Article 7 – no punishment without law 
Article 7 contains two rights.  Firstly, ‘no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law 
at the time when it was committed.’  Secondly, ‘nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one 
that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed’.  The European Court of Human 
Rights in SW v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 36 held that Article 7 embodied the rule of law principle of nullem 
crimen.404    The Convention only allows one exception to the prohibition on retroactive criminal 
legislation –  if the act was, at the time it was committed, ‘criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations’.  This is the exception relied upon in the two Acts 
previously discussed, the War Crimes Act 1991 and the International Criminal Court Act 2001 and 
flows on from the Nuremberg War Trials. 
As has been seen, the old UK case law of Antonelli and Re A Solicitor’s Clerk characterised 
disqualification from a position as a future consequence of a past action.  On that basis, such a 
provision was acceptable.  However, the ECHR approach asks instead whether a criminal penalty is 
now being imposed for that past action.  In this context, the specific sub-type of Janus-faced 
legislation is less relevant.  What is relevant is whether a criminal penalty is now being imposed for 
something which wasn’t criminal at the time when it was committed.  The test for this is set out in 
Achour v France (2007) 45 EHRR 2 
The court must therefore verify that at the time when an accused person performed the act 
which led to his being prosecuted and convicted, there was in force a legal provision which 
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made that act punishable, and that the punishment imposed did not exceed the limits fixed 
by that provision.405  
The court in Welch v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 247 gave specific guidance on the meaning of ‘criminal 
penalty’.  It said that the concept of a penalty is an autonomous Convention concept.406   The 
following factors should be considered: 
 Whether the measure is imposed following conviction for a criminal offence 
 Nature and purpose of the measure in question 
 Characterisation under national law 
 Procedures involved in the making and implementation of the measure 
 Severity407  
Welch concerned confiscation orders made under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986.  A pre-
requisite under the Act was that a person had been convicted of a drugs offence.  Once this trigger 
had been pulled, the person could be made the subject of a confiscation order in respect of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking, whether those proceeds had been gained before or after the 
commencement of the Act.  The court ruled that this breached Article 7.  The court in Jamil v France 
(1995) 21 EHRR 65 ruled that imprisonment for non-payment of a customs fine was not simply a 
matter of enforcement of payment, but a punitive sanction.  The court in Kafkaris v Cyprus (2009) 49 
EHRR 35 ruled that changing the prison rules on the meaning of ‘life imprisonment’ post conviction 
did not amount to retroactively changing the law.  However, the law had not been formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the individual to discern the scope of his life imprisonment, so Article 7 
was breached in the wider sense. 
The case most directly in point on the nature of a criminal penalty is R v Field.408  The court there 
proceeded on the assumption that disqualification from a particular post was not a criminal penalty.  
It was a preventative measure whose main purpose was to protect children, it was not designed as a 
penal measure to punish someone. 
 Article 8 – right to private and family life 
Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for their private and family life.  Janus-faced 
legislation can infringe upon this right if something done in the past constitutes a legal impediment 
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to enjoying your private and family life – for example if past conduct disqualifies you from 
employment in a particular profession. 
Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania arose out of the post-communist reconstruction in Lithuania.409    
It concerned a legal prohibition on employment which related to the entirety of the public sector as 
well as to many private sector jobs.  A person would be ineligible for these jobs if they had, before 
the legislation came into force, been a member of the KGB (or other state security body).   The 
European Court of Human Rights found that there had been a violation of Article 8 in conjunction 
with Article 14.  The Court found that Lithuania did have a legitimate right to regulate both private 
and public sector employment.  However, the court found the breadth of the prohibition 
objectionable and disproportionate.  The particular provision could be characterised as retrospective 
(future consequences of past actions) and interfering with the existing rights of those already in 
post.  However, this was not the key criterion upon which the judgement was based.  Judgement 
was based upon the breadth of the prohibition, not its location in the Janus-faced legislation 
spectrum. 
Article 9 – freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
Article 9 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  Janus-
faced legislation can interfere with this if some past conduct exercising this right colours the 
enjoyment of some current right.  In Thlimmenos v Greece, the applicant was disqualified from being 
a chartered accountant as he had a conviction for a serious crime. 410    The serious crime was a 
refusal to wear his military uniform during a general mobilisation.  He had been duly convicted of 
this crime, but his motivation for refusing to wear the uniform was religious - he was a Jehovah’s 
Witness. 
The European Court of Human Rights held that the general rule of prohibiting persons with 
convictions for serious crimes was legitimate.  However, the Court ruled that the legislation should 
have differentiated between different cases.  In a case where the conviction arose from the right to 
freedom of religion, it was not justified to disqualify the person.  There was no objective justification 
for treating conscientious objectors the same as other criminals.  Article 9, in conjunction with 
Article 14, had been infringed.  The question of whether the legislation was retroactive, 
retrospective or interfered with existing rights did not arise.  At issue was whether Article 9 was 
breached, and if the legislation was objectively justified in treating different people the same. 
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Article 10 – freedom of expression 
Article 10 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  Similar to the Art 8 rights, 
this right can be infringed where the past exercise of it can mean disqualification from a particular 
job.   
The European Court of Human Rights considered a number of cases from Germany where past (and 
present) political activities disqualified persons from being teachers.  The teachers were all civil 
servants and, as such, owed a duty of loyalty to the constitutional principles of the German 
democratic state.  It was argued that active membership of a communist party would breach this 
loyalty and that therefore the teachers should be disqualified.  In Glasenapp v Germany, the Court 
ruled that such disqualifications were not in breach of Article 10.411   However, the Court also ruled 
in Vogt v Germany that such disqualifications were a breach of Article 10.412   It is hard to see why 
these cases where decided differently.  The arguments in both cases were not focused on when the 
communist activity took place.  The arguments were focused on whether the right to freedom of 
expression had been interfered with and whether such interference was justified. 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 – right to property 
Everyone has the right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.  No-one is to be deprived of their 
possessions except in the public interest and in accordance with the law.  The state can interfere 
with possessions in the public interest or to secure the payment of tax.  When the state seeks to 
interfere with property rights, human rights jurisprudence has distilled the matter to: (a) is the 
interference for a legitimate aim? and (b) is the interference proportionate to achieving that aim?   
The case of Mellacher v Austria (1989) 12 EHRR 391 concerned rent control legislation which applied 
to existing leases.  Although Lord Reed characterised this as a civil law with retroactive effects,413 I 
would respectfully disagree.  It is a law which interferes with existing rights.  The European Court of 
Human Rights itself observed that ‘in remedial social legislation … it must be open to the legislature 
to take measures affecting the further execution of previously concluded contracts in order to attain 
the aim of the policy adopted.’414    The backward facing nature of the rent control legislation was 
one factor to consider in deciding upon its validity, but the main criteria were as set out in the 
previous paragraph: was the interference legitimate and proportionate? 
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The legislation in Bäck v Finland allowed courts to modify pre-existing creditor / debtor 
arrangements.415   The European Court again noted that the legislation authorised interference with 
existing rights.  This could be acceptable under the ECHR, but there would need to be ‘special 
grounds of sufficient importance to warrant it’.416   Although the Janus-faced nature of the legislation 
was relevant, the main criteria remained the same as for any decision under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol: was the interference legitimate and was it proportionate? 
3.2.9 Conclusion on efficacy of prospectivity as a drafting principle 
Four conclusions can be drawn from all this.  Firstly, if legislation is drafted to be prospective then it 
is predictable and satisfies this element of the rule of law.  Secondly, prospectivity is not generally 
accurately defined in the UK.  The taxonomy of Janus-faced legislation set out in this section will 
indicate better on what side of the line a particular provision falls.  Thirdly, prospectivity is a weak 
rule of law requirement as it can be over-ridden for good reasons, or as Bingham says it need only be 
obeyed so far as is possible.  Fourthly, criteria for determining what is a ‘good reason’ can be found 
in the ECHR and the jurisprudence under it.  In Axa Insurance the UK courts adopted the ECHR 
reasoning to rule that retrospective civil legislation in the UK was in accordance with the rule of law 
and the ECHR.417 
3.3 Determinacy 
Legislation is predictable if it is determinate.  Determinacy means that it has fixed or exact limits, it is 
certain and precise.  According to Simson Caird ‘the rule of law requires laws to be reasonably 
certain’.418  Determinacy is concerned with the words used in the legislation, and the construction of 
those words into sentences.  Provided the legislation is intelligible, determinacy means that there is 
no doubt about what it means, there are no grey areas.  Readers can examine the legislation and can 
then be certain of the legal effect of their own actions. 
There are two aspects to determinacy: legislation must be unambiguous and legislation must be 
precise.  Xanthaki argues for unambiguity and precision because ‘they render the law predictable’,419 
and Dickerson includes vagueness and ambiguity in his list of drafting diseases.420 In fact, virtually all 
of the major works on legislative drafting include strong requirements in favour of unambiguity and 
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precision.421  Indeterminacy can also arise from a wide degree of discretion of legislation, but this is 
considered separately below in section 3.9 
There are limits to what a drafter can do to combat indeterminacy where the policy itself is 
indeterminate.   VanSickle-Ward has investigated the causes of a lack of specificity in statutes.  Her 
conclusion is that the greater the degree of fragmentation in a state (partisan legislators, division 
between different arms of government, powerful and heterogeneous interest groups etc.) then the 
more likely the legislation is to be vague.422  Her analysis is from the political science perspective, but 
her findings indicate the limits of the power of legislative drafters – if the policy instructions are 
vague, then there is little the drafter can do to make the legislation specific.  Depending upon the 
perspective of the legislator, this can set up a tension between legislator and drafter, with the 
legislator seeking vagueness in order to keep political supporters on board, with the drafter seeking 
determinacy in order to satisfy the rule of law. 
3.3.1 Unambiguity 
What is unambiguity? 
A legislative provision is ambiguous if it can have more than one meaning.423  This isn’t a question of 
nuance or shades of meaning, it is a clear distinction between two completely separate and distinct 
meanings, both of which could legitimately be argued as the ‘correct’ meaning.  This is an important 
qualifier, that the interpretation is ‘legitimate’.  Language, by its very nature is not 100% precise as 
there is no such thing as perfect communication whereby 100% of the meaning intended by one 
person by the use of a word will be 100% understood by the reader of that word in that way.  I am 
discounting what could be termed fanciful or absurd constructions of a word leading to it being 
considered as ambiguous. 
If a legislative provision is ambiguous, then the reader cannot predict its legal effect, and can’t use it 
as a guide to action.  Xanthaki uses the analogy of overlapping circles of meaning, the ambiguous 
word could fall equally within either circle.  Take the example of a ‘light’ truck – the word light could 
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mean light in terms of weight, or light in terms of colour.  If we draw a circle entitled ‘colour’ and a 
circle entitled ‘weight’ then the word ‘light’ could be placed in the intersection of these two circles. 
Xanthaki includes the quality of unambiguity as one of the criteria for quality of legislation in her 
hierarchy.424  She proceeds on the basis that law is there in order to have effect, and if it is 
ambiguous, it cannot have effect.  My underlying rationale is different, that legislation ought to be in 
accordance with the rule of law, but the end result is the same, that legislation ought not to be 
ambiguous. 
There are two different types of ambiguity – semantic and syntactical.  Semantic ambiguity is at the 
level of individual words – the words can have different meanings.  Many words are polysemous in 
the English language – they have multiple meanings.  Using Dorsey’s example, a seal is both a marine 
mammal and also a form of official approval on a document, so a legislative requirement for a ‘seal’ 
is, by reference solely to that word, ambiguous. 425  ‘Tata Jesus is bangala’ says the missionary in the 
Congo in The Poisonwood Bible, an unfortunately ambiguous word as it can either mean that Jesus is 
precious, or Jesus is poisonwood.426 
Syntactical or grammatical ambiguity arises from the construction of words into phrases.  The phrase 
itself can mean more than one thing, either by regards to the placement of the words alongside each 
other, or the use of punctuation.  For example, if a sentence contains two nouns and one pronoun, 
which of the nouns does the pronoun refer to? Or if there is an adjective followed by two nouns, 
does the adjective refer to the first noun, or both nouns? 
There is a particular form of semantic ambiguity when a word is used which has a general meaning, 
but also one which is particular to a specific semiotic community.  There will be such a community if 
‘they share a common understanding of words and phrases which the larger community do not 
share’.427  Thornton gives the example of ‘issue’, which will mean a point of argument for most 
people, but for chancery lawyers it will mean offspring, and for philatelists an issue of stamps.428   
But what meaning should be followed when such a word appears in legislation, the ‘ordinary’ 
meaning or the ‘technical’ one?  For Sullivan, as a matter of statutory interpretation the ‘ordinary 
meaning of a legislative text is the meaning intended by the legislature. In the absence of a reason to 
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reject it, the ordinary meaning prevails’.429  Emon argues that this difficulty is to be resolved by 
looking at the audience of the statute, so if the statute is directed at a technical audience, then the 
technical meaning must prevail, but if directed at the populace at large, then the ordinary meaning 
must prevail.430  Unfortunately, the courts can take a different approach, as in Will-Kare where the 
courts took a technical meaning of the word ‘sale or lease’ even though it appeared in the Income 
Tax Act, a statute applying to everyone.431 
Is unambiguity always necessary? 
Although there may be times when vagueness / lack of precision may be regarded as acceptable (see 
further below), it is hard to see any circumstances in which ambiguity is acceptable in legislation.  
The alternative meanings of ambiguous legislative provisions can be equally reasonable and this 
makes it impossible for citizens to know what the actual law is.  The only justification is political, as 
set out in section 3.1.1 – ambiguous legislation to ensure that a contested statute is enacted. 
Drafting techniques to enhance unambiguity 
Having established that legislation ought to be unambiguous, how then is the drafter to do this?  
There are several techniques. 
Firstly, where possible, avoid ambiguous words. So if the reasonable reader would be confused by 
the meaning of a word in a statute, use a word which is not ambiguous.  For example ‘partner’ could 
mean business partner or romantic partner, so if the second meaning is intended, use ‘spouse’.432  
However, this is not a very strong abjuration, as many words in English are polysemous, and avoiding 
them all would make drafting very difficult. 
Secondly, consider the context.  This is probably the key concept, which saves many provisions from 
being ambiguous.  Going back to Dorsey’s example, if a document is required to have an official seal, 
it is abundantly clear from the context that this means a stamp, not a marine mascot.  The words in 
context (both the sentence and the statute as a whole) will remove many ambiguities. This chimes 
with Watkin’s advice that ‘clarity of expression therefore requires that it should be clear which of the 
several meanings which a word may bear is intended in a particular context’.433  So the drafter must 
ensure that the context within which a polysemous word is set resolves any potential ambiguities.  
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This requires a holistic appreciation of the text as a whole. So a bald requirement that “Each 
customer must be supplied with a fork” is ambiguous, but that ambiguity is resolved if the title of 
that provision is “Requirements for a restaurant” or “Requirements for a gardening centre”.  The 
context tells the reader if it is a fork for eating, or a fork for gardening. 
Thirdly, use definitions. If there could be a doubt over the light truck, then include a definition that 
‘light truck means a truck under 1,000 kg’.  Readers will normally expect words to have the ordinary, 
dictionary meaning.  If a word is intended to having a different meaning, or a particular technical 
meaning, then that meaning should be given in a definition section. 
Fourthly, use grammar and punctuation appropriately.  The running joke in Truss’s popular book on 
punctuation is on the meaning of the sentence ‘the giant panda eats shoots and leaves’.434   
Including a comma after ‘eats’ gives the sentence a completely different complexion.  Grammar does 
supply rules that allow for unambiguity.  Take for example the rule of the last antecedent. This rule 
states that where there is a list followed by a qualifier, the qualifier applies only to the last item on 
the list. This can be illustrated by the contract law dispute described by Adams.435  The contract 
provision stated: 
Subject to the termination provisions of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective 
from the date it is made and shall continue in force for a period of five (5) years from the 
date it is made, and thereafter for successive five (5) year terms, unless and until terminated 
by one year prior notice in writing by either party. 
At issue was whether the qualifying phrase (terminated by 1 year notice) applied only to subsequent 
contract periods, or also to the first contract period.  The rule of last antecedent indicates that it 
applies only to the last item in the list.  This contract provision contains a syntactical ambiguity which 
can be resolved by application of the rule of last antecedent.436   
However, this is a perfect example of a failure of drafting.  The provision was so ambiguous it 
required court proceedings to determine the full meaning, and only then by reliance on an obscure 
grammatical rule.  Citizens should not be subjected to this level of unpredictability.  Instead of 
relying on arcane grammar points to resolve ambiguity, the ambiguity should be avoided in the first 
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place. This leads onto the fourth way to remove ambiguities – by proper formatting.  Formatting is 
an easy way to remove ambiguity of this sort.  Thus, the provision should have read: 
Subject to the termination provisions of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective 
from the date it is made and shall continue in force 
(a) for a period of five (5) years from the date it is made, and  
(b) thereafter for successive five (5) year terms,  
unless and until terminated by one year prior notice in writing by either party. 
If the termination clause is intended to apply to only (b), then it can be reformatted so that it only 
appears in relation to (b). 
Polysemous words and ambiguous language are precisely the sort of area where the unreasonable 
reader can make mischief by misconstruing the statute.  So, if there is a reasonable argument that a 
provision is ambiguous, the drafter ought to resolve this by context, by definitions, by grammatical 
rules or by proper formatting. 
3.3.2 Precision 
What is precision? 
Legislation is precise (and thus predictable) if it is fixed and certain – the reader knows both the 
limits of the law and its details.  The reverse is imprecise or vague legislation – legislation which 
doesn’t contain sufficient specific information to allow a person to know what its effect will be.   
Writing within the context of legal determinacy, Dorf stated that ‘if the application of a rule requires 
deliberation about its meaning, then the rule cannot be a guide to action in the way that a 
commitment to the rule of law appears to require’.437   There are two broad ways in which legislation 
can be fail to be precise, firstly by using vague words or phrases, and secondly by a lack of specificity 
or detail. 
Turning then to vagueness.  Vagueness means that the boundaries of a word or phrase are in 
doubt.438  The core meaning may be clear, but the outer limits, or the length that the word extends 
to are not certain.  Xanthaki’s example is the word ‘vehicle’.  Most people would agree that it 
includes a car, but does it include a motorbike, or a snow-mobile, or a horse drawn carriage?  Like a 
stone thrown into a pond, the ripples of meaning spread far and wide – how do we know where the 
ripples stop? The core of the word is clear, so most people would agree that vehicle includes cars, 
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lorries and motorbikes.  But it is at the edges that the meaning of the word becomes blurred and 
indistinct.  
Nouns like ‘vehicle’ have a reasonably distinct core meaning that most people would be able to 
agree upon.  But there are other more general words where the boundaries of the word are much 
less distinct.  These words can cover different types of activities and are, of their nature, more 
indeterminate.  Words like “reasonable”, “necessary”, “appropriate” or “due care” give rise to a 
much wider spectrum of possible interpretation.  Citizens will know that they need a licence to drive 
a car, because: 
It is an offence for a person to drive on a road a motor vehicle of any class otherwise than in 
accordance with a licence authorising him to drive a motor vehicle of that class.439 
But citizens may not know precisely what kind of activity is prohibited by the following: 
If a person drives a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place without 
due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the 
road or place, he is guilty of an offence.440 
Then there are words that are so broad that they lack sufficient determinacy to allow citizens to set 
their affairs in order.  Lord Rodger criticises words like ‘almost’ or ‘perhaps’ in legislation ‘since 
legislation is meant to delimit rights and duties exactly’.441  I haven’t found any of these vague words 
in legislation, but there are some provisions which are equally vague.442 
Turning next to a lack of specificity.  Legislation ought to set out the details of the law, rather than 
leave citizens to guess at those details.  Legislation is not a sketch, or a rough guide to legal 
obligations, it is a detailed, exact and precise list of those obligations.  It is not the job of citizens to 
fill in the blanks left by a statute – how are they meant to follow the law if the law isn’t specific 
about what its requirements are?  The Supreme Court has considered this particular point in 
Reilly.443  That case revolved around the lack of specificity in Regulations.  Section 17A of the 
Jobseeker’s Act 1995 stated that  
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Regulations may make provision for or in connection with imposing on claimants in 
prescribed circumstances a requirement to participate in schemes of any prescribed 
description that are designed to assist them to obtain employment. 
Regulation 2 of the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme) Regulations 
2011, made under s.17A, stated that 
‘The Employment, Skills and Enterprise Scheme’ means a scheme within section 17A … 
known by that name and provided pursuant to arrangements made by the Secretary of State 
that is designed to assist claimants to obtain employment or self-employment, and which 
may include for any individual work-related activity (including work experience or job 
search). 
The Supreme Court held that regulation 2 was ultra vires because it wasn’t precise enough, it didn’t 
actually specify any scheme, all it did was mention a scheme.  The Court of Appeal stated  
The question as to precisely how much detail must be included in the Regulations in order to 
comply with the requirements of the Act does not arise for consideration in this appeal, 
since the Regulations contain none.444 
In agreeing with this decision, the Supreme Court spoke of ‘the importance of legal certainty’ 
particularly where a statute has a significant impact upon a person’s livelihood.445  Another example 
from Northern Ireland is abortion law, where there has been a long-standing argument that the 
legislation is too imprecise for people to know what the actual law on abortion is.446 
Is precision always necessary? 
The starting point is that law should be precise.  The courts have been quite clear about this, ruling 
that  
‘John Citizen’ should not be in complete ignorance of what rights over him and his property 
have been secretly conferred by the Minister … for practical purposes, the rule of law … 
breaks down because the aggrieved subject’s legal remedy is gravely impaired.447 
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The US courts have gone a stage further, developing the concept of ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine.448  
This doctrine means that a court can strike down any statute that is too vague.  Legislation is void for 
vagueness if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is 
so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement’.449  Cunnion 
specifically points the finger at bad rule making if a statute is void for vagueness.450  This doctrine is 
not available to UK courts, although they did strike down the Regulations in Reilly for being ultra 
vires.   
However, precision is not an absolute value.  In general terms, it is better for law to be precise than 
for it to be imprecise.  There are four reasons why sometimes absolute precision is not a good thing.  
 Firstly, precision can sometimes lead to over-precision or prolixity.  According to the Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel of Ireland, ‘It is frequently unnecessary to name every single thing you are 
forbidding or requiring.  An overzealous attempt at precision may result in redundancy and 
verbosity.  Drafting too precisely may create unintended loopholes’.451 Xanthaki speaks of the ‘trap 
of over-exhaustiveness’.452  As a hypothetical example, consider if a government wants to ban 
people from destroying polling cards.  The simple way is: 
It is an offence to destroy a polling card. 
An overly-precise way is 
It is an offence to burn, tear, immolate, rip, or chew a polling card. 
In trying to cover all eventualities, in trying to be too specific, two problems have arisen here, (a) 
that the sentence is longer to read and harder to understand, and (b) it has inadvertently left out 
some means of destruction, for example by dipping in acid.  Bingham himself, in a judicial capacity 
criticised a style of interpretation that leads to over-precision 
that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the 
particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages 
immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for 
every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the 
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will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the 
minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament 
intended to achieve when it enacted the statute.453 
Schulz criticises ancient Roman drafting as well as modern UK drafting for the tendency towards 
exhaustiveness ‘legal science was convinced that unambiguous expression of thought could only be 
attained through the medium of pedantic, circumstantial phrasing’ adding in a footnote ‘the nearest 
parallel is the form of the English statute’.454 
Secondly, it can sometimes be hard to set out in minute detail all the individual ways in which a 
statute can be breached.  Sometimes it is better to use a broad and general term.  Going back to the 
offence of driving without due care and attention,455 most people will have a general idea of what 
that means – driving without the appropriate level of care, or not driving carelessly.  The other way 
to approach it would be to say 
It is an offence – 
(a) to drive while talking on a mobile phone, 
(b) to overtake going around a bend, 
(c) to overtake on the brow of a hill, 
(d) to root around in the glove compartment for a CD while driving 
(e) to hold a cigarette in one hand and a drink in the other instead of having both 
hands on the wheel 
(f) etc. 
It will swiftly become apparent that there are a myriad of types of behaviour that we want to 
prohibit, and that the catch-all of ‘driving without due care and attention’ is the most effective way 
to describe them. 
Thirdly, with laws that regulate the activities of government, it can sometimes be necessary to have 
a level of flexibility, so that they can take whatever action is appropriate in the circumstances.  This 
can be contrasted with the precision necessary when a citizen is told to do something on peril of 
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breaking the criminal law.  See for example s. 6(2)(b) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
which states: 
(2) In considering that objective the Authority must, in particular, have regard to the 
desirability of— 
 (b) regulated persons taking appropriate measures (in relation to their 
administration and employment practices, the conduct of transactions by them and 
otherwise) to prevent financial crime, facilitate its detection and monitor its 
incidence; 
‘Appropriate measures’ is an extremely broad term here.  (VanSickle-Ward’s measurement of lack of 
specificity includes the use of terms like: where appropriate, deemed necessary, reasonable charges 
and generally accepted.)456  However, it is used in connection with the duties of the Financial 
Services Authority and it does not impose duties on individuals.  Likewise, the Secretary of State may 
do certain things for ‘the purpose of ensuring that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid 
damage to the environment’.457  As this gives a power to government rather than placing a duty on 
citizens, the benefits of flexibility outweigh the disadvantages of a lack of precision.  This was 
accepted as a valid point in the Reilly case – ‘the self-evident need for flexibility in the precise 
characteristics of any scheme introduced under section 17A render it unlikely that Parliament can 
have intended much, if anything, in the way of specific information about any scheme to be included 
in any regulation made thereunder’.458 
Fourthly, it is not always possible for the legislators to know in advance about the way in which 
society will react to a particular scheme, or know the different kind of factual situations that may 
arise. Although legislators ought to turn their mind to the impact of a law, it isn’t always possible to 
effectively predict every response.  This means it isn’t always possible to specify what is to apply in 
every single case. The US courts have recognised this, stating that 
most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the 
practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity 
with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.  Consequently no more than a reasonable 
degree of certainty can be demanded.459 
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Commenting upon this, Lockwood stated that it is impossible for legislation to achieve what she 
called ‘mathematical certainty’.460  Developing this argument, Soames461 (as summarised by 
Asgeirsson) states that ‘under certain circumstances, it is a good idea for lawmakers to formulate 
laws in vague terms and thereby facilitate their incremental, case-by-case precisfication, resulting 
from adjudication of borderline cases aimed at furthering their rationale’.462  However, I think this 
argument fails (in democratic terms) in its reliance on judges making law.  It also fails in accepting 
that the application of law is unknowable at the time it is made – this is the very opposite of 
predictability. 
As with so many aspects of phronetic legislative drafting, this comes down to a judgement call by the 
drafter, balancing the need for precision against the arguments set out above. The guiding principle 
should be the rule of law, specifically predictability in this case – the law should be sufficiently 
precise so that reasonable people can predict the legal effect of their actions by reference to the 
words in the statute book. 
Drafting techniques to enhance precision 
Much of the drafting techniques on unambiguity apply equally here.  In addition, the following 
techniques can assist with precision. 
Firstly, the use of a general term followed by a non-exhaustive list.  A non-exhaustive list sets out a 
certain level of detail, but states that there may be other points of detail which are not included in 
the list, and the fact that something isn’t included specifically, doesn’t mean that it is excluded.  
Taking the polling card example, it could be phrased as 
It is offence to destroy a polling card, including destroying it by burning, ripping, tearing or 
immolating. 
The fact that we haven’t specifically mentioned ‘or by dipping it in acid’ is no longer problematic 
now, as ‘dipping in acid’ falls within the general heading of ‘destroying’.  There are many ways to set 
up non-exhaustive lists: 
 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, X means … 
 Including, without limitation … 
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 For example, … 
This point can be seen by comparing the Commissioner for Complaints (NI) Order 1996 with its 
successor, the Public Services Ombudsman Act (NI) 2016.  In the 1996 Order, the Commissioner is 
given powers to effect a fair settlement.  IN the 2016 Act, the Ombudsman is given the same power, 
but with an addition “including by recommending that the listed authority make a payment to the 
person aggrieved”.463  In adjudicating upon the 1996 Order, the courts wrestled with the question if 
the Commissioner had a power to recommend a financial payment.464  However, the 2016 Act 
completely avoids the need for litigation as it expressly includes powers to recommend payment.  
Kirkham, in writing about the case, rather misses the point.465  His focus is on statutory 
interpretation when the legislation is unclear, rather than on drafting tools to make the legislation 
clear in the first place. 
Secondly, avoid indeterminate or subjective words where it would place a difficult burden on the 
citizen to understand, and where the consequences of failure to understand would be severe.  So, 
whilst it may be appropriate to require government to take ‘appropriate measures’ it would not be 
sufficiently precise to require citizens to take ‘appropriate measures’ on peril of breach of the 
criminal law. 
Thirdly, encourage the appropriate use of extra-statutory guidance. An indeterminate word or 
phrase may be fleshed out by official guidance.  This goes slightly beyond being a drafting principle 
as it is external to the draft, but the drafter can certainly recommend its use.  For example, there is a 
test for obscenity in the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
For the purposes of this Act an article shall be deemed to be obscene if its effect or (where 
the article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items is, if taken 
as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to 
all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.466 
Without anything more, the test of what is obscene could be as unhelpful to the citizen as the test in 
the American case of Jacobellis v Ohio – ‘I know what it is when I see it’.467  However, the Crown 
Prosecution Service in the UK have written guidance on when they will normally prosecute: 
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It is impossible to define all types of activity which may be suitable for prosecution. The 
following is not an exhaustive list but indicates the categories of material most commonly 
prosecuted:  
 sexual act with an animal  
 realistic portrayals of rape  
 sadomasochistic material which goes beyond trifling and transient infliction of injury  
 torture with instruments  
 …468  
3.4 Stability 
Law is predictable if it is stable.  This means that the law today is reasonably similar to the law 
tomorrow.  The Law Society have pointed out (in relation to rule of law problems in Fiji) that 
‘practical difficulties are created by the frequent amendment of decrees’.469 However, laws cannot 
be expected to remain static forever.  Fuller dismisses the argument that laws must never change so 
as to avoid prejudice to people who entered into contracts on the faith of an existing law.470  That 
way lies ossification and a refusal to let the law evolve in response to changing social circumstances, 
or as the Energy and Climate Change Committee put it ‘policy changes are a fact of life in a 
democracy’.471  Citizens cannot expect the law to remain static and that a social activity will always 
be regulated in the same manner.  In a Canadian case, Dickson J observed that ‘No one has a vested 
right to continuance of the law as it stood in the past’.472 
In fact, the question of how often a law ought to change isn’t really a drafting question at all, it is 
more a political question to be determined by reference to social pressures.  Tax law changes every 
year in response to changing financial pressures – the need for stability does not over-ride the need 
for a balanced budget.  Criminal law changes regularly in response to different political priorities, 
and again, this is entirely appropriate.  For example, if society / legislators see a heightened problem 
with knife crime, then it is perfectly acceptable for the law on knife crime to change in response. 
Therefore, we can say that stability is a weak drafting principle as it can be displaced if there is a 
good reason for it.  The drafter may not be in a position to evaluate what is ‘a good reason’ as the 
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reasons may not have anything to do with legal criteria.  However, the drafter must at the very least 
ensure that there are reasons advanced politically for legislation being unstable. 
3.4.1 The nature of legal change 
A stable law remains relatively constant over time.  Laws can be unstable in two ways: (a) if the 
magnitude of the change is large, or (b) if the frequency of change is high.   
Graphically this can be represented as set out below.   
The stable law line represents law with small changes in magnitude happening relatively 
infrequently.  A quantitative example could be the tax rate for a particular economic activity – it 
changes by a few percent points every couple of years. 
The flip flop law line represents a law with large changes in magnitude. This could mean a complete 
reversal of a previous policy.  An example could be gay marriage: it is unlawful, and then it is lawful, 
a complete change from the previous position, so the magnitude of change is large. 
The regular change line represents a law that changes with great frequency.  Every year the law 
changes (the magnitude of the changes could be large or small).  An example could be laws on 
criteria for welfare payments.  Each year the amount of welfare payments, their type, and the 
criteria for eligibility may change. 
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Although this is set out graphically above, this is an issue that is hard to quantify.  Some legal change 
does have numbers attached to it (for example, the maximum sentence length) and this can be 
measured.  Most legal change is however qualitative and therefore not easily measured. 
3.4.2 Ameliorating the effects of unstable law 
If there is a good reason why the law should not be stable, then the drafter must give effect to this 
policy.  However, the drafter does have some tools to ameliorate the difficulties caused by unstable 
law.  These are set out below. 
 
3.4.3 Highlighting the change 
The greater the magnitude of the change, the more prominent the change should be in the 
legislation.  If a new provision represents a radical departure from the old law, then it should be 
flagged up or highlighted within the legislation.  A large change makes law unpredictable, but we can 
ameliorate this unpredictability by telling citizens in the legislation itself that this is a large change.  
Drafters should always strive to draft legislation which communicates its central messages to 
citizens, this goal is even more important when the central message is a large change to the legal 
system.   A legal provision can be given greater prominence in several ways: being included in the 
title of the Act, being included as part of a section heading, or its relative place in the legislation 
(towards the start, not at the end). 
Take as an example the abolition of the death penalty in the UK.  This could have been done via a 
standard Criminal Justice Act. Instead, it was done in the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 
1965.  Abolishing the death penalty was a major change and citizens were told about it at the very 
outset of the legislation.  As another example, consider devolution for Scotland, contained in the 
Scotland Act 1998.  The very first section states “There shall be a Scottish Parliament”.473  As Lord 
Rodger points out, this is a brilliant opening line.474  It is short, clear and resonant.  However, for the 
purposes of predictability it is also excellent because it makes clear at the very outset the 
revolutionary changes that the Act is making. 
3.4.4 Advertising the change 
Legislation making major change can include an obligation to inform the public at large about that 
change.  The previous drafting technique is about making clear the nature of the legal change within 
the legislation.  But this technique inserts an obligation within the legislation to advertise the 
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change.  This is perhaps best illustrated by way of an example.  The Human Transplantation Bill 
(currently before the Northern Ireland Assembly) will make a substantial change to the law on organ 
donation.  Previously a person would have to opt in (or actively consent) to their organ being 
donated after they die.  Under the Bill, a person would have to opt out (or they would be deemed to 
consent) to donating their organ after they die.  This is a complete change in the law and would have 
a major impact upon people.  Therefore, in clause 1 of the Bill, there is included a duty upon 
government to  
inform the public about the circumstances where consent to transplantation is deemed to 
be given, and the role of relatives and friends in affirming that deemed consent.475 
So the unpredictability caused by a large change in law is ameliorated by including an express duty 
upon the state to tell the public about that change.  Jowell, in expanding upon Bingham’s definition 
calls for precisely this, arguing that the rule of law requires that ‘fair warning should be given about 
any change in the law’.476 
3.4.5 Long lead in time to change 
Thring stated that laws shouldn’t be commenced immediately after being made, that citizens should 
be given a chance to understand the law first.477  If the magnitude of change is large, then it is 
advisable for there to be a long period between the law being made and the law coming into force.  
This gives more time for citizens and government to get used to it and to make full preparations for 
the change.  The unpredictability is smoothed out by allowing time for people to be made fully 
aware of the change.  Taking the organ donation legislation again by way of an example, when this 
law was introduced into Wales, there was a provision within the legislation that stated that the law 
couldn’t be commenced until at least two years after it was made.478  This was inserted to give 
enough time for the population to be told about the radical nature of the change.  Investors argue 
for this kind of stability also:  
if policy changes are announced with sufficient lead time, are in line with the overall 
direction of energy policy, are not retroactive and result from an extensive and objective 
consultation they are acceptable to investors.479 
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3.4.6 Dealing with rapid technological changes 
One cause of frequent change in law is in order to respond to technological change.  So, if a new 
technology is created, or allows for doing something in a different way, it requires new legislation to 
regulate it.  Take as an example medicines law – the law which regulates pharmacies and the sale 
and use of medicines for human use.  The law on prescription only medicines for human use is 
contained in the Human Medicines Regulations 2012.  The following table sets out how many times 
it has been amended since it was enacted.480  These amendments are necessary as new types of 
medicines are constantly being created.   
Year Times Amended 
2015 6 
2014 4 
2013 3 
 
There has always been an arms race between societal innovation and legislative response.  By this I 
mean that society finds a new way to do something (or a new loophole) and then legislation is 
enacted to regulate it (or plug the loophole).  This then leads to fresh innovation and the cycle 
continues.   
This is not a new phenomenon, Rodger gives examples going back to Roman times of laws regulating 
the sale of slaves being abused and then recast to combat the abuses.481  However, there is an 
argument that technological advances speed up this arms race.  Thus, according to Wadhwa, ‘these 
regulatory gaps exist because laws have not kept up with advances in technology. The gaps are 
getting wider as technology advances ever more rapidly’.482  So previously, law might need to change 
once every 10 years in response to societal change, now it needs to change every 1 year in response 
to technological change.  This can be condensed down to the common trope that law is not ‘keeping 
up’, or ‘keeping pace’ with technological change.483  Voermans presents a novel solution that partly 
                                                          
480 Including amendments to the Northern Ireland equivalent regulations. 
481 Rodger in Feldman (n 441) 77. 
482 Vivek Wadhwa, ‘Lawmakers Can’t Keep Up with Technology’ (MIT Technology Review) 
<http://www.technologyreview.com/view/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/> 
accessed 5 January 2016. 
483 Lyria Moses, ‘Adapting the Law to Technological Change:  A Comparison of Common Law and Legislation’ 
(2003) 26 University of New South Wales Law Journal 417.  Michael Shapiro, ‘Is Bioethics Broke?: On the Idea 
of Ethics and Law “Catching up” with Technology’ (1999) 33 Indiana Law Review 17.Lyria Moses, ‘Recurring 
125 
 
addresses this problem.  He advocates greater use of ICT in order to speed up the process for making 
legislation,484  allowing a more rapid response to technological change.  However, this does not 
address the issue of stability in terms of the law changing far too frequently. 
The interaction of technological change and legislation is clearly a broad field of enquiry.  In this 
section, I consider only one aspect, how to maintain stability (and thus predictability) in the law in 
the face of technological change.  On the face it, there are two options, both of which lead to bad 
results. The first option is to repeatedly change the law to react to new technologies.  This makes 
legislation unstable and unpredictable as it is constantly changing.  The medicines law quoted above 
is an example of unstable legislation that is constantly changing.  The second is to leave the law as it 
is.  This results in uncertainty as citizens don’t know if the old law applies to new technologies.  For 
example, does the Theft Act 1968 apply to ‘stealing’ someone’s wifi connection?  
The normal solution which is proposed to this problem is to draft legislation in a way which future-
proofs it.  This means that current legislation will apply in the future, even if there are technological 
changes.  This can be done by drafting legislation in a way which requires the least amount of 
subsequent change in response to future technologies – what is generally called ‘technology neutral’ 
legislation.  Legislation is technology neutral if it ‘neither imposes nor discriminates in favour of the 
use of a particular type of technology’.485  The theory is, that if the legislation simply specifies the 
end result, without specifying the means to that end result, it will not need to change as the 
different means to that end change.   
Take a simple example, communicating a notice to a department.  The table below sets out the 
different ways this requirement can be satisfied.  As can be seen, there is a spectrum of ways to 
refer to technology.  This links into the argument made by Whitley, that there isn’t a simple binary 
choice between technology specific or technology neutral legislation, it is more a question of 
degree.486 
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Technology status Requirement in Legislation Methods that can be 
employed 
Technology specific Notice must be posted  Written hard copy, sent 
through the post 
Partially specific Notice must be in writing Hard copy letter 
Email 
Fax 
Text message  
Technology neutral Notice must be communicated Hard copy letter 
Email 
Fax 
Text message 
Phone call 
Online form filled in (boxes 
ticked etc.) 
Facebook poke 
New forms of communication 
 
In order to make legislation technology neutral, it is often necessary to focus more on principles 
rather than details.  In this way, if the technology changes, the principles will remain constant and 
will be able to guide the interpreter.  This is certainly the conclusion that John reaches, ‘rapid change 
is also a situation in which a non-detailed law is ideal’.487  This requires the drafter to look at the 
justification behind a suggested policy and to draft the rule in order to reflect the justification rather 
than looking simply looking at how the policy will be implemented with today’s technology.  Taking a 
very facile example, the justification behind a rule making it a crime to shoot people is that we don’t 
want people to be injured.  So the principle is ‘don’t injure people with a weapon’, and the detail is 
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‘don’t shoot people with a gun’.  In order to future proof this rule, we can use the principle as our 
rule, rather than the detail, so the rule will be ‘it is an offence to injure a person with a weapon’.  If a 
new technology comes along (say the Taser), our broad principle rule will cover it.  However, if we 
had drafted in a detailed way (‘it is an offence to injure a person with a gun’) then Tasers will cause 
problems as we don’t know if they fall within the detailed definition of ‘gun’. 
Technology neutral drafting is a useful principle to bear in mind and it can work in some 
circumstances.  However, to my view it is a weak drafting principle as there are four problems 
associated with it. 
Firstly, we can’t predict what future technology will do. Our mode of thinking is constrained by 
current paradigms that may be rendered obsolete by future technologies.  Or, as Moses puts it ‘the 
rule may also apply to conduct outside what could have been foreseen at the time of its creation’.488  
Bingham himself specifically addressed this issue in relation to legislative drafting, stating that ‘the 
situation which has arisen is one which the draftsman could not have foreseen and for which 
accordingly he has made no express provision’.489  For example, laws preventing threatening 
communications would work 100 years ago with regards to threatening letters and will work today 
with regards to threatening emails.  But we had no concept of ‘spam’ communications 100 years ago 
so the laws of then couldn’t possibly cope with spam emails today.  So, even if we think we are 
writing technology neutral law today, the environment in which it operates tomorrow may have so 
fundamentally changed that the law will be out of date, no matter how technology neutral we may 
think it is. 
Secondly, the more general the legislation becomes, the more it risks becoming vague and 
unfocused.  If we wanted to really future proof criminal law, we would have a single law which states 
‘it is an offence to harm another person’.  Yes, this would always work, but it allows for no nuance, 
no way of reflecting different sorts of crime and harm. 
Thirdly, in order to make something technology neutral, we may have to draft in more abstract 
ways. For example, if we specifically refer in legislation to ‘a smartphone’ then everyone can 
understand, but if we try to cover future technologies and refer to ‘a hand-held portable electronic 
communication device’ we introduce confusion.  This is exactly the problem with the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Bill 
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The instructions to parliamentary draftsmen were to make it technology-neutral, because 
everyone could see that the technology was moving very fast. Parliamentary draftsmen did 
an excellent job in doing that, but as a result I do not think the ordinary person or Member 
of Parliament would be able to follow the Act without a lawyer to explain how these 
different sections interact.490 
Intelligibility is dealt with in chapter 4, but it touches directly here on future-proofing law.  On this 
point, Smith stated that ‘unintelligibility is a direct consequence of the attempt to future-proof by 
technologically neutral, abstract drafting’.491  Smith went on to directly link this to the rule of law 
requirement that people be able to understand law. 
The fourth problem is more to do with democracy than the rule of law.  If we have technology 
neutral, general principles law, then we are passing on the responsibility to react to new 
technologies to judges rather than legislators.  We are leaving the job of regulating future 
technologies to judges on a case by case basis.  This is what happened in Quintaville.492  In that case, 
the question for the court was whether the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (which 
covered certain types of reproductive technologies) applied to a new type of reproductive 
technology.  The court, taking a liberal and purposive interpretation, and looking at the intention of 
parliament, held that it did.  In my view, Quintaville falls on the correct side of the line as the new 
technology was close enough in type to the old technology, requiring no fresh moral or ethical 
decision making about it – it was clear that as Parliament was intent on regulating similar 
reproductive technologies, it would have wished to regulate this reproductive technology if it had 
existed at the time the legislation was enacted. 
However, it is a rather different proposition when a ‘new’ problem arises out of new technology.  In 
that case, there is much less scope for extending the words of an Act to a novel problem.  So, taking 
the example of piggy-backing on someone’s wifi, this is quite different from the law of theft in the 
Theft Act 1968 and it would be wrong for judges to decide on this rather than Parliament.  Lord 
Wilberforce said: 
there is one course which the courts cannot take, under the law of this country; they cannot 
fill gaps; they cannot by asking the question 'What would Parliament have done in this 
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current case – not being one in contemplation – if the facts had been before it?' attempt 
themselves to supply the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act 
itself.493 
One of Moses’ arguments is that courts are better than legislators at dealing with technological 
change, this is because they are quicker and can deal with new cases incrementally and by 
analogy.494 This is true, but it is a question of degree.  If a judge can deal with a small jump in 
technology by a purposive and broad reading of existing legislation (what is termed ambulatory 
interpretation495), then this may be a cost effective way to deal with the problem.  But anything 
more than a small jump, and anything which would require twisting the current legislation to fit the 
new facts would be undemocratic. 
Drawing the line between acceptable and incremental extension of statute law by judges, and 
unacceptable new law-making by judges is very difficult and beyond the scope of this thesis.  The 
rule of law principle for the legislative drafter is to use technology neutral drafting where this is 
feasible without (a) making uncertain law, and (b) delegating power to make law to judges. 
3.5 Clear commencement 
Legislation rarely comes into force immediately when it is made.  Instead there will be a period 
between its making and its commencement (or coming into force, or coming into operation).  As 
well as making the legislation less navigable, commencement provisions can make the legislation 
less predictable – how is the citizen to know when a new law will come into force?  Consider an 
investor making a decision about whether to buy widgets.  The law regulating the sale of widgets has 
changed, but that change has not yet been commenced.  The legal position is therefore 
unpredictable and the investor does not have sufficient information on which to make a rationale 
business decision.  If she knows the commencement date then she can plan accordingly (for example 
by increasing or decreasing the size of her offer).  The unpredictability is entirely state imposed and 
should be eliminated so far as is possible. 
Predictability will be enhanced if the citizen knows at the outset when the new law will come into 
force, or is given clear information about the commencement date.  This can be done in several 
ways. 
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3.5.1 Commencement date on Act when Act is made 
When the legislation is enacted, it ought to state on its face the actual date when it comes into 
force.  This is the gold standard for predictability.  If different provisions are to be commenced on 
different dates, this should be done as simply as possible, and should be represented as clearly as 
possible, for example in a table. 
On some occasions, there may be a desire from within government to allow for some flexibility on 
commencement dates, thus there may be a request that a Minister is given a power to determine 
the commencement date at some point in the future.  According to Leigh, ‘this allows for flexibility, 
giving time for necessary administrative changes and for the law to be introduced according to 
political expediency’.496   As an example, see the Civil Evidence (Witnesses) Bill.497  This Bill allowed 
for (amongst other things) witnesses to give evidence via a video link.  Because it was not clear how 
long it would take to set up video links in all the courts in Northern Ireland, there was a power to 
commence on a day determined by the Department of Finance and Personnel.  So, when the 
technology was ready, the Bill would be commenced. 
Unfortunately, this also provides an excuse for government inaction – without a fixed date, 
government may drag its heels in establishing the necessary machinery for the Act to be effective.  
Worse still, this makes legislation subject to executive caprice – if a Minister decides she doesn’t like 
a particular statute, then she may simply decide not to commence it.  The courts have directly 
addressed this point.  In the Fire Brigades Union case they held that it was unlawful for the Minister 
to decide never to commence a statute, he was under an on-going obligation to at the very least 
consider commencing a statute.498 
3.5.2 Presentation of commencement dates 
If the actual commencement date does not appear on an Act, it is difficult for citizens to know if it 
has commenced.  This lack of predictability has now been ameliorated by s. 104 of the Deregulation 
Act 2015. That section provides that a commencement provision can be amended after the event to 
include the actual date of commencement. 
3.5.3 Clear repeal date 
It is equally important that the end date of a law is clear and certain.  There are several ways that 
legislation can cease to have effect.  The most common way is express repeal by another statute.  
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So, a new law will make new provision about a subject, and it will then expressly repeal the old law 
regulating that subject.  This gives the reader certainty.  The bad way is implied repeal, where the 
new law is incompatible with the old law, and it therefore impliedly repeals the old law to the extent 
of that incompatibility.  This is lazy law making which leaves the reader uncertain about what the 
actual law is.  I agree with de Paula’s conclusions that ‘explicit clauses are always preferable to 
general revoking’.499 
A relatively uncommon way to end law is the sunset clause.  This is a clause in a statute which states 
when that statue will expire. In many ways, this is an excellent drafting tool for assisting 
predictability, as the user will know in advance when the statute will cease to have effect.500  
However, as Bar-Siman-Tov points out, in many cases the point of temporary legislation  isn’t to give 
a definite end date to the legislation, it is to experiment to see if the temporary legislation actually 
works.501 In fact a sunset clause can be misleading if the sunset date is continually extended, or the 
legislation continually renewed.502 
The final way is the very undesirable situation where a law just becomes obsolete or falls into disuse.  
This makes predictability difficult because the reader won’t know if the statute on the page will 
actually be still applied in practice. This is a very good argument for the work of Law Commissions in 
tidying up the statute book, and statute law repeal Acts in removing obsolete statutes. 
3.6 Consistency 
Consistency in drafting promotes predictability.  The most basic drafting principle here is that a 
statute should not contradict itself – it shouldn’t have ‘simultaneous, mutually inconsistent 
meanings’.503 Kecskés points out that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has internal inconsistencies due to its 
hasty transit through the legislature, ‘proper attention was not given to the text of the bill, thus the 
approved Act contained duplicate provisions on sentencing which were likely to cause confusion’.504  
Watkin points out the efforts by medieval lawyers to resolve inconsistencies in the text of the 
Justinian Digest 
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Faced with contradictions and inconsistencies in the Digest, the jurists who studied it 
responded with a humility to match that of the theologians, believing that through the 
application of reason, the essential consistency and unity of the compilation could be 
demonstrated.505 
But in my view, this is a wasted effort. It would be much better to delete or avoid inconsistencies 
than to try to use sophistry to reconcile them. 
Consistency means much more than simply avoiding direct contradictions within a single statute.  If 
a novel statutory provision is introduced then citizens may not know how it will be applied.  But if a 
statutory provision is introduced which is in resonance with previously interpreted and applied 
provisions, then citizens will have a reasonable assumption that this provision will be interpreted 
and applied in a similar way. For example, the UK statute book is littered with ‘it is an offence to …’ 
and ‘a person commits an offence if …’.  This consistency of language helps readers to quickly 
understand that an offence is being created.  But if the provision states ‘a crime has the following 
elements …’, then this lack of consistency with other statutes creates unpredictability – why is this 
different, is an offence being created? 
However, consistency is not a strong drafting principle.  As with predictability it is subject to the ‘so 
far as is possible’ caveat.  Absolute consistency across the statute book, and blindly following 
precedent stifles innovation and the development of new drafting techniques.  Greenberg entitles 
one of his chapters ‘the pestilential power of precedent’506 and argues strongly in favour of 
individuality in drafting.  Undue consistency also corrals drafters into existing paradigms which may 
not effectively deal with the exigencies of emerging social problems.  Watkin questions whether 
‘received tradition can become invalid by the passage of time’,507 his point is more about whether 
old accepted practices can continue in the modern age, but it applies equally to old accepted 
precedents. 
What then does it mean to draft consistently?  It is submitted that it means (a) similar policies in 
different statutes are given effect by similar legal provisions, (b) similar words used in statutes are 
intended to have similar meanings and (c) the statute book as a whole is generally harmonious.  As 
will be explained further below, I have deliberately said ‘similar’ rather than ‘the same’.  Consistency 
is not the same as continuity or stasis.  It doesn’t mean that there is no change at all.  Every statute is 
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drafted to effect legal change (otherwise there would be no point in enacting new legislation).  
Drafters are not in the business of keeping the law static.  Consistency means that we draft 
legislation in a similar manner over time.  Laws uses a colourful metaphor to describe this, drafters 
must not ‘debase the coinage of communication’.508  Words are what we use to communicate, we 
must use them consistently and with respect in order that we are able to continue to use them (and 
for them to have the same meaning) in the future. 
This is the drafting theory, but how do we give effect to it? 
3.6.1 Words mean the same thing 
Within a single statute, it is imperative that words have exactly the same meaning throughout the 
statute. So if a child is defined as someone aged under 18 in one part of a statute, then that meaning 
should be used throughout the rest of the statute. If you mean the same thing, use the same word, 
but if you mean a different thing, use a different word.  ‘Consistency in this context means being 
repetitive, that is using the same word rather than a synonym’.509  Unlike in literature where a 
synonym may stop the text from being boringly repetitive, in legislation repeating the word shows 
you intend the same meaning to apply.  Elizabeth Barrett Browning could write ‘How do I love thee? 
Let me count the ways’ and then go on to enumerate them.510  Good for poetry, bad for drafting. 
An example of how confusing it can be to use the same phrase to describe two different things can 
be found in the Consumer Credit Directive.511  Article 14 is entitled ‘right of withdrawal’ and deals 
with the right of a consumer to withdraw from a credit agreement within 14 days.  However, article 
15 then goes on to talk about a ‘right of withdrawal, based on Community law’.  However, this right 
of withdrawal does not mean the same thing as the article 14 right of withdrawal, instead it means a 
separate and distinct right of withdrawal from a contract for the supply of goods and services.  The 
reader is left scratching his or her head trying to figure out the meaning, before (hopefully) 
eventually realising that notwithstanding that the same words are used, the meanings are 
completely different. 
It is superficially attractive to argue that words must also mean the same across the entirety of the 
statute book.  So, if we say ‘child’ anywhere in legislation, it will always mean someone under the 
age of 18.  However, this would not allow for necessary distinctions to be made in those different 
statutes.  Take tax, electoral and immigration law and their definitions of ‘resident’ as an example.  
                                                          
508 Laws, ‘Plus ca Change - Continuity and Change in UK Legislative Drafting Practice’ (n 336). 142. 
509 Martineau and Salernon (n 421) 59. 
510 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, ‘How Do I Love Thee (Sonnet 43)’. 
511 Directive 2008/48/EC. 
134 
 
The word ‘resident’ may mean quite different things in each of these statutes.  This is quite right and 
proper as it reflects the different purposes behind each of these subjects.  The criteria for taxing 
someone as a resident may be quite different from the policies behind letting them vote as a 
resident, or allowing their spouse to qualify as the spouse of a resident.  The English word ‘resident’ 
is the best word to use in each of those separate statutes as it indicates to the reader what type of 
concept we are discussing. We would quickly run out of synonyms if we couldn’t reuse a word 
already used in another statute. 
What applies to words specifically defined in different statutes applies less so to ordinary ‘working’ 
words that aren’t defined.  Ordinary words should generally have the same meaning across the 
statute book.  So, ‘contravene’ in one law should generally mean the same as ‘contravene’ in 
another law.  This allows us to use words as the common currency of communication – they mean 
the same and can be exchanged easily across the statute book.  So, when we use ‘shall’ or ‘must’ in 
different contexts in different laws it always indicate obligation, whereas when we use ‘may’ in 
different laws, we know that it always means discretion.  But if we start being inconsistent, or giving 
words an unnatural meaning, we lose the predictability of repeated use and understanding.  Sarat 
went further and argued that  
when words lose their meaning and their capacity to bind those who use them, neither 
democracy nor the rule of law can long survive.  In contrast, when citizens and officials insist 
on the integrity of language they nourish the hope that both will outlive current assaults on 
them.512 
There is a further difficulty with requiring a consistent meaning of words across the statute book.  
The meaning of words changes over time.  So, if we used a word simply because it has appeared in 
an older statute, we may not get the same meaning.  An extreme example can be used here by 
comparing the words we use to describe roads and bridges.  In the Preamble to the Statute of Pious 
Uses 1634 the following purpose appears ‘for the erection, building, maintenance, or repair of any 
bridges, causeyes, cashes, paces and highways within this realm’.  O’Halloran and Cormacain give a 
brief indication of the etymology here: ‘causeye’ is the root of the word causeway, ‘cash’ probably 
comes from cashel – a wall around a group of churches and ‘pace’ is a passageway.513  However, by 
the time we reach 1993, the following definition appears: 
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“road” means a public road, that is to say a road which is maintainable by the Department, 
and includes— 
(a) a road over which the public have a right of way on foot only, not being a 
footway; 
(b) any part of a road; and 
(c) any bridge or tunnel over or through which a road passes;514 
To use the words cash, causeyes and paces today would be meaningless.  Consistency of language 
does not mean blind and unthinking repetition of older words, that way lies not just stasis but 
obsolescence.   As Xanthaki says, ‘semantic change is one important aspect of the fluidity and 
instability of the vocabulary we use’.515 
3.6.2 Consistent grammar 
The rules of grammar allow us to reduce word length by using accepted shortcuts.  For example, we 
can say ‘the defendant’s possessions’ rather than ‘the possessions of the defendant’ because we 
know how apostrophes work. In the same way as with words, consistently using grammatical rules 
correctly means that people have a better chance of understanding what we mean – they can 
predict the effect of our words and grammar.  The same applies with punctuation.516  But if we start 
abusing the rules of grammar, people cannot rely upon them as a reliable means of predicting the 
meaning of a statute.  This doesn’t quite go as far as ‘bad grammar leads to bad men’,517 but it does 
bear witness to Orwell’s comment that slovenliness of language leads to foolishness of thought.518 
An example of this can be found in the use of the third person plural pronoun where the noun is 
third person singular: 
(10) A member shall not be eligible for nomination as a chairperson of a standing committee 
if at the date of such nomination they are a chairperson of another standing committee or a 
statutory committee.519 
‘Member’ is singular, but ‘they’ is plural.  This is a good example as it shows the limits of this drafting 
principle.  Yes, the rules of grammar are being broken here.  However, there is little confusion 
caused in this case as it is quite clear that, in spite of the infelicitous ‘they’ we are still talking about 
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the singular member. Furthermore, it is being done for a good reason – to keep the language gender 
neutral (otherwise ‘they’ could perhaps revert to a gender specific pronoun such as ‘he’ or ‘she’). 
Overall, consistent grammar is a weak drafting principle.  It should be followed as a general rule, 
provided that there is no good reason to break it.  Grammar is a good servant but a bad master.  The 
other example is the grammatical “rule” against starting a sentence with a conjunction (although it 
isn’t quite the rule that it is sometimes thought to be).  Sometimes effective communication of an 
idea is aided by starting the sentence with a conjunction.  For example: 
(1) It is an offence to have a weapon in a public place. 
(2) But this does not apply to police officers. 
3.6.3 Do similar things in similar ways 
There are many common tropes in legislation: establishing a body corporate, granting a right of 
appeal, creating a criminal offence etc.  If these are done in broadly similar ways, then it makes the 
legislation consistent and thus predictable. If the citizen is familiar with procedure X1 in a statute 
and then sees procedure X2 in a new statute, then they can be reasonably confident, based on their 
knowledge of X1 of how X2 will be applied. 
An example is how the prohibition on extra-territorial legislation is expressed in relation to the 
Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly.  Section 6(2)(a) of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 states: 
(2)A provision is outside that competence if any of the following paragraphs apply— 
(a) it would form part of the law of a country or territory other than Northern 
Ireland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards 
Northern Ireland;  
Section 29(2)(a) of the Scotland Act 1998 states: 
(2)A provision is outside that competence so far as any of the following paragraphs apply— 
(a) it would form part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or 
confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland, 
The words used are nearly exactly the same.  The consistency means that anyone familiar with how 
extra-territoriality works in Scotland will be able to predict how extra-territoriality works in Northern 
Ireland.  As with parallel structures discussed in chapter 2, using the same phrases makes things 
easier for the reader.  The provisions on extra-territoriality in Wales are quite different, reflecting 
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the special nature of the Welsh legal jurisdiction (Wales isn’t a separate jurisdiction, it is part of the 
legal jurisdiction of England and Wales, so the rules on extra-territoriality need to reflect this). 
A bad example, culled from these above three Acts, is the power of the Secretary of State to make 
changes to the legislation of other parts of the United Kingdom which are consequent upon the 
changes made by the devolved legislatures, but which those devolved legislatures have themselves 
no power to make.  So, in Northern Ireland, section 84(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 states: 
(2) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such amendments of the law of any part of 
the United Kingdom as appear to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient in consequence 
of any provision made by or under— 
(a)Northern Ireland legislation; or 
In Wales, section 150 of the Government of Wales Act 2005 states: 
(1)The Secretary of State may by order make such provision as the Secretary of State 
considers appropriate in consequence of— 
(a)any provision made by an Assembly Measure or Act of the Assembly, 
In Scotland, section 104(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 states: 
(1)Subordinate legislation may make such provision as the person making the legislation 
considers necessary or expedient in consequence of any provision made by or under any Act 
of the Scottish Parliament or made by legislation mentioned in subsection (2). 
These three different provision are all directed at the same end goal – a power to fix legislation in 
other parts of the UK in consequence of something done by one of the devolved legislatures.  But 
the ways in which they are drafted is all quite different. Doing a different thing will of course require 
different words, but doing the same thing should require fairly similar words.  The divergence 
between these three provisions doesn’t seem to reflect any policy deviation, and the lack of 
consistency makes it hard for the reader to discern if different procedures are to apply in each of the 
different jurisdictions. 
Sheridan approaches this from a technological and informatics perspective – identifying patterns in 
legislation to discern what works and what doesn’t work.520  He sees pattern language as a method 
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of describing good design practices, or a common vocabulary between users and professionals.521  
This reflects the fact that legislation normally follows consistent patterns, so repeating familiar 
patterns makes for greater consistency.  Moving back to law, Spencer argues that we should have 
standardised templates in criminal law – a standard way of setting out the elements of an offence, 
the actus reus, mens rea, defences, exceptions, penalties etc – these make it much easier for the 
reader to understand and follow.522 
3.6.4 Consistent presentation 
Similar to the above point but broader, legislation should generally be presented in a consistent 
fashion.  So if it normally begins with a preamble, enacting words then introductory provisions, then 
it should continue to do so.  If the layout is left-aligned with section titles in bold and chapter heads 
centred, it should continue to do so.  This kind of consistency also helps out with navigability. 
3.6.5 Address the same issues 
The above advice applies when the drafter is attempting to do similar things in different areas.  
Many times the drafter will be doing different things in similar areas because there is a different 
policy imperative.  However, if similar issues will arise in each of these areas, then it is advisable to at 
least address each of these issues.  So, if statute A establishes a body corporate X and sets out pay, 
pensions, legal status etc, then if statute B establishes a body corporate Y, it should also set out pay, 
pensions, legal status etc.  These provisions may be quite different from each other, but at least the 
same headings, the same categories are being addressed. 
3.6.6 Consistency and the development of new ideas 
The greatest challenge faced by consistency is new ideas, new solutions and new ways of doing 
things.  It has to be accepted that if the policy changes, then the legislation must change.  But what if 
the policy doesn’t change, but there is a better way of drafting the legislation? Or, half way between 
these two ends, the policy hasn’t really changed, but in a new iteration, it can better cover some 
potential loopholes in the old law?  Take the example of pre-emption rights in legislation privatising 
various public utilities.  In the British Telecommunications Act 1981, Schedule 2 doesn’t really deal 
with pre-emption rights at all.  But by the time we reach privatisation of water in the Water Act 
1989, schedule 2, para 2(6), does deals with pre-emption rights.  Then in the Coal Act 1994, schedule 
2, para 3(3), deals with pre-emption rights slightly differently.  This is what Laws is describing when 
                                                          
521 John Sheridan, ‘Using Data to Understand How the Statute Book Works’ (2014) 14 Legal Information 
Management 244.  See further Big Data on the government legislation website dealing with pattern language 
for legislation, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/projects/big-data-for-law>  accessed 20/1/2016. 
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he states ‘just as an innovation in drafting may commit future drafters to a particular approach for 
the future, it can also condemn them for not having adopted a particular approach in the past’.523 
Does a change (or an ‘improvement’) in a new statute mean that the old statute was wrong?  If a 
new statute plugs a loophole, does this mean that in the act of doing so, the drafter is 
acknowledging that there was a loophole in the old statute?  In my view, the decision must generally 
be taken in favour of the new, otherwise consistency would oblige us to continually wallow in the 
mud of unsatisfactory older law.  But this also requires the assistance of judges who must accept 
that just because a thing is being done in a new way, it doesn’t mean that the old way is wrong. 
 
3.6.7 Consistency and changes in legal culture 
The other challenge to be addressed in making legislation consistent is in dealing with changes in the 
legal culture that form the background and the context in which the legislation must be interpreted 
and applied.  The most obvious change in the UK is the influx of human rights jurisprudence 
following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.  An older piece of law may have been 
perfectly acceptable when it is made, but if we try to be consistent and replicate it now, it may fall 
foul of the new imperative to make legislation that is in accordance with human rights.  So, if an old 
precedent is being dusted off and inserted into a new statute, the classic modification to be made is 
to insert a right of appeal into it. 
It is this argument that led the Attorney General for Northern Ireland to discount old cases and 
legislation when considering the validity of a new piece of legislation.  He stated in evidence to a 
committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly  
[the old Acts] antedate the Human Rights Act 1998 and particular provisions in that that deal 
with retrospectivity. So, I do not think that those old statutes offer us any assistance about 
what might happen now.524 
An even more obvious example is changes in ideas surrounding gender equality.  Whereas 100 years 
ago, it may have been deemed appropriate for legislation to talk about ‘a man’, it is far more 
appropriate for legislation to be in terms of ‘a person’.  The need for consistency doesn’t require 
adherence to outdated concepts of gender bias. 
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3.6.8 Need for consistent interpretation by judges 
Consistent drafting is only one side of the equation.   For legislation to be predictable, there must 
also be consistent interpretation by judges. So, words must be given their normal meaning by the 
courts, the meaning that has been given to them in the past.  In addition, judges should be aware of 
the efforts of drafters to make legislation predictable.  This is generally the case in the UK, for 
example Gillen J stated that ‘precision drafting rather than disorganised composition is presupposed’ 
when it comes to the words of a statute.525  However, the drafter’s purpose is thwarted when judges 
take a perverse approach to interpreting the clear words in a statute.  Perhaps the nadir of perverse 
judicial interpretation was reached in Liversidge v Anderson.526  It was in this case that Lord Atkin 
made one of the most famous dissenting speeches of all time.  In criticising the interpretation placed 
on a phrase by his fellow judges, Lord Atkin said 
I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction: 
“When I use a word” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I 
chose it to mean, neither more nor less”. 
However, the need for consistent interpretation by judges is not a legislative drafting principle.  
Although drafters can certainly seek to engage with the judiciary on some levels, it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to investigate how judges reach their decisions. 
3.7 Application in the real world 
The law as stated on the statute book ought to be the same as the law applied in the real world.  If 
this is not so, then legislation cannot be used to predict the legal effect of actions and the rule of law 
is breached.  This seems so self-evident that it ought not to be worthy of discussion. However, there 
are many instances where the law on the statute book is not the same as the law applied.  Some of 
these are set out below. 
3.7.1 Law is ignored 
In a state that doesn’t respect the rule of law, the government will flout the legislation.  In a state 
without effective rule of law, citizens will ignore the law.  There is little any legislative drafting 
principle can do to combat this. 
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3.7.2 ‘The law is an ass’ 
The state ignoring the law is normally seen as a bad thing.  However, there are occasions where ‘the 
law is an ass’ and when to ignore it seems sensible.527  Even if this is done for the benefit of citizens 
however, it seriously undermines respect for the rule of law.  Greenberg cites an example where a 
new piece of legislation would prohibit Community First Responders (i.e. volunteer ambulances) 
from using the traditional Battenburg-style panels on their ambulances.528  This would have a serious 
impact on their ability to help people in an emergency.  The police stepped in, and recognising the 
sterling work done by these organisations, stated that they would not prosecute anyone during an 
informal transitional period.  This gave time to the organisations to re-organise how to provide their 
vehicles.  Unfortunately, the legal basis for an ‘informal transitional period’ as granted by the police 
is flimsy at best, as there were no transitional provisions in the legislation.  In fact it is a complete 
breach of the rule of law for the police to decide not to enforce the law.  Greenberg, somewhat 
tongue in cheek suggests that the best way to deal with bad law like this is simply to ignore it.529  
This is a pragmatic solution – if everyone knows the law is an ass, then everyone can simply ignore it.  
The huge drawback to this is that it seriously weakens respect for the rule of law. 
Enright gives an historical example of this when Creon, the ruler of Thebes decrees that it is unlawful 
for Antigone to bury her brother’s body.530 Antigone refuses to comply – ‘she does not seek to justify 
her actions with the terms of Creon’s law: she negates the law by handing it back to him, intact’.531 
There is one rather blunt drafting technique to deal with this problem – draft the law properly in the 
first place.  If the legislation in this example had included an exemption for Community First 
Responders, or allowed for a formal transitional period, then the law would not have been stupid, 
and it would have been obeyed.  Respect for the rule of law is enhanced if the law is not an ass. 
3.7.3 Impossible law 
In the world of the White Queen “the rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday – but never jam 
today”.532  As well as diminishing respect for legislation, impossible law is unpredictable as it 
incapable of being applied in the real world. 
                                                          
527 The expression ‘the law is an ass’ means that the law is idiotic or asinine, rather than the modern, cruder 
meaning.  The expression was first disseminated to a wider audience in the 1800s by Charles Dickens, Oliver 
Twist (New Ed edition, Penguin Classics 2007). 
528 Daniel Greenberg, ‘Coping with Bad Legislation: Strategy No. 1—Ignoring It’ (2015) 36 Statute Law Review v. 
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530 Anne Enright, ‘Antigone in Galway: Anne Enright on the Dishonoured Dead’ London Review of Books (17 
December 2015) 11. 
531 ibid 11. 
532 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass (Collector’s Colour Library 2011) 206. 
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3.7.4 Panglossian law 
Panglossian legislation is legislation that assumes that all is for the best, in this the best of all 
possible worlds.  So, it sets legal obligations which are wildly over optimistic, if not impossible. So, 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions to 80% of 1990 limits may be a tough target, but it is doable.533  
However, a requirement that all homes are immediately carbon neutral right now would be 
impossible.  Calabresi decried what he saw as a Panglossian view of what administrative agencies 
could actually accomplish within the legal framework534 but thankfully in the UK this kind of 
legislation doesn’t really exist. 
The drafting principle here is simple, ensure that requirements and assumptions contained within 
the legislation are realistic and achievable. 
3.7.5 Law is inaccessible 
If people can’t access the law, they can’t follow it.  Chapter 2 sets out drafting principles to combat 
this. 
3.7.6 Law is unintelligible 
If people can’t understand the law, they can’t follow it.  Chapter 4 sets out drafting principles to 
combat this. 
3.7.7 Disconnect between language of the law and practice on the ground 
Drafters must ensure that legislation is directly connected to the behaviour which it seeks to modify.  
The law was made for man, not man made for the law.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the drafter 
to determine what the actual intention of the law is and accurately reflect that intention rather than 
force citizens to do something which wasn’t intended.  So, if citizens are doing action X and we wish 
that to be lawful, then legislation must authorise action X.  There is no point in the law authorising Y 
when everyone (citizens and the state) want X to be done.  In this case everyone will follow Y even 
though the law actually says X. In discussing the Sexual Offences Bill, one parliamentarian stated: ‘we 
need to reflect on what is happening out there in the real world and ensure that our laws do not 
attract ridicule’.535  More recently an editorial in the New Scientist objected to the Investigatory 
Powers Bill (dubbed the ‘Snoopers Charter’) because it ‘asks for some powers that are nonsensical, 
because they bear little relation to how digital communications actually work’.536  Law is not 
predictable if there is a disconnect between the language of legislation and reality. 
                                                          
533 Climate Change Act 2008. 
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The object and the legal description of the object should be the same.  They should map as closely as 
is possible onto each other, otherwise the law moves into a parallel dimension divorced from reality. 
This means that drafters should strive to avoid a two- stage process of taking the thing, converting it 
into legal description, then when we come to apply it, comparing the thing to the legal description to 
see if it fits.  The legal description of the thing should relate as directly as possible (linguistically and 
practically) to the thing itself.   So, if we mean horse say horse, not four legged grazing animal.  If we 
mean cookie say cookie, not ‘the use of electronic communications networks to store information or 
to gain access to information stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user’.537 
Greenberg puts it this way ‘everyone knows this is what is meant to happen even though the law 
says something different’.538  The example Greenberg gives is Vehicle and Operator Services Agency v 
Kayes.539  In that case, a particular industry (the Showman’s Guild) had a long-standing agreement 
with the Agency that a particular type of vehicle (adapted for carrying showman equipment) was not 
to be regarded as a goods vehicle by virtue of falling under a particular statutory exception.  When 
the court examined that particular statutory exception, it was quite clear that the vehicle did not fall 
within that exception.  The court was able to find a reason to find this particular showman not guilty 
of holding a licence for a goods vehicle.  However, it had clear difficulties with this agreement, 
stating: 
I would very much doubt whether that would stand up to a legal challenge if such were 
brought because clearly it is very difficult to conceive that any showman’s goods vehicle 
which would carry any sort of equipment for a show could be properly regarded as [falling 
within the exemption].540 
What is the drafting solution to this?  I suggest it is the same blunt answer as was given in relation to 
the law being an ass – draft the law correctly in the first place (or amend any mistakes).  The judge in 
Kayes put this rather more diplomatically, saying: 
I need do no more than to suggest that it would be sensible for that matter to be put on a 
proper legislative basis, maybe by some amendment to the relevant regulations, because I 
suspect the time may well come when someone challenges the agreement and I very much 
doubt whether it would survive any such challenge.541 
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Bad law is one of the best ways to diminish respect for the rule of law.  If everyone ‘knows’ what the 
law is (whether by reference to convention, or official guidance), regardless of what the law actually 
states, then we undermine the basis of even having law. 
There is another example from Northern Ireland.  The Autism Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 included 
an obligation for the Department to produce an autism strategy, a laudable aim.  In the explanatory 
notes the deadline for this is described thus: 
Section 2 requires the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (“the 
Department”) to prepare and publish a strategy on autism within 2 years of the passing of 
the Act. 
However, in the actual text of the Act it states: 
2—(1) The Department must prepare a strategy on autism to be known as the autism 
strategy and must publish the autism strategy not less than two years after the passing of 
this Act. 
The actual legislation requires that it cannot be published within 2 years, but that Department must 
wait at least two years and then publish the strategy.  This is an obvious (and understandable) 
drafting mistake.  However, it has resulted in the law not according with the practice.  To put this 
another way, what everyone expects and wants isn’t the same as what the law requires. The law has 
become disconnected from reality.  In one way it is perfectly understandable to make the argument 
‘everyone knows that the strategy must be published within 2 years, the fact that there was a slight 
error in the legislation shouldn’t stop the timely publication of such an important strategy’.  
However, once we start ignoring the law, where do we stop?  We don’t live under the rule of à la 
carte law, where we get to pick and choose which laws we will follow. 
In the autism strategy case, the actual date of the publication of the strategy is difficult to 
determine, not least because the document containing the strategy doesn’t actually state the date 
of publication.542  A cynic might see in this obfuscation a realisation that the dates set out in the 
legislation aren’t entirely in accordance with the intended policy. 
3.7.8 Things which aren’t in the law but which are intended to be applied in practice 
If we want the law to be applied in a particular way, then we should make that clear in the law.  This 
is another way of saying that the law must be inclusive of all relevant material.  The drafting 
principle of inclusivity is dealt with in chapter 2. 
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3.7.9 Things which are in the law but which aren’t intended to be applied in practice 
If we want the law to reflect reality, then legislation must only contain provisions that it is intended 
will apply in practice.  So, if a citizen sees provision X in the law, she will expect X to apply in practice.  
And if X doesn’t apply in practice, then legislation cannot be used to predict the legal effect of the 
citizen’s actions.  Stepping back in time in the legislative process, if the legislators want a particular 
thing, then include that thing in the law.  But if they don’t actively want that thing, then don’t 
include it in the law.  Drafters have long said that excess matter in Bills, as in humans, goes septic.543  
This applies doubly if the excess material is unused material. 
There are three circumstances where things in the statute book aren’t applied in practice. 
Firstly, powers which are only to be exercised in certain circumstances, or on certain criteria being 
satisfied.  The most obvious example are powers to be exercised in the case of an emergency.  The 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 is a good example of this.  It makes express provision for a power to 
make regulations, but only in the case of an emergency.  The reader will not be confused into 
thinking that these powers always apply.  It is clear that they can only be exercised in an emergency.  
As long as the criteria for exercise of this powers is clear, then the legislation is predictable.  
Unpredictability only arises when the criteria for exercise of a power are vague. 
Secondly, we can have ‘just in case’ provisions in a statute. Thornton argues that there must be a 
necessity for a power in legislation, his point is that if the power is already contained (expressly or 
impliedly) elsewhere, that there is no need for it.544  But my point goes further, it isn’t about 
unnecessary duplication, but about actual use.  A just in case power is inserted when a legislator 
doesn’t think there is a current need for a particular power, but wants it inserted just in case it is 
necessary at some point in the future.  As well as cluttering up the statute book, it makes legislation 
unpredictable as readers will assume that powers contained in the statute book are there for a 
reason, they are there to be used.  But if they have only been inserted ‘just in case’ then the reader 
has a false impression of how the law will be applied in practice.  
It is difficult to determine whether a general power in a statute has been used as it will depend on 
the history of how that power has been applied in practice, and these things are not recorded in an 
easily searchable format.  However, it is much easier to determine whether a power to make 
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subordinate legislation has been used.   The exercise of powers to make regulations are recorded.545  
Take therefore, as an example powers to make regulations under the Licensing (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1996.  There are powers to make an order to vary opening hours,546 to make regulations 
relating to places of public entertainment where alcohol can be served,547 to make regulations 
relating to sale of alcohol at international airports,548 etc.  However, none of these powers have been 
exercised.  Why is a power inserted if it is never exercised?  If citizens read the legislation they will 
not be able to predict its effect as it is subject to a possible change. Why introduce that element of 
unpredictability if that change will never arise.  Of course, it is very difficult to say at the outset, 
when a Bill is being drafted – ‘do we really need this power?’  However, the momentum seems to be 
in favour of automatically including powers that are never exercised.  In the Licensing Order 
example, these powers to make regulations were originally contained in the Licensing (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1990.  They were not exercised under the 1990 Order, but in spite of this, they were 
then included in the 1996 Order (where they also remained unexercised). 
Another example also has to do with alcohol, but the unpredictability is more obvious and more 
serious.  The Scotch Whisky (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 regulates the sale of Scotch whisky in 
Northern Ireland.  Whisky is defined in Article 2(2), but Article 2(3) then goes on to say: 
(3) The Department may by order amend the definition of whisky in paragraph (2). 
How can a whisky seller or distiller predict the legal effect of their actions when the definition of 
whisky is unpredictable?  This power has never been exercised, so why was it inserted in the first 
place? 
There is an increasingly common practice in legislation to include a power to make further 
consequential provision by subordinate legislation.  An Act will generally make all necessary 
consequential amendments to other legislation.  However, the new practice is to insert an additional 
power to make further amendments in future as a consequence of the legislation.  Take as an 
example section 48 of the Pension Schemes Act (Northern Ireland) 2016: 
Power to make consequential amendments  
48. – (1) The Department may by regulations make provision that is consequential on any 
provision made by this Act. 
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(2) Regulations under this section may amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify any 
statutory provision (whenever passed or made). 
This is generally done not in response to a particular statute that hasn’t been properly fixed in light 
of the new legislation (although that is wrong in itself also).  This is a general power inserted just in 
case the legislators or drafters have missed something.  In many ways it is a sweeper clause inserted 
to allow mistakes that haven’t been corrected by the legislation to be corrected further down the 
line.  This makes legislation very unpredictable.  Previously the citizen could read the amending Act 
and know (from reading the schedule of consequential amendments) all changes that were being 
made.  Now, the citizen is uncertain, not knowing what future consequential changes will be made. 
Thirdly, we have legislation that is never commenced.  The Easter Act 1928 included a power to fix 
the date of Easter.  This legislation has never been commenced, yet it is still on the statute book, 
with the banner heading of ‘prospective’ (in the sense that this legislation may come into force at 
some point in the future).  What is the user to think?  This legislation is on the statute book, it was 
made 90 years ago and has never been repealed.  But the law does not accord with reality, the 
words on the statute book do not correspond with what actually happens on the ground.  Why on 
earth clutter up the statute book with material which will never actually be implemented? 
Perhaps the most egregious example of real world inapplicability of the words on the statute book is 
contained in section 21A of and Schedule 4A to the Northern Ireland Act 1998.  These provisions 
deal with the arrangements for the appointment of the Minister (or Ministers) of Justice in Northern 
Ireland. As it was unclear precisely what arrangements would be agreed between the parties, the 
legislation entered into not one, but four parallel universes of what would happen if a particular 
arrangement was adopted. 
1. Minister appointed by First Minister and deputy First Minister, approved by resolution of the 
Assembly.549 
2. Minister appointed following resolution of the Assembly.550 
3. Two Ministers acting jointly.551 
4. Minister and junior Minister appointed, with these posts being rotated.552 
This was further complicated by Schedule 4A setting out a further twenty pages of just in case 
provisions relating to each of the four options.  There was a pressing political reason for this 
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inclusion of all this material in the statute book – it was needed to keep political parties committing 
to an evolving negotiation.  However, as legislation, it promotes unpredictability.  The only message 
the reader receives is confusion. 
3.8 Implementation / Implementability 
The legal effect of one’s actions can only be predicted by reference to legislation if that legislation is 
actually implemented.  So, if a new law provides fantastic rights for citizens, but no mechanism for 
the citizen to enforce those rights, the effect of that legislation is unpredictable and the legislation 
itself is largely worthless.  Implementation requires two things, firstly a willingness for the state to 
implement the legislation on the ground.  Secondly, processes and procedures within the legislation 
which allow for it to be implemented.  The first isn’t something that drafters can really do much 
about.  The second is very much within their purview as they can ensure that implementation 
mechanisms are included within the legislation.  There is both a quantitative and a qualitative aspect 
to implementation mechanisms in legislation.  The quantitative one is that the implementation 
method exists, the qualitative one is that the implementation method is effective. 
Benedetto draws a distinction between a substantive norm (the thing which must be done) and the 
consequential norm (the consequence of failing to do the thing), and she sees this as the difference 
between obedience and enforcement.553  These two things are clearly conceptually different.  
However, they must both be present if the law is to be implementable. 
So, as a general principle, if a law imposes a duty upon a person to do a thing, there ought to be a 
clear understanding of what will happen if the person doesn’t do the thing.  This is most obvious in 
the criminal law where the duty and the consequence of failure to comply are wrapped up together 
– if you commit the criminal act, you are subject to the criminal penalty.  In other areas of law this 
link is not always as obvious and sometimes needs to be implied.  A good example is a time limit for 
a citizen to do a particular thing.  If the citizen doesn’t do the particular thing within the time, what is 
the effect?  If a provision is mandatory, it means that if the thing isn’t done in the required way, the 
thing is not regarded as having being validly done.  If a provision is directory, it means that if the 
thing isn’t done in the required way, it is still regarded as having being validly done.554  The 
distinction between mandatory and directory is not easy to discern.  According to Thornton ‘if the 
drafter makes no specific provision, the intention of the legislation will be ascertained, not according 
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to any general rule of formula, but by construing the statute as a whole and considering the 
provision which has been disobeyed in its context in relation to the general object to be secured’.555 
The necessity for a general inquiry into the nature of the legislation is a strong indication of a failure 
of drafting.  The answer to the question ‘what is the consequence if I fail to execute this obligation?’ 
should be set out next to the obligation, or easily findable from the obligation.  It should not require 
a close analysis of the legislation as a whole in order to discern the outcome from the general thrust 
of the legislative intent.  So, rather than saying ‘A notice must be served upon the Department 
within 28 days’, it is better to say ‘A notice is not valid unless it is served upon the Department 
within 28 days’.  In the second formulation, the consequence of failure to comply is explicit, whereas 
in the first formulation, we know that there is a duty, but we are unclear what happens if there is a 
breach of that duty. 
Contrast the obligations in the following two statutory provisions. 
Enforcement notice: safety measures 
71.—(1) This section applies in relation to a controlled reservoir where it appears to the 
Department that the reservoir manager has failed to comply with— 
(a)the manager’s duty under section 36(1) (to ensure compliance with a direction in 
an inspection report or a pre-commencement safety recommendation), 
(b)the manager’s duty under section 46(1) (to ensure compliance with a direction in 
a safety report). 
(2) The Department may by notice served on the reservoir manager require the manager to 
comply with the duty before the end of the period specified in the notice.556 
The preceding provisions of this Act set out obligations in relation to safety measures.  Section 71 
then goes on to make (I haven’t quoted all the subsections) detailed provisions about what happens 
if a reservoir manager doesn’t comply with those obligations.  This is excellent legislation.  The duty 
is clearly spelt out.  Then consequences of failure are clearly spelt out.  Contrast this with the 
following. 
Formation of the Opposition 
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2.—(1) Standing orders must make provision for the formation of an Opposition in 
accordance with this section.557 
There is nothing to state what will happen if standing orders don’t do this.  There is no time frame in 
which the duty must be complied with.  If the correct thing is done, there will not be a problem.  But 
if the legislation isn’t obeyed then we cannot predict the effect of a failure to implement. This makes 
for bad legislation.   
The standing orders example flags up one additional difficulty with specifying the consequences of a 
failure to comply with a duty – the identity of the person having the obligation. If a duty applies to a 
citizen, then it is reasonable to indicate the consequences of non-compliance.  But if the duty applies 
to a Minister (or other emanation of the state) then this becomes more problematic.  The general 
custom in UK statutes is that only the duty is specified for the state, not the enforcement 
mechanism for failure to comply.  The assumption underlying this is that the state respects the rule 
of law and will comply with its legal obligations.  It is a matter of constitutional etiquette – the state 
respects the law and obeys it, and the law respects the state and doesn’t threaten it with sanctions.  
In my view, this represents a reasonable compromise.  Firstly, the statute book isn’t cluttered up 
with provisions for enforcement of legal obligations on Ministers.  Secondly the very act of enacting 
an enforcement clause for a Minister opens up the possibility to the Minister that they can refuse to 
comply with a legal obligation.  Thirdly, the fact that no enforcement is specified in the legislation 
doesn’t mean that there is no enforcement as the field of constitutional and public law gives many 
remedies where the state fails to act lawfully.  Fourthly, it is reasonable to assume in the UK that the 
state will generally not wantonly disregard a direct legal obligation. 
Voermans talks about implementation as being the Achilles heel of European integration.558  He is 
speaking in the context of European legislation being implemented into domestic law.  However, his 
point is the same as the point being made here – the system is failing if legislation isn’t being 
implemented. 
The qualitative aspect of implementation means that the particular enforcement mechanism will 
genuinely lead to the law being properly applied.  Take the regulation of car emissions by the EU as a 
bad example.  Car emissions are governed by a plethora of EU Regulations.559  These set out the 
                                                          
557 Assembly and Executive Reform (Assembly Opposition) Bill. 
558 Wim Voermans, ‘Implementation: The Achilles Heel of European Integration’ (2014) 2 Theory and Practice 
of Legislation 343. 
559  Commission Regulation (EC) No 692/2008 on emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 
5 and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information.  The Regulations go all the way 
back to Euro 1. 
151 
 
manner in which car emissions are to be measured.  Unfortunately these are to be assessed in a 
laboratory under rather artificial conditions.  The headlines in car trade magazines and blogs indicate 
how unrealistic these tests are:  How Emissions Tests Work, And Why They're Stupidly Unrealistic,560 
‘Unrealistic’ emissions tests could make some diesel models ‘unaffordable’, say European 
carmakers,561  VW scandal highlights unrealistic lab tests.562 The European Commission has 
eventually responded and is now talking about ‘robust testing methods’ and a Real Driving Emissions 
test.563  If the law requires car emissions of a certain level, then citizens will reasonably expect that 
the implementation of these measure results in emissions of a certain level.  But if the 
implementation measures are not realistic then we cannot rely upon the words of the legislation as 
reflecting what actually happens. 
Unfortunately, this qualitative aspect is difficult for drafters to effectively address as they are 
unlikely to have the scientific skills to know if a particular mechanism is realistic. At a minimum 
though, they can ask the questions when they are asked to draft the legislation – how will this work 
in practice?  They can also apply their common sense – is a test in a laboratory sufficient for an 
activity that will be carried out in the real world? 
The final point on implementation is a specific one on implementation by means of subordinate 
legislation.  The standard position is that primary legislation sets out the main principles of the law 
(the powers and duties etc.), leaving some of the minor details to be filled in by subordinate 
legislation (time periods, notices, forms – some of the administrative machinery of the law).  But, 
what if the legislation can’t be fully implemented unless the subordinate legislation is made?  For 
example, if an application under an Act must be made on a form, but the form is to be prescribed in 
regulations made under the Act – if the form isn’t prescribed, the application can’t be made.  The 
usual approach is that Departments are given discretionary powers to make subordinate legislation 
‘the Minister may, by regulations …’.  However, necessary implementing provisions shouldn’t be a 
matter of power, they should be a duty.  So, in order for the law to be implemented, the drafter 
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accessed 21 January 2016. 
562 ‘VW Scandal Highlights Unrealistic Lab Tests | Fleetcare’ <http://www.fleetcare.com.au/news-info/fleet-
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should be quicker to impose a duty upon a Department to make necessary implementing 
regulations. 
This point was addressed by the Supreme Court in RM(AP).564  At issue was the Mental Health (Care 
and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 which gave rights to mental health patients which could in part 
be exercised via an application to a Tribunal.  However, before this right could be exercised, it 
required the Scottish Ministers to make regulations setting out the necessary administrative 
machinery.  The Scottish Ministers had failed to make these regulations before the Act came into 
force.  The Supreme Court ruled that this failure was unlawful – essentially that they had an 
obligation to implement an Act of the Scottish Parliament which had been commenced. 
3.9 Constraints on discretion 
The legal effect of actions is predictable if legislation sets out rules which are automatically followed 
– if X is done, then Y is the unavoidable legal consequence of it.  However, unpredictability creeps in 
if the automatic becomes instead the possible – if X is done, then Y may be the consequence.  This 
most often arises where there is a discretion on the part of a decision maker.  At its most basic level, 
this simply means that a decision maker has a power to do something, as set out in the table below. 
Discretion inevitably introduces unpredictability as it is difficult to predict how the discretion will be 
exercised.   
Duty (automatic outcome) Power (discretionary outcome) 
If a person fills in the form the Department 
must grant the licence. 
If a person fills in the form, the Department 
may grant the licence. 
 
This point was sufficiently important to Bingham that discretion warranted being the second 
element of his conception of the rule of law: 
Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by the application of the 
law and not the exercise of discretion.565 
For Emon, ‘the possibility of government action based on will as opposed to reason or reasoned 
deliberation is a keystone that reveals the undercurrent of rule of law debates’.566  Within the 
framework of the second element, ‘law not discretion’ reflects notions of fairness and equality.  
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However, for the purposes of element 1, it is equally relevant for the purposes of predictability. For 
this reason, it is considered in this chapter under the heading of predictability. 
3.9.1 Rules v discretion 
There is no simple and universal answer to the question over whether it is better to have rules, or 
better to have discretion.  Dicey was opposed to discretion and thought it anathema to the rule of 
law.567  Hewart had a similar view, arguing that if Ministers could simply do what they thought fit, 
there was no proper rule of law at all.568  He cited following legislative example: 
The expression ‘land likely to be used for building purposes’ shall include any land likely to 
be used as, or for the purpose of providing, open spaces, roads, streets, parks, pleasure or 
recreation grounds, … and the decision of the Minister whether land is likely to be used for 
building purposes or not, shall be final and conclusive.569 
This example is a negation of the rule of law as it allows the Minister to do whatever he wants.   He 
could designate any land to be land for building purposes and it could not be called into question. 
However, there has been a justifiable backlash against the view that any kind of discretion is bad for 
the rule of law.570  A certain amount of discretion is necessary for the effective administration of the 
modern state.  Discretion gives flexibility.  In fact, human rights jurisprudence cautions against the 
blanket application of automatic rules without the possibility of individual circumstances being taken 
into account.571 Turpin states that ‘we have today a better understanding of the necessity and value 
of discretionary power in many branches of public administration, in order that varying 
circumstances as well as the needs of justice in individual cases can properly inform the making of 
decisions’.572  Davis calls for ‘a proper balance between rule and discretion’.573 
This section examines the way that discretion can be structured in legislation and the criteria for 
determining how much (or little) discretion there ought to be. 
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3.9.2 Three legislative elements of discretion 
The most basic way to draft a discretion provision is to say that a person may do a thing.  This can be 
broken down into three elements.  Firstly, there is the height of the hurdle to be cleared before 
discretion can be exercised.  Secondly, there is the specificity of the criteria to be satisfied before the 
discretion can be exercised.  Thirdly, there are the factors to consider whilst exercising discretion. 
Element 1 – The height of the hurdle 
There is a sliding scale for how easy it is to exercise discretion in a particular case.  At the bottom of 
the scale, there is no hurdle at all, merely that “the official may do the thing”.  The scale then 
proceeds upwards until there is a very high hurdle to be overcome ‘the official may do the thing in 
exceptional circumstances’.  The table below sets out this scale in a non-exhaustive way.  The exact 
ranking on the scale is subjective. 
Height of hurdle Legislative provision 
low The official may do X 
 The official may, if he thinks fit, do X 
 The official may, if reasonable (or just) do X 
 The official may, if convenient, do X 
 The official may, if necessary, do X 
 The official may, in special circumstances, do X 
high The official may, in exceptional circumstances, do X 
 
Element 2 – The specificity of the criteria 
Sometimes there will no specific criteria to be satisfied before the discretion will be exercised, 
merely that the official may do X. This makes for the easiest kind of discretion to be exercised.  More 
commonly, there will be a specific purpose for which the criteria must be exercised.  So, in the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a court may exclude evidence if it would have ‘an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings’.574  In the Bail Bill, a court has discretion to refuse bail on the 
grounds that the defendant would fail to surrender to custody, commit an offence on bail, or 
interfere with witnesses.575 The Welsh Ministers can enact further subordinate legislation if it is 
‘necessary or expedient for the purposes of giving full effect to any provision of this Act’.576 
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However, this is where the drafter needs to have an awareness of constitutional and administrative 
law. A bald power to do something in legislation will not be interpreted in a bald way by the courts.  
Instead, it will be subject to a host of administrative law implied criteria.  So, it will be implied that 
this discretion is not to be exercised capriciously, but must be exercised for reasons, that those 
reasons are rational, that the decision maker has considered all relevant factors and ignored 
irrelevant ones etc.577  The House of Lords considered this point in relation to the discretion of the 
Home Secretary to release prisoners serving a mandatory life sentence.578  Lord Steyn stated that 
Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum.  Parliament legislates for a European liberal 
democracy founded on the principles and traditions of the common law.  And the courts 
may approach legislation on this initial assumption. 
So, in that case even though the statutory discretion was worded in very broad terms, concepts of 
reasonableness, legality and non-retrospectivity were read into it. 
In basic terms, the more specific the criteria, the more predictable for the citizen what the outcome 
of the exercise of discretion will be. 
Element 3 – other factors to consider 
The legislation may sometimes state what factors the decision maker must take into account in 
exercising discretion.  As with element 2, this element isn’t always present.  When it is present, then 
the decision maker must consider these factors and this thus acts as a constraint on the exercise of 
discretion.  A bland requirement to ‘take all relevant factors into consideration’ is unhelpful – if it 
wasn’t there would we expect the decision maker to take irrelevant factors into consideration?  
However, these factors can often be helpful in guiding the decision maker to the decision.  The more 
detailed they are, the more predictable will be the exercise of the discretion.  The factors can be 
exhaustive (only the factors listed in the legislation) or non-exhaustive (decision maker can consider 
any other factors not listed which are thought relevant. 
3.9.3 How tightly does the discretion have to be constrained? 
The section above sets out different ways in which discretion can be structured in legislation.  A 
tightly constrained discretion would have (a) a high hurdle, (b) very specific criteria for exercise of 
the discretion and (c) many factors to take into account.  A loose discretion would have exactly the 
opposite.   But on what basis should the drafter decide to have a tight or a loose discretion?  It isn’t 
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automatically the case that discretion should always be tightly constrained, there may be 
circumstances where maximum flexibility (and discretion) would be beneficial.  As with so much of 
drafting, there is no right or wrong answer.  But in this subsection, I will set out some principles 
which may assist in determining the tightness of the constraints on discretion. 
Principle 1 is the consequences of the exercise of the discretion.  The more serious the effects on the 
individual of the exercise of the discretion, the more tightly the discretion ought to be constrained.  
So, the decision to release a life sentence prisoner has a serious impact upon the liberty of the 
prisoner, so that discretion should be tightly constrained.  A decision to award a bursary for 
education has less serious consequences and can be less constrained. 
Principle 2 is reliance upon the integrity of the decision maker.  The more trust reposes in the 
decision maker, the less constrained the discretion needs to be. So, a judge may be given a broad 
discretion in reliance upon judicial integrity and high standards of ethics and probity.  Thus the rules 
of procedure for the Inquiry into Historical Institutional Abuse are ‘to be such as the chairperson 
may direct’.579  This is because the chairperson has to be a high court judge. But if the decision 
maker doesn’t have the same professional standards to adhere to, or is lower down the chain of 
decision making, it may be more appropriate to more tightly constrain their discretion. 
Principle 3 is the existence of complaint or review mechanisms.  The more prevalent these are, the 
less constraint need be placed on the exercise of discretion as any defects in that exercise can be 
remedied by the complaint or review mechanism. 
A practical example may illustrate the exercise of these principles.  The Inquiry into Historical 
Institutional Abuse has already been mentioned.  The rules of the Inquiry are to be formulated by 
the Chairperson.  He made a rule on late applications, ruling that they could only be accepted in 
‘truly exceptional cases’.580 This was after having regard to the amount of time people already had to 
submit applications, and other ways in which people could present testimony to the Inquiry.  So, the 
discretion has a very high hurdle and there are factors to have regard to.  There isn’t a blanket rule, 
and the Chairperson, as a judge, would have regard to all relevant factors.  This approach was 
validated by the court when the exercise of this discretion was challenged by a person refused 
permission to apply out of time.581  Dealing specifically with the amount of discretion, the court 
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stated that ‘In relation to the conduct of proceedings before the Inquiry, significant discretion must 
be afforded to the Inquiry.’582   
There isn’t a clear dividing line between ‘exercising discretion’ and ‘making a judgement’.  The more 
tightly constrained a discretion is, the closer it appears to be making a judgement.  It isn’t necessary 
for the purpose of this thesis to set out that dividing line. All that is necessary is to adopt a drafting 
principle that generally a very wide discretion should be avoided, and to include the various 
elements above in making it tighter. 
3.10 Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown the importance of predictability to the rule of law.  Predictability means that 
there is an element of legal certainty, that citizens can read the legislation and have a reasonable 
chance at predicating what the legal effect of their actions will be.  As well as highlighting the views 
of the prominent writers, it has also analysed why legislation is sometimes not predictable, usually 
because of real world problems. 
The main examination has been of drafting principles.  The most obvious of these is that legislation 
must be prospective, that it must take effect in the future, after it is made, not before it is made.  I 
have provided a new taxonomy of Janus-faced legislation to describe the different ways that 
legislation may have a backwards facing component.  I have argued that human rights jurisprudence 
provides the best guide for drafting principles here.  The second drafting principle is determinacy, 
meaning that the law must be fixed and definite, that it must be unambiguous and precise.  There is 
always a difficult balance to strike between precision and over-particularisation.   
The third drafting principle is of stability, that the law remains relatively stable, and that we 
ameliorate the negative effects of rapidly changing law.  A clear commencement date is the fourth 
drafting principle, that we know when the law takes effect from, as well as the date that it ceases.  
Consistency is the fifth drafting principle, consistency of words, of structure, of grammar and of 
general approach to legal problems.  Consistent drafting makes it easier for citizens to predict the 
effect of legislation.    The sixth principle is that legislation must be capable of being applied in the 
real world – so that there must be congruence between law on the page and law in real life.  The 
next principle is that law must be capable of being implemented.  This means that the legislation 
must contain effective implementation mechanisms within it, and must set out what happens if 
there is a breach of the law. The final drafting principle is that there must be a way to limit or 
standardise the application of discretion. The broader the discretion, the harder for the citizen to 
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know what the legal outcome will be.  Although these drafting principles may be in accordance with 
principles that others have put forward, they are derived from the wellspring of the rule of law and 
gain additional validity from that. 
All of these principles presuppose that the citizen is able to understand the law.  Like a three-legged 
stool, without the ability to understand the law, the value of accessibility and predictability is 
worthless.  All three values must be present.  The next chapter derives drafting principles from the 
requirement that legislation is intelligible.   
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Chapter 4 Intelligibility 
Introduction 
Bingham’s element 1 states: 
Law must be accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable. 
This chapter examines what it means for legislation to be intelligible and clear.  Intelligible means 
able to be understood, to be comprehensible.  Clear means that something is easy to understand or 
interpret.  These two words are not the same, but they are similar.  The difference between them is 
the degree of understandability, ‘clear’ indicating a higher degree (or greater ease) of 
understandability.  To avoid long-windedness, in this chapter I will mainly use the term ‘intelligibility’ 
as the rule of law concept to mean making legislation easier to understand.  This ties quite neatly in 
with Fuller’s morality of aspiration concept, of striving to make legislation easier to understand, 
rather than a binary distinction between intelligible and unintelligible legislation.  I do not undertake 
an epistemological analysis of the concept of a person ‘understanding’ legislation as this would be 
beyond the scope of the thesis.  I am content with the bald statement that intelligible legislation is 
easier to understand. This principle can hardly be said to be new, the Latin phrase leges ab omnibus 
intelligi debent (laws should be understood by everyone) stems back to antiquity. 
Part 1 looks at what intelligibility means, and what Bingham and others took it as meaning.  It also 
inquires into why legislation is sometimes not intelligible, either in an unthinking way, or deliberately 
so. 
Part 2 is the main part of the chapter and derives drafting principles from the rule of law 
requirement of intelligibility.  These are that intelligibility should focus on the user, that amending 
legislation should be intelligible, avoiding excessive interconnectedness, using plain language, 
easification, good writing and also using examples. 
Part 1 – The Theory of Intelligibility  
4.1 The Importance of Intelligibility  
Bingham said that laws must be, so far as possible, intelligible and clear.583 This mirrors Xanthaki’s 
argument (albeit from the perspective of effectiveness of legislation rather than the rule of law) that 
good quality legislation ought to be clear.584  Bingham’s reasons for this are the same as the reasons 
for making law accessible and predictable, he didn’t deconstruct these elements into their 
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constituent parts.  To recap (from previous chapters) laws should be intelligible so that citizens can 
easily know what the law is.  This is for three reasons.  The first is to do with effectiveness of the law 
– if we can’t understand what the law is, we can’t obey it.  The second is related, if we don’t 
understand the law, we cannot take advantage of its provisions.  The third is a commercial one, that 
commerce is improved if it is regulated by rules that are clear and easy to understand for 
commercial actors. 
Two key reports make it clear that intelligibility of legislation is a fundamental requirement of the 
rule of law.  Firstly, the Venice Commission on the Rule of Law stated that legislation must be clear 
and precise.585  Secondly, Lord Simon in the Renton Report stated that ‘a society whose regulations 
are incomprehensible lives with the Rule of Lottery, not of Law’.586  Dickson recognised the 
importance of Bingham’s definition and his short-hand way of describing the qualities of the rule of 
law was that it was accessible and understandable.587  Voermans expressly links intelligibility to the 
rule of law.588 
Raz prefigured Bingham by stating in his principle 1 that law ought to be clear.  His reason was that if 
law wasn’t clear, it can’t guide people.  Therefore, law should not be obscure.  This is a practical 
reason, which he develops further – that if a particular law is to succeed, people need to be capable 
of following it.  And if they can’t understand it, they can’t follow it.  Implicitly following Raz, Hashim, 
a legislative drafter from Malaysia directly considers the necessity of having clear law and answers 
that ‘the most important reason is the rule of law’.589  Baratta adds a small twist to this, not only is it 
important that the law is intelligible to citizens, it must also be intelligible to the officials charged 
with implementing it, particularly in the context of domestic officials implementing EU law.590 
Fuller’s desideratum 4 is clarity of laws.  Surprisingly he didn’t go into great detail about what he 
meant by clarity, although he does talk about the opposite, ‘obscure and incoherent legislation can 
make legality unobtainable by anyone’.591  We can gain further insight from his exposition on eight 
ways to make bad law, where the fourth way is a failure to make rules understandable.  This 
exposition puts him in conformity with Bingham’s requirement for intelligibility.   
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Northern Ireland provides a practical example of this fourth way to make bad law when we consider 
its laws on abortion.  The problem is that the lack of clarity in the legislation leads to confusion and 
fear for both women and medical practitioners.  A newspaper report summarises the problem: 
Because the law is so unclear, midwives say they are worried they may be committing a 
crime if they agree to help with an abortion. Some fear they could still be prosecuted for 
procedures they have assisted with in the past because of this legal uncertainty.592 
As may be expected from someone whose writing on legislation was voluminous, Jeremy Bentham 
had much to say on the subject of intelligibility in statute law.  His preferred solution was a 
Pannomion – ‘a complete body of proposed law, in the form of statute law’.593  One goal of the 
Pannomion was cognoscibility, meaning that the law is capable of being known.  As he explained to 
US President James Madison, this meant that citizens would know what they are meant to do, or not 
meant to do.  His Pannomion would be ‘a written, and visible, and intelligible, and cognoscible rule 
of action’.594 
Bentham developed his theory of cognoscibility in further letters to US states in 1817 (Madison had 
politely rejected Bentham’s proposal to draft the entire US federal code).  The properties desirable 
in a body of laws as set out in these letters include notoriety ‘only in so far as it is present to the 
mind can any idea be productive of any effect’.595   Another property was clearness of language.596  
In Letter VIII he prefigured the plain language movement by nearly 200 years calling for legislation 
that was ‘all plain reading’.597 
Underpinning all these criteria is the goal that ‘every man should be his own lawyer’598 and they can 
only do that if they can understand the law.  The Lex scripta of the Isle of Man makes the same 
argument ‘the laws are plain, simple, summary – to all capacities intelligible … that the door of 
justice is open to the poor and the rich’.599  This was precisely the root of the objection of a Canadian 
court to unintelligible tax law,  
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while there is little danger that the Act will ever become user-friendly or self-explanatory, it 
is of particular importance in a self-assessment tax system to promote an interpretation of 
provisions, where possible, that is comprehensible to the taxpayers themselves.600 
Bentham was particularly dismissive of lawyers in his own time ‘say that a lawyer has no interest in 
the uncertainty of the law, as well might you say, that a gunpowder maker has no interest in war, or 
a glazier in the breaking of windows’.601    Although not writing directly from the perspective of the 
rule of law, Bentham was adamant that legislation ought to be capable of being known by the 
people it was directed at. 
4.1.1 The qualifier – so far as possible 
As with predictability, intelligibility isn’t an absolute value.  It isn’t something to be achieved at all 
costs, just ‘so far as possible’ according to Bingham. So, for Gower although it is good that legislation 
is readily intelligible, this isn’t to be achieved at the cost of sacrificing certainty.602  As I set out 
below, there are sometimes good reasons why legislation is not as intelligible as it could be. 
4.2 Why is legislation sometimes not intelligible? 
There is unanimity across the spectrum of academics603 and practitioners604 writing on legislation 
and the rule of law that legislation ought to be intelligible.  I have not found a single writer seriously 
arguing that legislation ought to be hard to understand.  However, there is also widespread 
exasperation that legislation is frequently unintelligible.  This comes from: 
 Journalists who speak of legislation which is ‘torturous and laborious even by the standards 
of statute-speak’.605 
 Judges who speak of ‘drafting quagmires’.606 
 Parliamentarians who state that ‘we have simply no right to legislate in a manner which is 
incomprehensible to the people to whom the legislation is addressed’.607 
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Preparation of Legislation’ (n 129). 
607 Lord Simon of Glaisdale (26 June 1997) 581 HL debs Col 1648 
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 Drafters who give examples of unintelligible legislation.608 
Why is there this paradox?  All those involved in the legislative process want intelligible law, but they 
are the ones who don’t produce it.  I suggest that there are five reasons for this.  Although there is 
overlap between these reasons, there are enough differences to warrant division into different 
categories. 
4.2.1 Exhaustiveness / comprehensiveness 
A law can be short and intelligible if it covers a single proposition which governs the vast majority of 
the populace.  However, ‘the vast majority’ is not ‘all’ and so sometimes, for the purposes of 
certainty and predictability, it is necessary to go into more detail to cover all eventualities, not 
simply the most common ones.  The difficulty is that this level of detail can obscure the main point 
and thus make the legislation less intelligible, or as John put it ‘the detailed rules aim to achieve legal 
certainty, which in turn leads to over particularisation and incomprehensible regulation’.609 
Take as an example legislation on a social security payment in Northern Ireland known as a welfare 
supplementary payment (WSP).  There are a large number of different types of WSP which a person 
is entitled to if they (or their partner) meet certain criteria.610  The legislation exhaustively sets out 
all these different criteria.  But it then goes on to provide for what happens if a couple separate and 
what impact this has on entitlement.  Furthermore, it makes provision for what happens if a person 
who is entitled to WSP in their own right subsequently forms a couple with another person who may 
also be entitled to a different type of WSP.  This leads to the following ‘challenging’ provision 
(5) Where case 1 or 2 applies, the amount of welfare supplementary payment to which A is 
entitled is reduced to the amount of welfare supplementary payment to which A would have 
been entitled under Part 3 if A had satisfied the conditions for payment on loss of carer 
premium on transition from disability living allowance to personal independence 
payment.611 
The need for predictability necessitates a comprehensive provision, as people on benefits will get 
married and separate, and they need to know how that changes their entitlement to benefit.  This is 
so even though the exhaustive nature of the provisions as a whole make the law less intelligible. 
                                                          
608 Ross Carter, ‘Statutory Interpretation and the Rectification of Drafting Errors’ [2012] New Zealand Law 
Review 207. 
609 Ubena (n 487) 99. 
610 See for example the Welfare Supplementary Payment (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2017. 
611 Regulation 22C, Welfare Supplementary Payment (Loss of Carer Payments) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 
2016. 
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But there is not always a need for exhaustiveness.  I previously stated that  
Drafting practice in common law countries (particularly the UK) is to set out both the 
principles and the details. There is a noble desire for the law to cover every possible 
eventuality, but this sometimes means that the basics of the law become obscured. In civil 
law systems, the detail is usually not included.612 
The civil law system has much to recommend it in this respect.  We don’t need to expressly state 
every possible combination and permutation, nor state things which are common sense or which a 
reasonable reader would apply anyway.  Take another example of a draft Bill on special measures for 
vulnerable witnesses giving evidence.  Clause 3 begins 
(1) A witness is eligible for assistance in giving evidence if the court considers that the quality 
of evidence given by the witness is likely to be diminished by reason of fear or distress in 
connection with testifying in the proceedings. 613 
This is tolerably clear.  However, the rest of the clause then continues with a long list of factors that 
the judge must consider when deciding whether a witness should have the benefit of a special 
measure in giving evidence.614   
Does the long list of factors to consider really assist either the court or the reader?  In my view it is 
reasonable to expect a judge to have a modicum of intelligence and discernment.  Although it may 
be helpful to have a list of factors to consider, these are surely things which any reasonable judge 
turning his or her mind to the question, would consider anyway.  The overly prescriptive list is not 
                                                          
612 Cormacain, ‘Have the Renton Committee’s Recommendations on Electronic Access to Legislation Been 
Fulfilled?’ (n 209). 
613 Civil Evidence (Witnesses) Bill in Northern Ireland Law Commission, ‘Vulnerable Witnesses in Civil 
Proceedings’ (2011) NILC 10. 
614 Those factors are: 
(a) the nature and alleged circumstances of the matter to which the proceedings relate,  
(b) the nature of the evidence the witness is likely to give,  
(c)  the age of the witness,  
(d)  any relationship between the witness and any party to the proceedings,  
(e)  the behaviour towards the witness of-  
(i)     any party,  
(ii)    family members or associates of any party,  
(iii)    any other person who is likely to be a party or a witness, and  
(f)  any views expressed by the witness. 
The judge must then consider: 
(a) the racial group of the witness,  
(b)  the domestic and employment circumstances of the witness,  
(c)  any religious beliefs or political opinions of the witness,  
(d) the sexual orientation of the witness, and  
(e)  any other matter that the court considers relevant. 
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necessary here, and tends to make the legislation less intelligible.  The Renton report supports this 
move away from detail to towards principles in favour of intelligibility.  However, in reviewing the 
impact of Renton ten years on, Lord Simon stated that  
these recommendations have been completely disregarded; and statutes are still drafted in 
elaborate and incomprehensible detail to deal with every foreseeable combination of 
circumstances which might arise.615 
It has hard to be dogmatic on what level of prescriptive detail a statute should contain.  If it renders 
the statute unintelligible, that would indicate removing it. If it isn’t strictly necessary for the 
purposes of precision, that also indicates removing it.  Following Orwell’s suggestion, if text isn’t 
strictly necessary, cut it out.616  John reaches the same conclusion, that detailed law should only be 
used where necessary.617 
4.2.2 Complex policy 
It is possible to work backwards from unintelligible legislation that is caused by the complexity of the 
law, which is caused in turn by the complexity of the legal policy behind the law.  This is similar to 
unintelligibility arising through exhaustiveness, but it is more of a policy choice to have different 
rules applying in different situations. Complex policy is about creating policy distinctions between 
different cases when the law would work (from a legal perspective) without those different policy 
distinctions.  An exhaustive law seeks to cover all eventualities, whereas a complex law will seek to 
introduce different rules for different circumstances. 
An example may make things clearer.  A simple policy is that the Ombudsman may investigate 
maladministration in public bodies.618.  However, the actual policy is more complicated, and so we 
need to have different rules for how the Ombudsman may investigate health and social care 
bodies,619 general health care providers, 620 independent providers of health and social care, 621 and 
universities.622 
The decision to have a complex policy isn’t a drafting decision, it is a political one.  One thing the 
drafter can do is to point out that complexity leads to reduced intelligibility and to ask if there is a 
need for this amount of complexity.  But with a complex policy, although the drafter can work to 
                                                          
615 Lord Simon, ‘Renton Report - Ten Years On, The’ (1985) 1985 Statute Law Review 133, 135. 
616 Orwell (n 518). 
617 Ubena (n 487) 99. 
618 S. 14 Public Services Ombudsman (Northern Ireland) 2016. 
619 Ibid. s. 15. 
620 Ibid. s. 16. 
621 Ibid. s. 17. 
622 Ibid. s. 18. 
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simplify the legislation, this will be more difficult than if the policy was simple.  This is borne out by 
the official findings of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel report on complexity in legislation.  
One of the headings of that report is ‘mapping the causes of unnecessary complexity’.623  The clear 
implication is that there is such a thing as ‘necessary complexity’.  However, we should be clear here 
that the necessity is a political one, not a legal or drafting imperative.  The House of Commons 
recognised the limits of drafting skill to make complex law more intelligible: 
However, while the tax profession has welcomed the TLR’s outputs and made positive 
comment on the usability of the legislation it has produced, it has certainly not made the 
underlying tax law appreciably easier for the layman to navigate. Nor, as the Institute of 
Directors pointed out, has it clarified the underlying tax policy.624 
4.2.3 Complexity masking a lack of direction 
Complex (and unintelligible) legislation can sometimes mask a lack of understanding and certainty 
about what the law and policy are meant to be. It is hard to hide ignorance in an intelligible 
provision, much easier to do so in a long, meandering and incomprehensible one.  Orwell was critical 
of this style of writing where ‘the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish 
thoughts’625 and ‘the writer either has a meaning and cannot express it, or he inadvertently says 
something else, or he is almost indifferent as to whether his words mean anything or not’.626 
The OPC report on complexity in legislation bears witness to this.  It notes one reason for 
‘unnecessary complexity’ as being a dysfunctional relationship between policy and legislation, which 
can be caused by imprecise policy objectives, rushed instructions, public or media pressure, political 
contingencies and a failure to think things through.627   A drafter can’t weave straw into gold.  If the 
policy is incoherent then the resulting legislation will be unintelligible. 
4.2.4 Desire for solemnity  
Which is more impressive: Moses comes down from the mountain with a stone tablet declaiming 
“thou shalt not kill”, or a drafting committee producing a piece of paper which says “It is an offence 
to kill”?  There is a human desire for majesty and solemnity in our legislation – that not only must it 
be law, but it must look and feel like law.  Greenberg has found a desire for ‘legalese’ in legislation so 
                                                          
623 Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, ‘When Laws Become Too Complex - Inside Government’ (n 144). 
624 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Principles of tax policy, Eighth Report of Session 2010–11 
paragraph 45. 
625 Orwell (n 518) 1. 
626 Ibid, 2 
627  Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, ‘When Laws Become Too Complex - Inside Government’ (n 144).  See 
para 4.2. 
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that people (citizens, legislators) will be impressed by it, that they will accord it a higher status 
because of its weighty form.628  This is perhaps one reason why the enacting words in UK statutes 
are rather grandiose (‘Be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty…’).  Bennion gives an 
example where his draft included the more intelligible ‘tried his best’ rather than the less intelligible 
‘used his best endeavours’.  Rather than welcoming the plainer words, parliamentarians lamented it 
as ‘amateurish’.629  
The desire for solemnity can (for some drafters) morph into a desire for pomposity and ponderous 
language.  Greenberg argued that in reality, people like a bit of pomposity in law.630  But legalese can 
be unclear.631  This can lead to unintelligible and archaic phrases ‘as aforesaid’, ‘hereinafter’ etc.  
This is rather like the wizard in the Wizard of Oz making himself sound impressive by the use of 
smoke and mirrors.  However, there is a sense in which the desire for solemnity is well-placed.  If the 
rule of law means we are all subject to the law, we should enact law which is more likely to be 
respected and obeyed, and if legislation is phrased in too casual a manner, it is less likely to 
engender respect.  Intelligibility shouldn’t be sacrificed for solemnity, but neither should the use of 
demotic language dilute respect for legislation. 
4.2.5 The nature of legislation 
The nature of legislation itself is a barrier to intelligibility.  Legislation is law enacted by Parliament 
and it must conform to the requirements of the medium.  The various techniques available to other 
forms of communication are not available to it.  For example, it cannot repeat itself, it cannot 
include unnecessary material, it cannot use an informal style.  One particular limitation is the use of 
direct speech or the second person “you must have a licence” rather than “a person must have a 
licence”.  According to Stefanou, the idea of drafting in the second person has not been well 
received in the UK and has not been used.632  Having searched through the UK statute law database 
the only “you” in it is in tax law (PAYE or “pay as you earn”) and in forms which are directed to 
members of the public.   As Pearce says ‘the legislative drafter is obliged to follow a form that 
enables the bill as drafted to be debated in accordance with the standing orders of the parliament 
that is to consider it’.633 
 
                                                          
628 Greenberg, Laying down the Law (n 92) 219. 
629 Francis Bennion, Bennion on Statute Law (Longman 1990) 38. 
630 Daniel Greenberg, ‘The Three Myths of Plain English Drafting’ [2011] The Loophole 103. 
631 David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Resource Publications 2004) 24. 
632 He cites evidence from the Tax Law Rewrite in the UK, see Constantin Stefanou, Drafting Legislation: A 
Modern Approach (Helen Xanthaki ed, 1 edition, Routledge 2008). 
633 DC Pearce and RS Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (5th edn, Lexisnexis 2001) 3. 
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Part 2 Drafting Principles that Promote Intelligibility  
4.3 Characteristics of the user 
So far I have spoken about intelligibility without any qualification.  But intelligibility does not exist in 
a vacuum, it has at least two dimensions: 
 The statute to be understood 
 The person who is to understand it 
So, a general principle that legislation ought to be intelligible is too unfocused.  Instead, the principle 
is that a particular piece of legislation ought to be intelligible by the persons who will use it. 
4.3.1 Conception of legislation and relationship with human autonomy 
To whom is legislation (or a particular piece of legislation) directed?  Before answering this in a 
practical way, it is necessary to consider the theoretical and philosophical conception of legislation.  
One view is quite paternalistic, that legislation is bestowed upon the populace by the legislature and 
then applied to them by the government. This conception of law and state sees the citizen as the 
object of the legislation – the thing to which law is applied.  Under this view, the citizen is the 
passive recipient of law.  Bennion stated that ‘It may be positively dangerous to encourage non-
lawyers to think they can understand legal texts unaided by expert advice.’634  The other perspective 
sees the citizen as more of an active participant in law.  The citizen is the subject of the law, the 
citizen reads it, interprets it and then applies the law.  The citizen has autonomy and volition such 
that the citizen is the end user of the law rather than the state. 
If the citizen is the object, then the target audience of the legislation (i.e. the user) will be the 
various state actors (civil servants, ministers, judges, police etc.) It isn’t necessary that the law be 
intelligible to the citizen, what is important is that the government actors who are actually applying 
and enforcing the law understand it.  But if the citizen is the subject, then the legislation needs to be 
intelligible to the citizen, it is the citizen who the drafter must have in mind when preparing 
legislation. 
Most people would eschew the first conception of legislation as being the property of the state.  
Instead, they would value human autonomy and conceive of legislation which is to be directed at 
citizens and thus intelligible by them.  So, at a high theoretical level, we can say that legislation 
ought to be intelligible by the citizen, although as will be seen below, we can sometimes subdivide 
this, and we can sometimes consider the user as the state. 
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4.3.2 Target audience – the citizens using the legislation 
 Some laws are very broad and general in their application such that it is reasonable to assume that 
the citizenry as a whole will use them.  For example, we all might be users of the criminal law on 
assault, or on driving a car.  We could summarise this approach as legislation must be intelligible to 
all citizens. 
The orthodox view is that criminal law and tax law applies to all citizens, and so must be drafted in a 
way that renders it understandable to them.635  But the position is not as straightforward as this, as 
much of the criminal and tax law will be irrelevant to most of the population.  For example, the 
person on the street doesn’t need to be able to understand the offences relating to registration and 
authorisation for radioactive substances.636  Only those working (in the main) in the nuclear industry 
need to be able to understand this.  Taking another example, a small shopkeeper should be able to 
understand the provisions of income tax legislation which apply to them, but they don’t need to 
know (taking a random provision from the tax legislation) the tax treatment of the expenses of 
management investment companies.637 
Then there is legislation that clearly does not apply to the entirety of the populace. So, the law on 
the duties of company directors only needs to be intelligible to company directors (and perhaps a 
small number of others who use companies law).638  So, if a piece of legislation is addressed to a 
particular user group, it is only necessary that it be intelligible by that user group, not by the 
population as a whole.  On rare occasions there has been research to identify the user group of a 
particular piece of legislation, with consequences for how that legislation is to be drafted.639  Bertlin 
notes the findings of some key empirical research on who are the users of legislation in the UK, and 
this has implications for how we draft specific pieces of law.640  This approach could be summarised 
as: specific legislation must be intelligible to the specific citizens to whom it applies. 
                                                          
635 For example, in a parliamentary debate as long ago as 1853, the Chancellor was urged to make tax law 
intelligible to everyone, quoted in a chapter on tax simplification in Robert Chote and others, The IFS Green 
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The Business Tenancies (Northern Ireland) 1996 Order is a specific law with a reasonably discrete 
group of users: landlords, business tenants and their advisers.641  Do they form a semiotic 
community?  They form such a community if they share a common understanding of words and 
phrases that the larger community do not share.  Taking another example, there is a semiotic 
community of oil producers who understand the definition of ‘light oil’ within the meaning of the 
Hydrocarbon Oil Duties Act 1979.  The technical definition (‘not less than 90% by volume distils at a 
temperature not exceeding 210C’) is probably meaningless for most people, but meaningful for 
them. 
The key point is that the person who will use a particular statutory provision needs to be able to 
understand that provision.  This requires a level of granularity or particularisation in the intelligibility 
of the legislation.  A blanket exhortation that all citizens must understand all the law, (or even all of 
the criminal or tax law) is unnecessary and unrealistic.  What is needed is focused intelligibility, that 
the person to whom the law applies needs to be able to understand it.  This should be widened 
slightly, as users won’t simply look at the single provision which applies to them, in searching for it, 
they will look at the provisions around it.  So, the provision which applies to a citizen, as well as the 
provisions surrounding it (or the provisions set in their context) should be intelligible by the user of 
the legislation. 
The danger though is that the drafter only considers one user group when drafting legislation, not 
the whole panoply of potential users.  So, one might consider that the law on financial regulation 
only needs to be intelligible by those working in the finance sector.642  But if a financial services 
provider becomes insolvent, there is a mechanism by which ordinary investors can claim 
compensation.643  Those provisions could be used by ordinary investors, so it is important that it is 
intelligible to them. 
One useful rule of thumb is that any provision which states that a person must (or may) do a 
particular thing ought to be intelligible by any person who could reasonably be considered to be 
subject to it.  So an obligation on a person in relation to the storage of nuclear waste should be 
written so as to be intelligible by a person who is storing nuclear waste.  But an obligation on a 
person in relation to driving a car should be written so as to be intelligible by a person who is likely 
to be driving a car. 
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Participation of citizens in the law making process may be an ‘essential element of a due process of 
lawmaking’644, but it is not a requirement of the rule of law.  However, if citizens have a role in the 
making of legislation, it is more likely that the legislation will be more intelligible as it will have been 
‘tested’ by them first before it is enacted. 
4.3.3 Target audience – state focused legislation 
Despite disagreeing with the general conception of legislation as being bestowed upon citizens who 
are passive recipients of it, there are some instances where it is proper to consider the target 
audience as being the state.  Some statutes are directed at the administration of the state.  So if a 
statute sets up a new quango, the provisions of the statute regulating the constitution of that 
quango are really only of interest to the quango itself.645  If legislation restructures the health service 
or the education service, then it only needs to be intelligible to those governmental officials actually 
implementing this change, or as the EU suggests ‘texts may include technical requirements whose 
implementation falls to specialised officials in that field’.646 
However, this is subject to a rather large caveat.  Although the users of this legislation may be state 
officials, many ordinary citizens will have an interest in the policy choices and the impact upon them 
as citizens.  So, intelligibility of the legislation as it passes through parliament is important as it helps 
citizens in their efforts to lobby for changes in that legislation, or to hold their elected 
representatives to account.  Complex legislation may be fine for the health service administrator, but 
not for the patient trying to figure out if it means that their local GP practice will close down. 
This becomes truly problematic if the interests of those charged with the administration of the 
legislation take priority over those who the legislation affects.  The Supreme Court considered 
immigration rules in Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department.647  It considered the 
audience of immigrants to whom the rules applied and stated ‘it is difficult for the applicants, for 
many of whom English is not even their first language, to navigate their way around the 
requirements.  It may be, however, that, as intended, the system is not difficult for caseworkers to 
administer’.648  The idea that legislation is drafted for the benefit of the state rather than the citizen 
is anathema to basic notions of fairness. 
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4.3.4 Target audience – special cases: those with a particular difficulty in understanding 
legislation 
The principle set out so far is that legislation should be intelligible by its users.  But there are some 
circumstances where it would be unreasonable to expect the end user to understand the legislation.  
Two prime examples are legislation governing children and legislation governing those who lack 
mental capacity.  So, section 1 of the Children Act 1989 states that ‘the child’s welfare shall be the 
court’s paramount consideration’.  These words are vital as they set out what is called the welfare 
principle, that the child comes first.  But the phrase ‘paramount consideration’ is unlikely to be 
understood by a child, particularly a young child.  Equally, depending upon the mental capacity (or 
lack of mental capacity) it may not be reasonable to expect a person to understand the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005.  In special cases like these, it may simply not be possible to make the legislation 
intelligible to the end user. 
4.3.5 Target audience – those who will always have an interest in the legislation 
There are some groups who will always be users of the legislation, no matter what the legislation is.  
Legislators always need to be able to understand the legislation they are enacting, otherwise there is 
a substantial loss of legitimacy of that legislation.  Therefore, legislation needs to be intelligible to 
them.  However, notwithstanding the criticism of intermediaries set out below, it is reasonable to 
expect legislators to be briefed on legislation and to be assisted in scrutinising that legislation by 
experts. 
Judges, and others involved in the legal system also need to be able to understand legislation.  This 
specific user group can be assumed to have a high level of legal ability, so a requirement that 
legislation be intelligible to them will most likely be subsumed that the legislation is intelligible by 
the rest of the target audience.  The reverse is also true, if a piece of legislation is unintelligible to a 
trained judge, what chance does the lay user have.  For the sake of completeness, it is also 
reasonable to expect that juries may sometimes be end users of legislation.  However, it is 
reasonable to expect that they will have substantial assistance from a judge in the form of directions 
when it comes to them understanding the law. 
4.3.6 Intelligibility and law as a method of communication 
Legislation performs at least two functions.  The most obvious function is to make new law, in the 
sense that it brings law into being.  But another function, as Crabbe points out, is to communicate 
that new law.649 Stefanou develops this concept stating that ‘law is a form of communication where 
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legal relations are comprehended and appreciated through a communicative process.650  Roebuck 
goes further and argues that language is a code, and the purpose of it is to transmit a message.651 
So one text both does the thing and explains the thing.  It is this second function to which 
intelligibility is more relevant.  The first function is satisfied if the legislation is certain and precise, 
even if it very difficult to understand.  It is only in conveying the information to the end user that 
intelligibility becomes important (or in Stefanou’s analysis transmitting the message to the receiver).  
But this sets up an internal tension, because things which tend to make the legislation more 
communicable are not always conducive with making the law.  Consider the following two 
statements on the obligation to have car insurance. 
1. A person in charge of a motor vehicle must be in possession of a valid certificate of motor 
insurance. 
2. Drivers, it is absolutely imperative, and I cannot stress this enough, that your car is insured. 
The first statement makes the law, the second statement communicates it.  They are both effective 
within their own paradigm, but not so effective when considering the other paradigm.  Statement 1 
is a definite statement of law, but doesn’t perhaps convey the gravity of the command.  Statement 2 
conveys the importance, and is directed at the end user, but its use of repetition means it doesn’t 
work as a legal obligation.  But legislation doesn’t have the luxury of containing two statements, it 
only has one.  And so that one statement must seek to do both, making the law and communicating 
the law.652 
In moving towards intelligibility for the purposes of communication, it is therefore vital not to lose 
sight of the fact that legislation is first and foremost the way of making law.  As I previously stated, 
‘the primary purpose of a statute is not educative, it is to effect a change in the law’,653  Repetition, 
tmesis, underlining, rhetoric, and many other devices which aid communication are incompatible 
with a document which makes law. So the principle of intelligibility is constrained by the function of 
legislation as a tool for making law.  Methods which promote intelligibility within those constraints 
are to be welcomed, methods which break those constraints are unacceptable. 
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Pennisi goes further than this and argues that for specialized discourses (including legislation), there 
is in fact a need for two separate texts, one for specialists and one for the lay person.654  The 
communicative purpose of the lay text is informative.  This could be seen as the logical extension of 
what I have argued above, that communicating information to the lay person is not the primary 
purpose of legislation.  However, I think Pennisi’s argument goes too far as it provides an excuse for 
drafters to retreat back into unintelligibility, safe in the knowledge that a second text will 
communicate the law to users.  Although there is much that is admirable about government 
providing additional material to help explain the law to lay readers, this does not take away from the 
obligation to make the legislation itself intelligible to lay users. 
Having argued that intelligibility shouldn’t lead to certainty being subverted, it is also necessary to 
argue in the other direction – just because legislation is there to make law, doesn’t mean that we 
should ignore its communicative dimension.  Ilahi points out that some critics of the plain language 
movement ‘deny any communicative role of the legislation and are of the view that the legislation is 
only meant to change and contain (not explain) the command of the law’.655  This is a wilfully blind 
view as it completely ignores the fact that legislation is also about communication. 
4.3.7 Role of intermediaries 
So far, my argument has been that legislation ought to be intelligible by its users.  However, is this a 
realistic requirement to impose upon the drafter of a statute?  For many people, legislation is not 
consumed directly, but it is interacted with by way of an intermediary – someone who mediates 
between the law and the citizen.  The most obvious intermediary is the lawyer who advises the 
client on the client’s legal rights and responsibilities under the legislation.  But there are other 
intermediaries: the accountant who advises on tax law, the Citizen’s Advice Bureau worker who 
advises a client on social security benefits, the campaigning charity who advises members on the 
impact of a proposed new law.  The government itself can act as an intermediary, advising citizens 
on the changes made by a new law by producing guidance notes.  This approach can be summarised 
as: legislation must be intelligible to intermediaries, who must then produce guidance that is 
intelligible to citizens.  
What are the consequences of this for intelligibility?  If the drafter knows that the citizen will be 
making use of an intermediary, then all that is necessary is for the legislation to be intelligible to that 
intermediary, not the end user (the citizen).  This is precisely what Bennion argued for.656  Legislation 
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will be the primary source of information, but the citizen will use the secondary source provided by 
the intermediary.  Developing Stefanou’s theory on legislation as communication, it is the 
effectiveness of this secondary source as a means of communication that is important.  The 
mediated information doesn’t have to fulfil the function of ‘making the law’, only of ‘communicating 
the law’, so it can take advantage of those communicative techniques which are prohibited to the 
drafter of the legislation. 
There are five broad objections to the argument that legislation only needs to be intelligible to the 
intermediary. 
The first is the practical one, that the secondary source (the information provided by the mediator) 
may not accurately reflect the actual content of the law.  In processing and transmitting the 
legislation, the intermediary may simply get it wrong.  There is always the risk that in transcribing 
the information, the transcriber will make an error.  So, it is much better for the legislation itself to 
be intelligible so that it doesn’t need to be mediated. 
The second objection is that the use of intermediaries sets up a self-fulfilling loop which justifies 
unintelligibility of legislation.  The loop works like this: legislation is unintelligible, so we need an 
intermediary to render it intelligible to the layperson, if the layperson is using an intermediary then 
the legislation only needs to be intelligible to the intermediary.  So the use of intermediaries justifies 
setting low standards of intelligibility in legislation. 
The third objection relates back to the rule of law and the conception of legislation as something 
which is made for us and which we are subject to.  Sullivan is scathing in her criticism of what she 
terms as law being oracle rather than canon. 
The statute book as oracle, however, invites a different kind of response.  Messages sent 
through oracles call for interpretation; they have to be deciphered to be understood. The 
words of an oracle are pregnant with meaning, but the meaning is obscure and incomplete. 
They may provide a fixed basis for law, a stable entry point, but they say different things to 
different people. For this reason, official interpreters are needed to establish privileged 
readings of the text that can, when necessary, displace the vulgar readings of the 
uninitiated.657 
Law as oracle as Sullivan describes it (or law through intermediaries as I describe it) divorces the 
citizens in whose name the law is made from the law itself.  It reframes them once again as passive 
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recipients of the law, who can’t be trusted to interpret and apply it themselves.  There is an 
interesting historical parallel here.  Before the Reformation in Europe, the Christian religion was 
seen as something ‘owned’ by the religious classes who then instructed the laity on their obligations. 
The Bible was in Latin, and its message was mediated by the clergy.  However, one of the 
fundamental changes made by the Reformation was the move to the vernacular Bible and the 
removal of the priest as the mediator between the person and God.658  The individual was trusted to 
find their own route to salvation via their own reading of the Bible (although still within the limits set 
out by the wise masters!). 
It is fundamentally undemocratic and antithetical to the rule of law if the persons who will use 
legislation cannot be expected to understand it, and must employ others to explain it to them.  
Legislation isn’t quantum physics which is intrinsically complex and hard to understand by its very 
nature659.  Legislation is a human construct so it must be susceptible to human reasoning.  It 
infantilises citizens to say that they are much too stupid to even attempt to comprehend the law, 
that they must be spoon-fed it via a lawyer.  Legislation is not there for lawyers, it is there for the 
citizen.660  Barnes considers both sides of this argument, but doesn’t come down on one side or the 
other.661 
The fourth objection is another practical one – how is the drafter to know what legislation will be 
consumed directly by the citizen and what will be mediated? Or alternatively, when is it reasonable 
to assume that intelligibility needs only to be directed at the intermediary? 
The fifth objection stems from another of Bingham’s elements of the rule of law, that the law applies 
to everyone equally.662  If legislation is only understandable via the use of intermediaries, then we 
make legislation accessible only to those who can afford to pay for intermediaries.  As Anatole 
France caustically remarked ‘In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep 
under bridges’.663  There is no equality in legislation that is only intelligible by those who can afford 
lawyers. 
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The final point is not an argument against the use of intermediaries, it is that intelligibility can help 
those intermediaries as well as helping the lay reader.  Some empirical research has shown that 
lawyers can struggle with intelligibility as much as non-lawyers.664 
4.3.8 The consequences for intelligibility in considering the user 
Proceeding from the conclusion that law ought to be intelligible to the person who is using it, what 
are the consequences for legislative drafting?  The main consequence is that the language used must 
be appropriate to the target audience.  So if the target audience is the populace at large, the 
legislation must be intelligible to them. This doesn’t mean reducing the language to the lowest 
common denominator in terms of simplicity, but it does mean using language that most ordinary 
people could reasonably expect to understand.  It doesn’t mean using the wrong word merely 
because the wrong word is easier or more common-place.  Provided that the user could readily 
identify the meaning of the uncommon (but correct) word, then that word should be preferred. 
I previously discussed this in relation to the legislation on tenancies and a definition that included 
the phrase ‘the effluxion of time’.665  This is not a common phrase in regular English usage. The 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles defines it as ‘the action or process of 
flowing out: an outflow’.  Aiyar includes effluxion of time within a legal dictionary and defines it, with 
reference to tenancies as  
the conclusion or expiration of an agreed term of years specified in the deed or writing, or 
expiration arising in the natural course of events, in contradistinction to the determination 
of the term by the acts of parties or by some unexpected or unusual incident or other 
sudden event.666 
The requirement of intelligibility would suggest substituting a simpler synonym for effluxion, such as 
‘passage of time’, or ‘expiry of time’.  Both of these phrases are more intelligible to readers and 
neither of them requires the use of a dictionary for the reader of average intelligence.  Neither 
‘expiry’ nor ‘passage’ captures the precise meaning which effluxion conveys.  If time effluxes, it runs 
out.  It conveys the notion that there was a fixed quantity of time and now that time has naturally 
flowed out – there is none left.  The passage of time or the expiry of time do not give that same 
sense of the fixed quantity running out by a natural process.  Effluxion may not be as readily 
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understandable but it is the more precise term. So effluxion is the more accurate word to use, even 
though we lose some intelligibility. 
It is when we come to consider legislation to be used by a specific group that there are more 
important consequences for drafters.  If legislation is to be used by a particular group, then it is 
reasonable to use language and concepts that are readily intelligible by that group, even though 
these may not be intelligible by the populace as a whole. So technical language, or even jargon might 
be acceptable for that legislation as it would be intelligible by that audience.  So, the ordinary reader 
may struggle to know what an ampoule is (a small sealed capsule containing a liquid), but for vets it 
is perfectly acceptable for legislation to talk about storing a batch of donors in the same ampoule.667 
4.3.9 The reality of citizens using legislation 
Much of what I have argued above is predicated on the right of citizens to understand legislation 
which affects them.  But what actually happens in practice?  There is little point in expending time 
and effort on making legislation intelligible to citizens if citizens don’t actually read it.  Bingham 
acknowledged this point when he joked that criminals don’t check out the legislation before they 
decide to rob a bank.   Hunt in particular has been critical of the desire to make legislation intelligible 
to a public who don’t read legislation.  In fact he went so far as to call it an unwise assumption that 
‘that members of the public are interested in reading raw legislation’.668 
At the level of high theory, we are all treated as if we knew the law – it remains a legal maxim that 
ignorance of the law is no defence.  Contrary to what Hunt originally asserted, there is now empirical 
evidence on the readership of legislation.  A major study was carried out by the National Archives 
and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.669  That research made for very interesting reading.  
The official UK legislation website has 2 million separate visitors each month.   About 60% of the 
visitors were found to be non-lawyers who used legislation for work (the examples given were police 
officers, human resources professionals or council officials).  Then there were members of the public 
seeking to use law to enforce their rights.  The final user group was lawyers of all kinds.   
The results of this research give empirical weight to the central argument of this chapter that 
legislation ought to be intelligible to the user.  There are huge numbers of non-lawyers using 
legislation.  Legislation ought to be drafted in a way which is intelligible to them.  Although bank-
robbers might not read up on the Theft Act 1978, substantial numbers of citizens do read legislation.  
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Ilahi prefigured the UK research when he argued in 2012 that even though the public at large may 
not read the entirety of the statute book, they will be interested in that portion of it which affects 
them.670  Furthermore, he went on to argue that even if not everyone reads the law this ‘does not 
absolve the State of her responsibilities to strive for making the laws easier to understand’.671 
4.4 Intelligibility of amending legislation or of the legislation as amended 
The thing to be understood is the legislation.  In a simple world with a simple statute book this 
statement is straightforward and without nuance.  But the world and the statute book are not 
simple.  One complication is that a law rarely stands alone, complete in itself.  Instead it is woven 
into an existing tapestry of laws.  Most legislation is amending legislation in that it amends existing 
legislation.  There are therefore two potential targets for intelligibility: 
1. The amending legislation (the most recent law which changes the existing law) 
2. The legislation as amended (the existing law, taking into account those changes) 
Although the distinction may seem Jesuitical, there is a crucial difference between the amending 
legislation and the legislation as amended.  The first is the change itself, the second, the thing 
changed.  For example, the Children and Social Work Act 2017 works in part by making multiple 
amendments to the Children Act 2004. So, is the goal to make the 2017 Act intelligible, or the 2004 
Act intelligible?  Or are they both important, or is one more important than the other?  Is it like 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (the more precise your knowledge about an object’s speed, the 
less precise you are about its location) – the more you know about the change, the less you know 
about the object being changed? Before addressing this, it is important to first set out how 
amending legislation works. 
4.4.1 How amending legislation works 
Amendments normally work in one of two ways: textual amendments and non-textual amendments.  
A textual amendment makes a direct change to the text of the old law.672  Thornton refers to this as 
‘direct and textual’.673  The following is a direct textual amendment from the Children and Social 
Work Act 2017 
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29. In section 66(3) of the Children Act 2004 (regulations subject to affirmative procedure), 
after “12B(1)(b)” insert “, 16B (whether alone or with regulations under section 16F), 
16E(3)”. 
So the 2017 Act delves into the text of the 2004 Act and inserts new material into it.674   
A non-textual amendment makes an indirect change to the existing law, not by changing the text of 
the existing law, but by requiring it to be read in a different way.675  The key point is that there is 
nothing on the face of the existing law indicating that it is to be read in this particular way. Thornton 
refers to this as ‘indirect, referential and cumulative’.676  I think that ‘cumulative’ is slightly 
misleading here as textual amendments are also cumulative in the sense that they build on top of 
each other.  A non-textual amendment doesn’t always refer directly and specifically to all the law 
that it amends, it can instead make a general or global reference.  For example, the Department for 
Employment and Learning Act (Northern Ireland) 2001 changed the name of the government 
department.  Instead of going through the statute book, identifying each instance where the old 
name was used and changing it, it instead stated that all references to the old name were to be read 
as references to the new name. This kind of non-textual amendment is very common, particularly 
when there are a very large number of ‘cosmetic’ changes to the law being made. 
4.4.2 Different users, different needs 
When it comes to intelligibility of amending legislation versus legislation as amended, different users 
have different needs.  Parliamentarians need to understand the law in front of them (the amending 
law) as they need to understand what they are enacting.  Professionals working in the field will most 
likely know the existing law, and only need to know what the changes are.  Lay persons most likely 
don’t need to know the minutiae of when various amendments are made, they just need to know 
what the law as amended is. 
In my view, textual amendments are most in accordance with the rule of law.  This is because it is 
more important for citizens to know what the law actually is, rather than how the law has changed. 
The textual amendment makes it easier to read and understand the law as amended.  The non-
textual amendment is more difficult to find as it isn’t part of the text of the existing law.  
Furthermore, the non-textual amendment requires the reader to jump through the difficult 
intellectual hoop of reading a text ‘as if’ it actually said something else. 
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Ilbert was of the view that non-textual amendments were good for legislators ‘for parliamentary 
purposes [non-textual amendment] is the most convenient, because under it every member of 
Parliament who knows anything of the subject learns at once the nature of the amendment 
proposed’.677  But although legislators are an important user group of legislation, legislation is not 
made for their benefit, but for the benefit of society as a whole. It is more important for citizens to 
understand the law through its lifespan than it is for legislators to understand it at its birth.  
The preponderance of views in the drafting community agree with the argument that textual 
amendments are generally to be preferred.  For Samuels ‘textual amendment, substitution of a new 
section for the old section, is desirable in principle’.678  Berry679 and Thornton agree.680  Textual 
amendments are far more common, both in the UK and around the Commonwealth.  Non-textual 
amendments may be easier for drafters (less statutes to check and cross refer to) but they do not 
assist understanding where it is most needed. 
As ever though, it is wise not to be dogmatic.  Sometimes a non-textual amendment can be made 
with little loss of intelligibility but large gains in other directions.  Going back to the departmental 
renaming legislation example.  If we required textual amendments each time a departmental name 
changed, the statute book would quickly be littered with thousands of pointless cosmetic changes. If 
a textual amendment doesn’t cause problems with intelligibility, its use can be justified.   
But even if a non-textual amendment can be intelligible, it can cause uncertainty, precisely because 
the impact of the non-textual change hasn’t been considered in every single place where it will be 
applied.  Let’s say there is a Dogs Act which regulates dogs, and let’s say we now want to regulate 
cats.  We could make textual amendments to the Dogs Act, by adding “or cat” after every single 
“dog”.  We could draft an entirely new Cats Act which replicates the Dogs Act.  Or we could make a 
non-textual amendment that in the Dogs Act a reference to a dog shall be taken to include a 
reference to a cat.  If we do the job right and make a new Act, or make textual amendments to the 
Dogs Act, we will see that parts of it don’t work for cats – for example a lead for a dog may make 
sense, but not for a cat, or there may not be dangerous breeds of cat in the same way that there are 
dangerous breeds of dog.  But with non-textual amendments, we don’t check those things, we 
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simply make a global change without looking at the detail and consequence of what that change 
means in all circumstances. 
The key point is what actually works, not an automatic rule that textual is good and non-textual bad.  
Generally, textual makes legislation more intelligible, as well as more certain.  In some 
circumstances, where the application of the law is tightly constrained, a non-textual amendment will 
be both intelligible and certain. 
4.4.3 Drafting solutions to dealing with amendments 
I previously set out some thoughts on tools to enhance clarity in amending legislation.681  In this 
section, I expand upon and develop that list.  The following can assist intelligibility both of the law as 
amended, and of the amending legislation. 
Access to the law as amended 
In chapter 2 I argued that accessibility included a requirement for access to the law as amended.  If 
this is done, then the fact of an amendment, in itself, causes zero intelligibility problems.  This can be 
done via a statute law database, or (as Samuels682 and Lord Simon683 argued) via reprints of the law 
as amended.  If the reprint or database is by the state, then it will be quasi-authoritative, even if it 
doesn’t have the authority of an actual Act of Parliament.  Beatson saw the value of this in Scotland 
where an unofficial version of the law as amended was reprinted ‘because without it the new law 
was utterly incomprehensible’.684  Teasdale is also of the view that the reprints (along with 
consolidations etc.) where valuable tools for improving the quality of the statute book.685 The same 
conclusion was reached by the Renton Committee.686 
Bare textual amendments 
A bare textual amendment makes the amendment in the smallest possible number of words.  So, if 
an amending statute changes the penalty for an offence from 2 to 3 years, the amendment is  
In section 6(2), for “2” substitute “3”. 
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A bare amendment has the benefit of brevity, but gives the reader of the amending statute very 
little idea about the nature of the change being made. 
Expansive textual amendment 
An expansive textual amendment develops the idea of a bare textual amendment.  But instead of 
amending the one or two words which are actually changing, it sets out the whole provision in its 
amended form.  So, the amendment is 
For section 6(2) substitute ‘A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years’. 
The only thing which is actually changing is the number 2 to 3, but the amendment restates the 
entirety of the subsection, letting the reader at least know what the nature of the amendment is.  
The EU suggest this as the best way to proceed ‘preference shall be given to replacing whole 
provisions (articles or subdivisions of articles) rather than inserting or deleting individual sentences, 
phrases or words’.687  This is at least intelligible.  The reader can understand what is in front of her, 
although the exact nature of the change may not be clear. 
Consolidation with amendments 
A consolidation repeals all the previous legislation on the point, and re-enacts it with the 
amendments included within it.  Lord Simon thought it the best way to deal with legislation which 
has been amended multiple times.688  His fellow judge, Lord Hailsham had the same view – ‘statute 
law revision and consolidations are both valuable ways of improving the statute book’.689  
Consolidation is a statutory duty of the Northern Ireland Law Commission690 and the Law 
Commissions and England and Wales and Scotland.691 The value of them is reflected in the fact that 
special parliamentary procedures exist to make consolidation acts easier to pass through 
Parliament.692 
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Consolidation helps the reader to see what the law as amended is.  However, it isn’t particularly 
good at showing what the changes being made to the law are. This is because the changes aren’t 
flagged up in any way, all that a consolidation does is set out the new law. 
Repeal and restatement 
Repeal and restatement is consolidation but at a smaller level.  Instead of repealing the entirety of 
the old law and passing a new consolidated act, only the old provision is repealed and restated in a 
new law.  The courts have in the past expressed a preference for this ‘where possible, statutes, or 
complete parts of statutes, should not be amended but re-enacted in an amended form so that 
those concerned can read the rules in a single document’.693  This approach also finds favour with 
Lovgren.694  As with consolidations though, this renders the amending law less intelligible, as it is 
hard to know what exactly is being changed.  An up to date statute law database would render 
repeal and restatement unnecessary. 
Textual amendment with explanatory material 
A textual amendment with explanatory material builds upon a bare textual amendment, but uses 
explanatory material (within the actual legislation) to give a narrative to what is happening.  So the 
amendment is 
In section 6(2) (penalty for offence of burglary) for “2 years” substitute “3 years”. 
Material in parenthesis can be used to describe the section that is being amended, and slightly more 
expansive amendments can be made than are strictly necessary.  The reader can have a reasonably 
good idea of the subject matter of the amendment, and also the nature of the change being made.  
As I previously argued ‘the drafter might amend more words than are strictly necessary, but the 
nature of the amendment will be more intelligible to the reader’.695  The amending legislation is 
intelligible, and if that amendment is updated into the statute law database, the law as amended will 
also be intelligible. 
Official / Unofficial guidance  
The state can also issue official or unofficial guidance on the law as amended.  This can be a version 
of a consolidation, although without actually being legislation.  In fact, the existence of such 
guidance was cited as a reason why there was no formal consolidation in the Social Security Fraud 
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Bill 2000/01.696  Although this may make the law as amended intelligible, it is a poor substitute for 
actual legislation.  Although guidance can be a useful adjunct to legislation, if used instead of 
legislation, it attacks the rule of law – it is rule of pamphlet, not rule of law.  As the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law said 
We view with considerable misgiving the widespread practice of government by circular, 
with no legal force.  Legislation is so complex that administrators … use circulars instead of 
text.697 
Brightman made a similar criticism, although he extended this to the output of commercial 
organisations as well.698  The point he was making was that although these sources may be useful, 
they didn’t have the authority of an actual Act of Parliament. 
Keeling schedules 
A Keeling schedule is a schedule in amending legislation which sets out the legislation as amended.  
So, the London Local Authorities Act 2012 amended the City of Westminster Act 1999 by way of 
textual amendments in the body of the 2012 Act.  Then, in a schedule to the 2012 Act it set out the 
1999 Act as amended (including both all the amendments made before 2012 as well as the 
amendments made by the 2012 Act).  So, in one statute, the reader can see the changes as well as 
the thing being changed.  The amendments are done by way of textual amendment, and the 
schedule is essentially a restatement, or consolidation of the law.  But the schedule, as part of a 
statute, is as authoritative as any other statute. 
The Keeling schedule is a little known legal device in the UK.699  It was named after Edward Keeling, 
the MP who first used it and its use was endorsed by the Prime Minister in 1938.700  It is used very 
rarely, on average once a year since 1938.  However, practically everyone who has considered it has 
recommended it: the Renton Committee,701 the Statute Law Society,702 Bates,703 Brightman,704 
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Beatson,705 Samuels,706 Hand,707 Berry,708  and Simon.709  Zander said it was a ‘simple and attractive 
idea’.710  Carr said it would improve the statute book.711  Hailsham ‘will always do what I can to 
encourage … a Keeling schedule’.712 
In the absence of a properly accessible statute book that contains the law as amended, Keeling 
schedules perform a vital role.  In addition, they are particularly useful when amending legislation is 
passing through Parliament – the legislators can see both the amending law, and what the law will 
look like after they enact the changes.  There are a number of problems with them however.  Firstly, 
as Bennion argues, they can ‘uselessly clutter up the statute book’713 as all they do is collate (and 
then repeat) material already in the statute book.  Secondly, they take up important parliamentary 
and drafting resources – instead of just adding a textual amendment, the drafter must manually 
update the legislation, and parliament must debate and pass a bill containing the law as amended.714  
Thirdly, they give rise to the possibility of re-opening a contentious point which has already been 
resolved by the legislature – an amendment may deal only with a non-controversial point, but in 
passing a Keeling schedule on the entire legislation, parliament may then have a chance to debate 
afresh one of the contentious points contained within it.  Fourthly, if a statute is continually 
amended, the Keeling schedule will either itself have to be continually revised, or it will swiftly 
become out of date. 
In my view, Keeling schedules can improve intelligibility of the law as amended.  However, they are 
very much second best when compared to a proper statute law database containing all the law as 
amended.  Technology should render them obsolete, and with that technology the calls for their use 
(despite what I have previously argued715) have less strength. 
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4.5 Excessive interconnectedness of legislation 
Legislation is interconnected if one provision refers to another provision, either within the same 
statute or in a different statute.  Legislation suffers from excessive interconnectedness if the number 
and density of interconnections makes the legislation harder to understand.  So, if a reader can only 
understand s. 10 of the Companies Act by also looking at s. 50 and s. 60, and s. 100 of the Insolvency 
Act and s. 52 of the Directors Act, then there are too many jumps, too many connections.  Excessive 
interconnectedness requires a reader to read multiple provisions simultaneously, to have multiple 
books open at once, or on screen to have multiple windows up.  Legislation by its very nature is 
interconnected – none of it works in a vacuum.  What I am arguing here, is that excessive 
interconnectedness is bad because it restricts the ability of the reader to understand a law. 
There are three broad ways in which legislation can be interconnected: 
1. Legislation which amends other legislation 
2. Legislation which contains (internal and external) signposts (see further chapter 2) 
3. Legislation which refers to other provisions within it (internal cross-references) or to 
provisions in other legislation (external cross-references) 
4.5.1 Excessive interconnectedness and amending legislation 
The orthodox view is that multiple layers of amendments make legislation unintelligible. I have 
previously pointed to Article 48 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 as 
an example of bad legislation because it has been amended so many times.716  This is not a recent 
criticism, Parliament stated in 1875 that 
A reference to parts of several Acts of Parliament, some of which are repealed, some 
amended, and others kept alive, subject to the provisions contained in the amending Bill … 
makes the Statute so ambiguous, so obscure, and so difficult of comprehension that the 
judges themselves can hardly assign a meaning to it.717 
The problem goes back even further.  Sir Francis Bacon in 1616 wanted to reform a situation where 
we had ‘statutes heaped one upon another’.718  Whether textual or non-textual, the argument has 
been that continually amending a statute make it less and less intelligible.  Cross references can be ‘a 
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boon to the drafter but a bane to the reader’719 and Spencer sees over-referential drafting as 
contributing to the impenetrability of the statute book.720   
However, subject to two caveats, I no longer see multiple amendments as posing a problem for 
intelligibility.    The first caveat is that the amending legislation is clear, perhaps by using the drafting 
techniques set out above in section 4.4.3.  The second caveat is that the legislation is truly 
accessible, as set out in chapter 2, so that the reader can easily see the statute as amended.  If this is 
the case, then it doesn’t really matter that a section has been amended 10 times, so long as the 
reader can read it with all those amendments contained within it.  Multiple amendments do not, of 
themselves, make legislation unintelligible.  It doesn’t really matter what the provenance of each 
particular provision is, as long as the reader can read it easily. 
4.5.2 Excessive interconnectedness and signposts / cross references 
The more cross references that are needed to understand a provision, the more jumps that are 
necessary across the statute book, the less intelligible (and navigable) that statute is.   This point 
applies equally whether the interconnection is a direct reference (for example ‘director has the 
meaning given in the Directors Act’) or a signpost (for example ‘see the Directors Act for further 
information on the duties of directors’).    A cross reference is necessary in order to give legal 
certainty to a provision, a signpost is inserted to make the legislation more intelligible.  But once 
these start to mount up, then we start to lose intelligibility.  The reader is placed in a spinning 
roundabout, trying to take in information from 360 degrees, and getting dizzier and dizzier with each 
revolution. 
There are three drafting solutions to this.  Firstly, we can reduce the number of cross references.  A 
signpost should only be used if it will make the legislation easier to understand. It should be a helpful 
aid to direct the reader to further information if the reader feels they need to know that other 
information. It should not be compulsory in order for the reader to understand the legislation in 
front of her.  A cross reference should only be used if necessary.  It will often be easier for the reader 
for a definition to be repeated in a statute rather than require the reader to go to another statute to 
read the definition.  Rather than require the reader to go to the Directors Act for the definition of 
director, it may be better to instead copy out that definition and repeat it in the current Act.   
But even this simple drafting solution is subject to exceptions.  A short definition may be repeated 
instead of referred to.  But a long definition, or a provision which is to be applied to the current Act 
may stretch over several pages.  A short cross reference here may be better than adding several 
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pages of text to the current Act.  Furthermore, there may be definitions of general importance, 
where it is important that the same definition applies across the statute book.    If we want to 
update that definition, it is easier if we only have to update it in one place, rather than in multiple 
places.  For example, if company is defined only in the Companies Act, then if we want to extend 
that definition by adding single member companies to it, we only need to make one amendment.  
But if company is defined in the Companies Act, Insolvency Act, Directors Act etc, then if we want to 
update it, we need to amend the definition in three different places.  This opens up the possibility of 
making mistakes where some definitions are updated but others aren’t. 
Secondly, we can avoid circular references – ‘a reference to another provision which itself refers 
back to the provision which referred to it’.721  This kind of cross reference traps the reader in a 
referential circle, going round and round in a loop to try to understand a provision. 
Thirdly, we can avoid serial references - ‘a reference to another provision, which itself refers to a 
third provision and so on’.722  This also sets the reader on a wild goose chase, chasing down cross 
references in more and more different statutes before eventually being able to understand the 
original statute. 
4.6 Plain language 
4.6.1 What is plain language? 
According to Eagleson 
Plain English is clear, straightforward expression, using only as many words as are necessary.  
It is language that avoids obscurity, inflated vocabulary and convoluted sentence 
construction.  It is not baby talk, nor is it a simplified version of the English language.  
Writers of plain English let their audience concentrate on the message instead of being 
distracted by complicated language.723 
Drafters have specifically considered this in the context of legislation, stating that ‘plain language is 
language which is direct and straightforward.  It is designed to deliver its message to its intended 
readers clearly, effectively and without fuss’.724 Kimble725 and Thomas726 both advocate its use in 
legislation.  Gashabizi, another drafter, agrees ‘plain language is an approach to organising and 
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writing documents which makes materials clear and understandable to the user while making use of 
everyday language’.727  Xanthaki includes plain language as one of the elements in achieving high 
quality legislation.728  Although it is possible to find arguments against the effectiveness of plain 
language drafting,729 there is unanimity on the question of what plain language is, and what it strives 
to achieve.730  According to Tanner, the use of plain language in legislation can be demonstrated to 
improve its intelligibility.731 For Karpen legislation should be ‘formulated in a clear, plain language’.732 
The term I use here is plain language, rather than plain English.  This is for two reasons.  Firstly, 
taking into account the Welsh statute book, the UK as a whole comprises at least one bilingual 
jurisdiction,733 so ‘English’ by itself is not accurate.  Secondly, I take a broad approach to language as 
covering not simply the words on the page, but structure, formatting, layout and numbering.734 
Thornton becomes almost poetic in describing the problems that plain language seeks to overcome, 
referring to legislation as ‘a veritable cobweb of words and in the forest of their verbosity, the 
reader dare not enter, or, if he enters, he is apt to get lost in no time’.735  If there was a competition 
for the most vivid description of unintelligible legislation, it would go to Lord Harman who spoke of  
Wading through a monstrous legislative morass, staggering from stone to stone and ignoring 
the marsh gas … A Slough of Despond through which the court would never drag its feet, but 
I have, by leaping from tussock to tussock as best I might, eventually, pale and exhausted, 
reached the other side.736 
There are three broad criticisms of plain language.  These are relatively minor or ‘quibbles’ as Dorsey 
puts it.737  They are not arguments in favour of unintelligibility, merely criticisms of plain language as 
a tool to achieving intelligibility.   
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The first criticism, made by Greenberg, is that plain language gives a false sense of knowledge to the 
reader.738  The argument is that, since the language is plain and the words simple, the meaning is 
therefore clear to the lay reader.  But this may be false because the meaning of a word may not be in 
accordance with the plain language meaning, or a word or phrase may be freighted with legal 
meaning which places a different complexion on how it should be interpreted.  Greenberg’s example 
is the use of the word ‘person’ in legislation.  Citizens may automatically assume that this is a human 
being, not being aware that it can extend to legal persons (corporations with a legal personality) as 
well as to unincorporated associations.739  If a statute is only to extend to human beings, then the 
word used in the statute will be ‘individuals’.  It is better, according to Greenberg, that the language 
is obscure so the reader knows they don’t understand it, rather than being plain so that the reader 
thinks they understand it, when in truth they actually misunderstand it. 
There is some weight to this argument, even though it seems counter-intuitive.  I don’t attempt 
brain surgery because I know I am ignorant of the subject, but an amateur who “thinks” he knows 
could cause irreparable brain damage.  However, to my mind there are four counter-arguments 
which displace the notion that plain language is not helpful in improving the quality of legislation. 
Firstly, don’t use words where the plain and ordinary meaning of the word is different from the 
meaning you intend it to have.  This isn’t simply ambiguous, it is downright misleading.  In the EU, 
there is a list of faux amis, words which have one meaning in one language, but a different meaning 
in another language.740  Using a word which normally means one thing to mean another thing is a 
deliberate faux ami, but without the excuse of a different language.  In fact, the EU recognise this 
very drafting problem, stating that ‘if a word has one meaning in everyday or technical language, but 
a different meaning in legal language, the phrase must be formulated in such a way as to avoid any 
ambiguity’.741 
Secondly, it isn’t critical if there isn’t 100% congruence between the ordinary meaning of the word 
and the technical meaning of the word, so long as the lay reader will get the gist of the word.  So the 
lay reader will know that ‘person’ includes them, even though they may be ignorant that the 
penumbra of meaning also extends to bodies corporate and unincorporated associations. 
Thirdly, don’t attempt to simplify language by using an ordinary word which is inaccurate and could 
ultimately mislead. Instead, use the precise legal word, even if that will hinder intelligibility.  So, in 
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the legislation setting out how land will be assessed for rates (local land tax), a unit liable to rating is 
called a hereditament.742  If the legislation eschewed ‘hereditament’ for an ordinary English word 
like land, or building, then Greenberg’s criticism would be correct, and the user would have a false 
sense of understanding.  Better then to use the proper word rather than use an imprecise word.  But 
as Eagleson said, plain language isn’t about dumbing down, and it doesn’t require precision to be 
sacrificed.   
Fourthly, we can go beyond the third argument by clever use of definitions.  We can use the ordinary 
and plain word throughout the text, the word that readers will generally understand.  But then we 
can define that word using the correct and technical legal language.  So, in the hereditament 
example above, we could use the word “property” throughout the legislation when we are talking 
about what is liable to rates.  Then at the end, we can define property to mean a hereditament, with 
the full technical meaning of hereditament.  This is one working example of what Xanthaki calls the 
‘layered’ approach, where different layers of complexity exist in the legislation.  The ordinary reader 
will gain sufficient understanding at the first layer when they read “property”, and the technical 
reader will gain sufficient understanding at a subsequent layer when they read the definition of 
“property”. 
The second criticism, made by Dorsey, is that plain language elevates intelligibility over certainty.  In 
fact, he states that we should ‘beware’ plain language.743  As I have already pointed out, there is a 
tension between intelligibility and certainty, but this does not mean they are diametrically opposed 
to each other.  Legislation should strive to achieve both.  Dorsey goes rather too far when he argues 
that ‘precise but unclear might be exactly what the client wanted.  Your duty as a drafter is to give 
effect – with 100% faithfulness – to what the client wants’.744  Although it is true that the drafter 
owes a duty to the client, this does not override the obligation to the rule of law.  In my counter-
argument to the first criticism above, I pointed out that plain language does not require imprecision, 
and that the correct legal word can still be used.  Both proponents and opponents of plain language 
are correct here – there is no point in being precise if you are unclear, but equally there is no point in 
being clear if you are imprecise. 
The third criticism, noted by Xanthaki,745 is that it is too simplistic a solution to merely require all 
legislation to be in plain language.  It can certainly help with intelligibility, but it is not a panacea.  As 
noted above, sometimes complexity cannot be removed from legislation, for reasons outside the 
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control of drafters.    This ties in with one of Greenberg’s complaints – that there is nothing 
innovative about the desire to use plain language.  One only has to look at Thring, writing 150 years 
ago and telling legislative drafters that ‘clarity is the main object to be aimed at in the drafting of 
Acts of Parliament’.746  Plain language is a tool, which used correctly can promote intelligibility.  The 
automatic or mechanical application of it though, without considering clarity and precision more 
generally, will not always promote the rule of law. 
4.6.2 Plain language techniques 
What follows are some specific plain language techniques, tools which are aimed at improving 
intelligibility in legislation.  For a more in-depth consideration of these techniques, see Thornton747 
and Turnbull748. 
Short sentences 
According to Thornton ‘studies in linguistics show that a sentence of above 15 -20 words is 
incomprehensible’.749 The EU state that ‘unnecessarily long sentences are a serious obstacle to 
clarity in European Commission documents’750  and suggest an average sentence length of 20 words 
(although this advice is consistently ignored if one reads any preamble to any EU legislation).   A 
sentence which rambles on over several lines is difficult to understand, because by the time the 
reader has reached the end, they may have forgotten the start.  Brevity, by which I mean expressing 
legislation in short sentences, does lend itself to intelligibility, ‘clarity is helped by the use of short 
sentences’.751  Oscar Wilde can write a sentence 119 words long, 752 drafters cannot. 
Uncomplicated sentences 
But brevity by itself is insufficient in sentence construction.  We also need to make sentences less 
complicated by reducing the number of concepts contained within them.  A sentence is complicated 
(and hence more difficult to understand) if it contains multiple rules, conditions, provisos, persons, 
exceptions etc.  This harks back to Thring’s statement that ‘enactment in its simplest form consists of 
legal subject and legal predicate’,753 that is to say 
1. A person 
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2. Must do (or not do) a thing 
To this we can add the condition, case or circumstance in which the rule applies 
1. A person 
2. Must do (or not do) a thing 
3. In a particular case / circumstance 
If subject, predicate and condition are simple, then all three can be expressed in a single, 
uncomplicated sentence.  For example 
The members shall be appointed by the Department.754 
The court must refuse to hear an application under a provision listed in subsection (2) if it 
considers that the applicant does not have a sufficient interest in relation to the missing 
person’s property or financial affairs.755 
However, once these categories start filling up, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand a 
single sentence which still contains them all.  Mackinlay refers to this as ‘syntactic discontinuity’ if 
there is too much of separation of two elements of the same phrase by the insertion of another 
element.756  So, if there are multiple legal subjects, predicates or cases, then it can be better to 
separate these out into different sentences.  We can then have the outline framework at the start, 
followed by further sentences which explain the details.  For example 
1. A person, as defined in subsection (2) 
2. Must do the thing described in subsection (3) 
3. In the circumstances set out in subsection (4). 
There is no hard and fast rule about how many concepts are “too many” for a single sentence.  But 
at some point, intelligibility will decrease the more concepts are packed in, and it will be better to 
chop a long sentence up into smaller sentences.  Paradoxically, this can mean that a longer section is 
more intelligible than a shorter section as instead of one long provision, we have several shorter 
ones. 
Division into paragraphs 
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This flows on from the above point and follows Thornton’s advice on paragraphing.757  Division of a 
provision into paragraphs allows for a more logical structure for that provision.  It allows the reader, 
at a glance, to see the division into the different elements of subject, predicate and case.  For 
example: 
4 (1) A person is entitled to welfare supplementary payment under this Part if the person 
meets – 
(a) the IS entitlement condition, 
(b) the disability-related premium entitlement condition, 
(c) the PIP refusal condition, and 
(d) the termination of disability-related premium condition.758 
The reader sees at a glance that there are 4 conditions that must be satisfied, and the following 
paragraphs then set out in greater detail what each of these conditions are.  However, if a list is 
short, it may be better to keep it all together rather than unnecessarily break it into paragraphs. 
Active not passive voice 
In general terms, writing is more intelligible if it is in the active voice rather than the passive voice.759  
When it comes to legislation, it is imperative that citizens know what duties fall upon them: “the 
thing must be done” is unclear compared to “the person must do the thing”.   As a bad example, in 
relation to consumer credit agreements ‘All the contracting parties shall receive a copy of the credit 
agreement’.760  Is the government to send out the agreements, or the creditor, or the consumer, or a 
credit intermediary? 
Of course, context can provide the identity of the person upon whom the duty does fall, particularly 
if this is set up by what comes before.  So, if a person must make an application for a licence, it is 
acceptable for the following provision to refer to application requirements in the passive voice, as it 
is clear that the person making the application must comply with them. 
Main point first 
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The main point ought to come first, both at the level of an individual section, and at the level of the 
Act itself.  Law isn’t poetry, open to nuance and a multitude of subjective opinions, nor is it an 
adventure novel where there can be a twist at the end of the story.  It is instruction to the citizens 
with consequences for failure to comply, so it must get its message across from the start.  Starting 
with the main point first allows the reader to understand the legislation from the outset, rather than 
struggling through minor points of detail without knowing where they are going.  So, if a section is 
going to ban cars from the city centre, it should begin with this bold statement, rather than by 
starting with definitions of cars and city centres. 
It can be more difficult to do this at the level of the Act itself, as often Acts will have several main 
points.  But the more important the provision, the closer it should go to the start, particularly with 
single purpose Acts.  For example, the main purpose of an Act was to ban criminals from acting as 
special advisers to government ministers, so in the second section, the first line reads: 
Subject to subsection (2) and section 3, a person is not eligible for appointment as a special 
adviser if the person has a serious criminal conviction.761 
Use of negatives (and double negatives) 
Legislation is easier to understand if it is expressed in the positive rather than the negative.762  ‘An 
application must be in writing’ is better than ‘an application will not be accepted unless it is in 
writing’.  Double (or triple or more) negatives are a barrier to understanding as the reader must first 
jump an intellectual hurdle before understanding a provision: ‘please untick this box if you do not 
want to receive marketing material’ is not as good as ‘tick here to receive marketing material’. 
Front-loading of sentences with conditions 
Watson-Brown counsels against front-loading sentences with conditions.763  This is a specific 
outworking of the general advice for uncomplicated sentences.  Front-loading means that the 
conditions for application of the rule appear in a long list before the rule itself appears.  I previously 
argued that ‘it is difficult for readers to link the first part of the sentence to the last part of the 
sentence if they have to push their way through four conditions in the interim’.764 
Formatting and numbering 
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As with paragraphing, formatting and numbering can help to visually organise sentences.   
(1) An indentation can indicate how a provision only relates,  
(a) to certain cases, or 
(b) to other cases. 
(2) Before a return to the more general proposition. 
Formatting can break up ‘a large slab of unbroken text’765 and white space on a page allows for a 
separation of concepts on the page, which leads to greater intelligibility.  
Structure 
A logical structure makes legislation more intelligible. This is dealt with in chapter 2. 
Archaic, technical, jargon and foreign words 
Thornton recommends avoiding archaic words, legalese and foreign words.766  Classic examples, 
often favoured by lawyers, are hereby, as aforesaid etc.  Thornton’s advice is sound, although 
sometimes the precise word may be a foreign one, such as ultra vires.  A phrase such as ultra vires 
has a very particular meaning, built up through case law, and so it can be risky to jettison it for an 
English concept such as “beyond the powers”.  As stated previously, depending upon the target 
audience, a technical word, or even a word which is jargon can be acceptable, if it is intelligible to 
those who will be using the legislation. 
Visual aids, supplementary aids 
Legislation doesn’t have to be just words.  We can use maps, diagrams, formula, tables, flow charts 
etc.  Research in the UK has found that users find it easy to understand mathematical calculations if 
they are written out as a formula rather than written out longhand in words.767 
Use of present tense 
Legislation should be in the present tense.  Legislation always speaks, meaning that we should write 
the law as if it will be applied right now. 
Splitting the verb 
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The greater the distance between the person and the thing they are to do, the more unintelligible 
the legislation.  Xanthaki suggests that we shouldn’t split the verb.768 This is another outworking of 
the basic plain language technique of avoiding complicated sentences. 
Avoid nominalisations 
If there is a simple verb, use it, rather than turning it into a noun and adding another verb.769  So, it is 
simpler to say that “a constable may investigate” rather than “a constable may carry out an 
investigation”. 
Separate out provisos 
A proviso is an additional qualification or restriction at the end of a provision which colours how that 
provision is to be applied.  Thring cautioned against their misuse,770  Coode spoke strongly against 
them,771 as did Driedger772 and Thornton.773   There are certainly times when they can be used, but if 
they are used, they should be separated out and stand alone, rather than appear at the end of a long 
sentence.  Considering the following example, which deals with several plain language techniques.  
Firstly, we have the original provision from 1996: 
2.  Action which is or may be investigated by the Attorney General with a view to the 
institution of proceedings under section 31 or 46(9) of the Local Government Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1972. 
Provided that, if, after the Attorney General has decided not to proceed with such an 
investigation into such action or not to institute such proceedings in respect of it, or after 
the final determination of any such proceedings in respect of such action, a person 
aggrieved complains that such action resulted in his sustaining injustice in consequence of 
maladministration and that such injustice has not been remedied, the Commissioner may, if 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that complaint investigate such action, 
notwithstanding any limitation of time imposed by Article 10(6).774 
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Then we have the new version from 2016, restated in plain language, using several of the techniques 
discussed in this part. 
4. (1) Action which is or may be investigated by the Attorney General with a view to the 
institution of proceedings under section 31 or 46(9) of the Local Government Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1972. 
(2) But the Ombudsman may investigate that action, notwithstanding any limitation of time 
imposed by section 26, if conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. 
(3) Condition 1 is that— 
(a) the Attorney General has decided not to proceed with an investigation, 
(b) the Attorney General has decided not to institute proceedings, or 
(c) there has been a final determination of those proceedings. 
(4) Condition 2 is that— 
(a) a person aggrieved complains that the action resulted in the person aggrieved 
sustaining injustice in consequence of maladministration and that such injustice has 
not been remedied, and 
(b) the Ombudsman is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for that 
complaint.775 
4.7 Easification 
Easification is a linguistic tool designed to make legal text more accessible, readable and easier to 
understand.776  It provides the perspective of linguists on the rule of law requirement of 
intelligibility, it comes from a different professional background, but the end goal is the same.  
Therefore, it can be used as a drafting principle derived from the rule of law.  For Pennisi, ‘linguistics 
can provide a method by which drafters can assess the effectiveness of their draft’.777 
Easification analyses legal discourse – the construction and organisation of language.  It needs to be 
distinguished from simplification – which is a separate linguistic tool which produces an additional 
(and simpler) form of the text. Simplification is therefore not relevant to legislative drafting, 
although it is relevant to the production of explanatory material which may accompany the 
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legislation.  Easification makes legislation more intelligible, simplification allows for the creation of 
additional material to shed light upon the legislation.  
For Bhatia, there is an implicit criticism of the form of legislation where it is ‘considered 
advantageous to condense all the necessary information into a single sentence’.778  This produces 
difficulties with cognitive structuring – the ability of the brain to process many different concepts at 
the same time.  The solution is good cognitive structuring which is about ‘facilitating the cognitive 
and syntactic processing of long sentences with multiple qualifications inserted at various points 
often adding excessive information load at various points in the syntactic arrangement of legislative 
provisions’.779 
Pennisi expands upon this and gives practical examples about how legislation can be improved by 
these techniques.780  This involves parsing sentences by reference to their different components: 
case, condition, sub-condition, legal subject, legal action.  Where one of these components splits 
into binomials or multinomials, then that split can either be removed and placed elsewhere, or the 
text can be reformatted to show that split as a clear and logical sub-clause.  So, if a long line of text 
has multiple conditions, and multiple references, it can be re-organised into a clearer format of: 
IF 
X or Y applies 
THEN a person must 
Do A or B 
Easification gives academic weight to what many drafters already do in practice – to write out all the 
elements which are to go into a provision, and if there are too many elements, to split them into 
different provisions, or use formatting and numbering to show divisions and sub-divisions.  Pennisi 
also sees the value of focusing on the core regulatory message as soon as possible, and using other 
devices already discussed in relation to plain language, such as active not passive voice.  Easification 
represents a more formal and empirically grounded form of plain language techniques and is a 
useful additional tool in enhancing intelligibility. 
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4.8 Good writing  
Paul Romer, former Chief Economist at the World Bank stated that ‘if a document is well written, 
anyone with a copy can read it and convert the codified knowledge stored in text back into human 
capital’.781  Legislation is more likely to be understood if it is well written.  The concept of good 
writing isn’t one applying just to legislation, it is to all writing.  A detailed inquiry into good writing is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, we can take one of the best proponents of good writing 
in the English language and examine his findings on the issue. 
George Orwell, the author of 1984 and Animal Farm, was obviously not a drafter.  Orwell’s first two 
questions for a writer are: what am I trying to say and what words will express it?782  Bowman, 
former First Parliamentary Counsel in the UK set out his approach to drafting.783  He summed up his 
drafting philosophy very simply: first decide what you want to say, second, say it .  This is uncannily 
similar to Orwell’s command.  Therefore, we can see if Orwell’s solutions correspond to the drafting 
principles adopted by drafters. 
Orwell’s rules for good writing are: 
 Avoid tired metaphors. 
 Never use a long word where a short one will do. 
 If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out. 
 Never use the passive where you can use the active. 
 Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or a jargon word if you can think of an 
everyday English equivalent. 
 Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.784 
 
His first rule would not be popular amongst drafters, particularly those who rely heavily upon 
precedents in their drafts.  Unlike most writers, drafters are under no pressure to say something 
novel, in fact the reverse pressure usually applies – to use the same words which have been proven 
to have worked in the past.  However, the rest of Orwell’s rules can find direct analogues in drafting 
principles – even down to the exhortation that the rules should be broken if necessary.  
4.9 Examples 
The dictionary definition of an example is a thing characteristic of its type, or an illustration of a 
general rule.  The preponderance of views in the drafting community is that examples make 
legislation more intelligible.  Greenberg stated that ‘there is possibly no innovation that could do 
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more to help the readers of legislation and bring additional clarity to the statute book’.785  Barnes 
likes them because they give a concrete illustration of the rule.786  Piper is a fan because they help 
readers understand a general principle.787 For Flesch ‘whenever you write about a general principle, 
show its application in a specific case; ...tell a pointed anecdote. These dashes of color are what the 
reader will take away with him’.788  Dorsey is unusual in opposing examples.789 
4.9.1 Different ways of drafting an example 
Examples can be drafted in several ways.  The most obvious is to say “for example”. 
A local authority may meet an adult's needs under subsection (3) where, for example, the 
adult is terminally ill (within the meaning given in section 82(4) of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012).790 
This is a relatively new way (in the UK) to give an example.  Much more common place is the 
“inclusionary example” technique.   Under this technique the general rule is given, followed by a few 
specific things that the rule is expressly stated to include.  This is an example, even though the 
phrase “for example” isn’t used. 
the results of the ballot, including in particular— 
(i) the total number of votes cast, 
(ii) the number of persons who voted in favour of the imposition of the BRS, 
(iii) the number of persons who voted against its imposition,791 
There are two variations (at least) on this inclusionary example.  The first is to give the rule, and then 
follow it by “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, this includes …”  The second is 
slightly shorter, after the rule is stated it is followed by “including, without limitation …”.  The 
purpose of these two variations is to make it clear that the use of an example is not intended to limit 
the general application of the rule, so that if something falls outside the example, it may still fall 
within the rule. 
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4.9.2 Appropriate cases where examples can be used 
Examples do help the reader to understand legislation and ought to be used.  The following are cases 
where it is appropriate to do so. 
Firstly, where the rule must be expressed in a precise (perhaps even technical way), but we need 
also to convey meaning to the user.  In this case, we can give an example of the most common 
circumstance where the rule will be used.  The rule will cause the casual reader to scratch their 
head, but the example will make it clear.   
Optical instruments for capturing or storing images (for example a camera) are prohibited 
inside a prison. 
The rule may be expressed in a broad and technical way, in order to capture many different devices, 
but the reader may not understand what we are talking about here.  However, when we give the 
example, the reader straight away gets the gist of the provision.  The example is short, it allows for a 
precise rule, but also for an illustration to make the rule intelligible. 
Secondly, where we want to give an indication to the reader the various kinds of activities or 
circumstances that it is envisaged the rule will cover, in order for them to better understand how the 
law may be used. 
Persons must be compensated if they are abused in a care home, including 
1. Physical abuse 
2. Sexual abuse 
3. Emotional abuse 
Abuse is a wide term, by giving examples, we are setting out the different sorts of circumstances we 
envisage where compensation will be paid.  This can be useful especially when we are making a 
provision which empowers a public authority, or gives rights to citizens as it helps them to be aware 
of the breadth of the rule.  A rule which allows a local council to take measures to help children with 
special needs at school sounds useful.  But it is more illuminating if the rule then says “this may 
include setting up additional facilities for those children, or employing an additional teacher or 
assistant to help in the classroom”.   
Thirdly, where there is a particularly contentious or problematic case which may crop up often, and 
we want to ensure that it falls within the rule.  If we don’t include an example, there could be 
arguments about whether the case is included within the rule 
The notice must be in writing (including by way of a text message). 
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Legislation must be as clear as possible, so there is no doubt whatsoever about what it covers.  So, if 
there is a question mark over whether text messages can constitute a notice, then the legislation 
isn’t working.  Better then to make it absolutely crystal clear that text messages are included so that 
there is no confusion.  However, this particular use of an example is a little problematic as it can 
allow for shoddy drafting in the first place, on the basis that any shoddiness will be remedied by the 
example.  This is a common ground to attack the use of examples in legislation which is explored 
more below. 
4.9.3 Difficulties with examples 
These above cases are all what Piper would call a “textual example”.792  He contrasts this with 
“narrative examples”.  Unfortunately, although he gives ‘examples’ of these, he doesn’t actually 
define them.    I would tentatively put forward the distinction between these two.  A textual example 
is a brief statement of a case to which the rule applies.  A narrative example is a longer, narrative 
statement illustrating how the rule will apply in detail.  The following is a textual example: 
A vehicle, for example a car, must not be allowed into a park. 
The following is a narrative example: 
A vehicle must not be allowed into a park. 
So, if Fred is driving a car and approaches the gates to the park, he must stop at the gates 
and is not allowed to go any further. 
In my view, a narrative example goes beyond illustration and becomes an exposition and 
explanation of the legislation.  Although such exposition can be useful, and does have a place 
(possibly in explanatory notes, or official guidance) that place is not in legislation as it is not making 
law, merely describing the effect of that law.   In mathematics, this would be called a “worked 
example” as it follows through all the steps of the formula (or rule) to show how we reach the end 
result.  But the legislation ought to be clear enough without the need for a worked example, the rule 
should be clear in itself without needing to be repeated with some sample facts thrown in to show 
how it will apply.  A narrative example doesn’t illustrate a case to which the law applies, it is an 
explanation or restatement of the rule itself. 
The second difficulty with an example is where the example conflicts with the rule itself.  This sets up 
a clear tension or ambiguity in the legislation, should the rule be followed or the example?  In the 
UK, whatever is contained in the text of the legislation is part of the legislation.  This obviously 
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creates huge problems for the interpreter if two different parts of the legislation conflict.  This is the 
height of bad drafting, far from being an aid to intelligibility, it creates confusion.  If the drafter is 
faced with this situation, then the drafter needs to either revise the way the rule is expressed, or 
delete the example. 
The third difficulty is related to the second, and it is where the particularisation of the example may 
colour how the rule will be used in practice.  Barnes thought that this would be a good thing ‘while in 
theory an example does not close off a discretion but merely illustrates it, the example may provide 
a strong message that it is a desirable, or at least a safe course’.793  Although this is not wrong, it is 
problematic.  The rule is there to prescribe or proscribe a general course of action, but if the 
example is too specific, it may influence users into thinking that only the example, or things like the 
example, are the things that are prescribed or proscribed.   
Take a hypothetical case where we want a broad new offence “it is an offence to obstruct the 
administration of justice”.  Let’s say we add to that “for example by bribing a judge”.  This example 
may start readers thinking along the lines of courts and judges, and not thinking about other types of 
obstruction, for example threatening witnesses or lying to police officers.  This is linked to the 
principle of statutory interpretation known as ejusdem generis.794  That principle means that the 
scope of general words in legislation may be limited in their application by reference to specific 
words which follow them.  Bennion’s example is ‘having in possession or conveying in any manner’, 
where the normal broad meaning of possession is limited in its sense by the narrowing concept of 
conveying.795 
The fourth difficulty is where an example isn’t used just as an illustration of a rule, but is instead (or 
additionally) used to help justify or explain the rule.  Barnes argued that an example ‘can illustrate 
the reason for the general rule’.796  I think that this is wrong, as it politicises the law.  It is of course 
important that law is justified, but that justification should take place at the time it is made, and 
amongst those debating the law.  If we start including reasons / arguments / justification for law 
within the law itself, we are clogging up the law with propaganda.  Take a bad example from the EU: 
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Member states shall specify a time period of at least seven days during which the consumer 
will have sufficient time to compare offers, assess their implications and make an informed 
decision.797 
The law is that the consumer has a 7 day time period before a mortgage agreement is concluded.  
The reason behind that is to give the consumer time to think through the offer and look at 
alternatives.  But the use of this example above conflates law and justification in a confusing way.  
Do consumers break the law if they don’t compare offers? 
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of intelligibility to the rule of law. Bingham, Raz, 
Fuller, Bentham and others have all argued that the law must be clear and understandable to 
readers.  However, reality can sometimes deviate from this practice, and I have set out reasons why 
sometimes legislation isn’t intelligible. 
The main focus of the chapter has been on drafting principles derived from the rule of law 
requirement of intelligibility.  Firstly, we need to consider the user of the legislation, and target the 
legislation specifically at them.  So rather than a general principle that legislation ought to be 
intelligible to citizens, there is a more focused requirement that a specific piece of legislation ought 
to be intelligible to those who are likely to use it.  I also considered the inherent tension between the 
function of bringing the law into being, and communicating that law to users.   
The second drafting principle examined in greater detail the thing to be understood in the context of 
amending legislation.  There can be a clash between making amending legislation intelligible versus 
making the legislation as amended intelligible.  A more expansive style of amendment, making use of 
explanatory material in parenthesis can help here.  The third drafting principle is to reduce, where 
possible the number of interconnections in legislation.  The more the reader has to jump around 
between different provisions, the more difficult it is for them to understand the legislation. 
The fourth, fifth and sixth drafting principles all considered specific techniques to make language 
easier to understand, to better communicate the message.  The most familiar one to drafters is the 
plain language movement.  This is specifically designed, by use of drafting techniques, to make 
legislation clearer.  Easification brings more academic rigour to this approach, trying to set out in a 
more scientific way this approach of making language easier to understand.  Good writing is a 
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broader approach to making text more readable.  All three of these approaches reflect the rule of 
law requirement of making legislation intelligible. 
The final drafting technique is the use of examples.  Examples help to explain legislation and show 
how it works in practice 
This concludes the chapters on the drafting principles.  In the final chapter I examine the conclusions 
and assess whether or not the hypothesis has been proved. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Proving the hypothesis 
The hypothesis was that legislative drafting principles could be derived from element one of 
Bingham’s definition of the rule of law, and that these principles would facilitate the drafting of 
legislation in accordance with the rule of law.  Element one was that legislation ought to be 
accessible, predictable, clear and intelligible.   
5.1.1 Accessibility 
In Chapter 2 I examined accessibility – that citizens must have access to legislation.  Bingham, Fuller, 
Raz and Locke, along with others spoke of the importance of accessibility.  There are difficulties with 
access, in terms of the cost of it, the volume of legislation, its interconnectedness and the speed 
with which we make new legislation. 
I derived three drafting principles.  Firstly, the text of the law must be available to citizens: this 
means both the law as enacted, and the law as it applies at any given point in time.  In addition, 
citizens need to know what law applies in the different parts of the UK.  As well as the bald text of 
the legislation, the legislation must also be contextualised, by referring to other legislation (and non-
legislative texts) which have a direct impact upon how the law will be used.  Finally, legislation must 
be drafted to promote findability, to make it easier for the user to find the particular statutory 
provision which is relevant to them. 
Secondly, legislation ought to be drafted in a way which makes it more navigable.  It must be well-
mapped and signposted so that users can find their way around it as easily as possible.  There are 
many specific drafting techniques to enhance navigability: descriptive short titles of Acts, avoiding 
omnibus legislation, descriptive section headings, logical structure for Acts (including, where 
appropriate, parallel structures), signposting of other relevant provisions, sensible numbering, and 
avoiding ‘hidden’ provisions. 
Thirdly, legislation must be inclusive of all important legal information.  If something extraneous to 
the legislation will have a direct influence on it, the reader of the legislation will have a misleading 
impression of what the law does.  This is particularly the case where a broad power is included in an 
Act, but a ministerial statement is made that, notwithstanding this broad formulation, the power will 
only be exercised in limited ways. 
5.1.2 Predictability 
In Chapter 3 I examined predictability – that users ought to know what the legal effect of their 
actions will be by reading the legislation.  Bingham, Locke, Fuller and Raz all argued from this 
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perspective.  There are sometimes reasons why legislation is not predictable, for example if it is as a 
result of a political compromise which papers over ambiguities.   
I derived eight drafting principles.  Firstly, law must be prospective, that is to say, it must take effect 
in the future and not go back in time to have a legal effect before it is made.  I made a fresh 
taxonomy of Janus-faced legislation to highlight the different ways in which legislation can apply 
over time: retroactive legislation, retrospective legislation and legislation which affects existing 
rights.  There is no absolute rule that legislation must always be prospective, what is necessary is a 
consideration in each individual case, by reference to criteria set out in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Secondly, legislation must be determinate, it must be fixed and certain.  In order to be determinate, 
it has to be unambiguous and it has to be precise.  There is however a difficult line between 
exhaustive to cover all circumstances, and being over-precise and burdening the legislation down 
with too much detail.  Thirdly, legislation must be relatively stable, so that the law today is 
reasonably similar to the law tomorrow.  This doesn’t mean that the law should remain set in stone, 
but it does mean that there must be good reason for legal change.  In addition, the destabilising 
effect of frequent or large legal change can be ameliorated by highlighting the change, advertising it 
or giving a long lead in time for it.  Dealing with rapid technological change is a challenge for the 
stability of legislation, but this can be partially solved by drafting more in general principles and less 
in technical detail. 
Fourthly, legislation should have a clear commencement.  The date the law comes into force should 
be immediately obvious to the reader without having to search for additional legislation setting out 
commencement dates.  Fifthly, legislation should be drafted in a consistent manner.  So words 
should mean the same thing in a statute, grammar should be applied consistently (and in accordance 
with normal grammatical rules), similar things should be done in similar ways, and the same issues 
should be addressed.  But as with stability, this doesn’t mean ossification, legislation can also 
innovate where that helps the user. 
Sixthly, the law on the statute book should be the same as the law applied in the real world.  So the 
law shouldn’t be ignored, it shouldn’t be foolish, impossible or Panglossian.  There shouldn’t be a 
disconnect between legislation and practice.  Nor should there be things in the legislation which 
aren’t intended to be applied in practice.  Seventhly, legislation should be capable of being 
implemented.  So, the legislation must contain implementation mechanisms, it must contain 
sanctions.  As well as saying what must happen, it ought to also say what is the outcome if the 
person fails to comply with a duty.   
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Eighthly, there must be constraints on the exercise of discretion.  The more freedom a decision 
maker has, the less predictable their decision will be.  There are ways in which legislation can 
circumscribe the discretion available to a decision maker, while still allowing for some flexibility. 
5.1.3 Intelligibility 
In Chapter 4 I examined intelligibility and clarity, meaning that the law must be capable of being 
easily understood by users. Bingham, Raz and Fuller all argued that law must be intelligible, and 
Bentham argued that it must be cognoscible.  There are some sound reasons which can make the 
law more complex and less intelligible, for example where the law seeks to be exhaustive, or where 
there is a complex policy. 
There are seven drafting principles.  Firstly, legislation need not be intelligible in the abstract but 
must focus on the characteristics of the user.   So if a statute will be used by a specific user group, it 
must be intelligible to that user group. Although citizens will sometimes use intermediaries to 
understand legislation, it should always be drafted so that it is understandable by citizens, not just 
by intermediaries.    Secondly, both the legislation as amended and the amending legislation need to 
be intelligible.  So users need to know both what the changes being made to the law are, as well as 
what the law will be like after those changes.  It is possible to do this by creative use of textual 
amendment with explanatory material. 
Thirdly, we should avoid excessive interconnectedness of legislation.  The more times a reader has to 
jump from provision to provision, from statute to statute, the less intelligible the legislation is.  
Fourthly, drafters can make use of plain language techniques.  Plain language is part of a broader 
movement to make writing easier to understand.  There are many specific plain language 
techniques, such as shorter sentences, simpler words, active not passive voice etc. 
Fifthly, we can use easification techniques.  These are specific linguistic tools which have been used 
by professionals in that field to make language easier to understand.  Sixthly, we can use good 
writing techniques.  As with plain language, these are tools to make for a better quality of writing.  
Seventhly, we can use examples in legislation to make things clearer for readers.  Examples both set 
out specific matters which fall within or outside the law, as well as providing an illustration of how 
the law will be applied in practice.   
5.1.4 Derivation of drafting principles 
All these legislative drafting principles derived from the starting point of element one of Bingham’s 
definition of the rule of law.  There is a clear line between the rule of law and the drafting principles 
which flow from it.  The process used deductive reasoning, so in each case I asked if legislation has to 
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have these characteristics, what are the drafting principles which will give effect to it?  Some of 
these drafting principles may be familiar to those in academia or practice (for example the use of 
plain language).  Some of the individual techniques may resonate with drafters (for example 
descriptive short titles).    In other cases (for example navigability and inclusivity) these are relatively 
fresh concepts which haven’t been presented in this format before.  Critically, these are not simply 
‘good ideas’ for drafting legislation, rather they are principles grounded in the rule of law and 
derived from the rule of law.   
The originality of this thesis stems from the interaction between legislative drafting and the rule of 
law.  Although others have written about what makes for “good” legislation, this can be subjective 
and piecemeal, based upon what individual drafters or academic consider as “good”.  Xanthaki’s 
thesis goes beyond this as it does have a methodologically sound basis for determining “good” 
legislation (the functional approach).  However, this thesis roots “good” legislation not in the idea of 
what is functionally effective, but on the agreed notion of respect for the rule of law.  This is a value 
to which all have agreed, and if we have all agreed on the validity of the rule of law (albeit we may 
disagree about some of the content) we are logically bound to respect drafting principles which 
derive from it.  This moves drafting principles away from a technical point for drafters to discuss, 
which can be ignored when suited by others, into a fundamentally important method by which we 
respect the rule of law. 
5.2 Is the hypothesis built on sound foundations? 
The hypothesis is only valuable if it is built upon provable and relevant assertions.  Underpinning the 
hypothesis are three assumptions.  Firstly, that the rule of law is a cornerstone of the legal system in 
the UK.   Secondly, that legislation is the most important source of law.  And thirdly that drafters 
have a key role in the legislative system such that they can influence the form and content of 
legislation.  Without these three assumptions, then even if the hypothesis is correct, it offers little of 
practical value. 
5.2.1 Importance of the rule of law 
There are a number of arguments for the importance of the rule of law. 
Firstly, the UK legislature itself has declared the importance of the rule of law.  Part 1 of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is entitled the rule of law.  Section 1 states that the Act does not 
affect the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law.  Section 17 amends the Promissory 
Oaths Act 1868 so that the Lord Chancellor’s oath includes a promise to ‘respect the rule of law’.  In 
a country without a codified constitution, these are important provisions.   
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It is true that this is the only place in the UK statute book with an express commitment to something 
called ‘the rule of law’.  However, many of the fundamental constitutional statutes in the UK give 
effect to some of the key precepts of the rule of law.  Magna Carta 1215 is probably the single most 
important law on the UK statute book, and a key source of the rule of law.798  The same basic 
principle, that citizens can only be punished in accordance with the law, is behind the Petition of 
Right 1628.  Some key provisions of the Bill of Rights 1689 (Parliament’s ‘bargain’ with the new King) 
were that there was no divine authority to overrule the law, that there was no power to suspend 
laws without the consent of Parliament and that there was no power to dispense with laws.   
Secondly, judges have many times stressed the importance of the rule of law.  Lord Neuberger, 
President of the Supreme Court, gave an interview warning of the dangers of governments ignoring 
judicial judgements.799 The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland also speaking in an extra-judicial 
capacity, said that we were a ‘society subject to the rule of law’.800  Lord Steyn called the rule of law 
an ‘overarching principle of constitutional law’.801  
Judges also say the same when speaking in a judicial capacity.  Lord Hope stated that ‘the rule of law 
enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based’802 and 
the European Court of Justice agrees.803  Lord Steyn ruled that ‘unless there is the clearest provision 
to the contrary, Parliament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law’.804  The 
Supreme Court restated this when it stated that ‘there is no principle more basic to our system of 
law than the maintenance of rule of law itself and the constitutional protection afforded by judicial 
review’.805  
Thirdly, the international community, by means of international treaties and declarations, highlight 
the importance of the rule of law.806  The General Assembly of the United Nations has affirmed the 
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importance of the rule of law a number of times807 as has the Secretary General.808  One of the 
Millennium Development Goals is to ‘strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in 
national affairs’.809  The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in its 1990 
Copenhagen Document welcomed the commitment of all participating states to build democratic 
societies based upon the rule of law.810  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development has attempted to define it.811  According to Zamboni ‘practically all Western legal and 
political orders have adopted the rule of law’.812 
Fourthly, lawyers themselves recognise the importance of the rule of law. 813   The Declaration of 
Delhi 1959 arose out of a gathering of over 185 lawyers and declared the importance of the rule of 
law.  There is no express reference in the Codes of Conduct for professional lawyers in the UK to an 
obligation to respect the rule of law, although there are references to respecting the administration 
of justice,814 independence and integrity,815 and serving the interests of justice.816  The International 
Bar Association includes respect for the rule of law as an obligation on all lawyers.817   
Fifthly, politicians regularly cite the importance of the rule of law. Respect for the rule of law is part 
of the Pledge of Office of all Northern Ireland Ministers.818 No Northern Ireland Minister can 
therefore be appointed unless they pledge to uphold the rule of law.  Former Prime Minister David 
Cameron gave a speech to the Foreign Policy Centre.  He was trying to describe the shared values of 
what it meant to be British and he said ‘We can do it in a single phrase, freedom under the rule of 
law’.819  There is even a guide to the rule of law for politicians.820 
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Finally, some of the strongest proponents for the rule of law are economists.  Their view is that rule 
of law gives legal stability, certainty and promotes the protection of contractual and property 
rights.821  These are preconditions to economic growth and law is a ‘springboard to economic 
development’.822  The Economist magazine published an article entitled ‘Economics and the Rule of 
Law: Order in the Jungle’ wherein it was argued that ‘economists have repeatedly found that the 
better the rule of law, the richer the nation’.823  Barron talks of the World Bank’s ‘discovery’ of the 
rule of law as a means to promote economic development.824  Indeed, the World Bank has an index 
on its website where rule of law indicators can be compared to economic progress.825  As Barro says 
‘the general idea of these indexes is to gauge the attractiveness of a country’s investment climate by 
considering the effectiveness of law enforcement, the sanctity of contracts, and the state of other 
influences on the security of property rights’.826  Carothers dampened this enthusiasm somewhat by 
pointing out that there was little empirical evidence that linked the rule of law with development.827  
5.2.2 Importance of legislation 
Under UK constitutional theory, legislation is the highest form of law.  Case law is subservient to it.  
In terms of scope of subject matter covered, legislation regulates much more than common law 
regulates.828  In the modern era, judges are much more likely to apply legislation to the facts of a 
case than they are to develop the common law themselves.  Constitutional supremacy and scope of 
subject matter are two reasons for the hegemonic nature of legislation. 
Seeley was correct (increasingly so) that we live in a ‘legislation state’.829  It is thought that all wrongs 
can be righted by legislation.  Waldron shares this view, ‘every day another demand emerges for 
new legislation to deal with some difficulty or to reorganize some aspect of social affairs’.830  As 
Turner said ‘the belief is widely held, that there is no human situation so bad but that legislation 
properly designed will effectively be able to cure it’,831 although Turner astutely notes that failure to 
legislate is normally a charge levied by the opposition parties rather than by the government.  Those 
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charged with drafting government bills are aware of this too, stating that ‘Legislation is perceived as 
a sign of action and therefore it is a powerful communication tool’.832 
5.2.3 Importance of drafters in the legislative process 
Drafters occupy a key role in the legislative process.  Only they turn policy ideas into law. Although 
the legislature decides what the law will be, the drafter determines how it is constructed.  The actual 
words used in the statute book are theirs, as Greenberg states ‘in principle the wording of an Act is 
entirely a matter for the senior Counsel to whom the Bill has been assigned’.833  The form of 
legislation will nearly always be determined by the drafters.  Even the substance of it will reflect the 
drafter’s advice. 
Carter shares this view, ‘legislative counsel’s contribution is not determinative but is, even so, 
critical’.834  Palmer, writing in the foreword to a report of the New Zealand Law Commission stated 
that ‘the professional expertise of Parliamentary Counsel is the essential quality control that is 
required in the production of statute law’.835  For Driedger, quality in legislation depends upon the 
ability of the drafter.836  Carter concluded that advice ‘within legislative counsel’s unique expertise, is 
particularly likely to be followed’.837  For Zamboni, although non-legal experts contribute to the 
external effectiveness of legislation, when it comes to internal effectiveness (making the law valid), 
this is the key function of legislative drafters.838 
5.2.4 Practical value of the hypothesis 
The following assumptions have been shown to be correct: that the rule of law is important, that 
legislation is the key source of law, and that drafters have a key role in the legislative process.  
Therefore, legislative drafters have a crucial opportunity to give effect to the rule of law by the way 
in which they draft legislation.  It is therefore valid to give them legislative drafting principles which 
can properly reflect the rule of law.  The hypothesis is sound, and it also has a practical value. 
5.3 Validity of hypothesis by reference to practice 
I have shown that the hypothesis is internally sound as it logically derives from Bingham’s definition 
of the rule of law.  However, it can also be checked against practice to see if it resonates with the 
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views of others on drafters and the rule of law, and generally accepted legislative drafting principles.  
If it does so, then it is evidence that the conclusions in this thesis are valid. 
5.3.1 Drafters as ‘guardians of the statute book’ and protectors of the rule of law 
Not only are drafters important to the process of making law, they also have a special responsibility 
for the content and integrity of the statute book.  This is perhaps best summed up in the description 
of legislative drafters as ‘guardians of the statute book’.  Although it is unclear who first coined this 
phrase, it has been used by Bromley,839 Burrows,840 Levert,841 Elliot,842 and Poloko.843  In a similar 
vein, drafters have been called custodians of the statute book by Donelan,844 and Wolmarans.845  
Erasmus endorsed Bennion’s use of the phrase ‘keepers of the statute book’846 as a description of 
drafters, ‘what a lovely word that – keeper – with its echoes of custodian, preserver and 
protector’.847  Erasmus makes the point that politicians come and go, but laws (and even drafters) 
are there for longer.  Laws makes exactly the same point when he considers drafters as being 
advocates for the integrity of the statute book.848 He argues that they are responsible for 
maintaining legislative language at a high standard so as not to debase the ‘coinage of 
communication’ between the legislature and the executive.849  Wilson argues that drafters have a 
special responsibility for the coherence of the statute book.850  Archer argues that responsibility to 
protect the statute book also belongs to the Law Officers i.e. the Attorney General and Solicitor 
General.851  Daintith and Page consider this point in detail, describing drafters as custodians of legal 
values who have a duty ‘to the law and the statute book’.852 
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Not only are drafters regarded as guardians of the statute book, they are also regarded as having a 
special obligation to the rule of law.  Gashabizi, a Rwandan drafter, said that it is ‘a cardinal principle 
of the rule of law that citizens should know in advance their rights and obligations under the law’.853  
His context was arguing in favour of clarity in legislation.  Hashim, a Malaysian drafter presents a 
case for adoption of plain language drafting.854  She cites several reasons for this ‘but to the writer 
the most important reason is the “rule of law”’.855  Greenberg, a British drafter said that ‘a good 
Parliamentary drafter is … totally dedicated to the rule of law’.856  Davies, a Welsh drafter cites both 
Fuller and Bingham as evidence for his contention that legislation in Wales should be accessible in 
Welsh.857 Seidman, an American drafter said that a ‘Third World drafter cannot avoid the 
obligation to draft to enhance the rule of law’.858  Seidman puts the case particularly strongly, 
not only should the form of the legislation respect the rule of law, but it must be drafted in such 
a way that it maximises compliance with the rule of law on the ground.  This requires the drafter 
to have a substantial policy input into legislation. One of Elliot’s (a Canadian drafter) arguments 
in favour of high quality legislation is that it enhances respect for the rule of law.859 Bartole 
concludes that ‘the drafting of the legislative acts is strictly connected with the establishment of 
the rule of law’.860  For Bartole, if the drafters aren’t experts in the rule of law, then those 
experts must also be brought into the process of making legislation.  For Lovric, an Australian 
drafter, if there is a loss of experienced legislative counsel this poses a risk not just to the 
drafting office, but to the rule of law itself.861 
Laws a former First Parliamentary Counsel in the UK didn’t expressly state that drafter should 
obey the rule of law.  However, he has stated that the rule of law (in particular Fuller and 
Bingham) ‘provide[s] a useful pragmatic guide to drafters on how to avoid producing legislation 
that cuts across the grain of the values of the law’.862  Another former First Parliamentary 
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Counsel has expressly referred, not only to the rule of law but to Bingham’s definition of the rule 
of law and then went on to say that ‘For legislative drafters, and for the government’s online 
publishers, this is a fundamental part of our mission’.863  According to Feldman ‘one of the tasks 
of lawyers in politics … to uphold respect for the values of the rule of law among ministers, civil 
servants and parliamentarians’.864 
Daintith and Page set out a non-exhaustive list of the kind of things that drafters should object 
to.865  Although this list isn’t headed ‘the rule of law’ it contains many elements which form part 
of the rule of law.  They go on to say that ‘in the absence of a higher law by which a sovereign 
Parliament is bound, the concept of legal policy as interpreted by Parliamentary Counsel is as 
close as our system has traditionally come to a check on the “constitutionality” of legislation’.866   
5.3.2 Current drafting practice in the UK 
As stated in Chapter 1 a key UK source of drafting principles is the Good Law project, run by the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.867  For the purposes of validating the conclusions of this 
thesis, I have avoided referring to Good Law throughout this thesis. In the table below, I set out 
the points made by the Good Law project and cross refer them to sections of this thesis which 
make similar points. 
 
Good law point Corresponding point in thesis 
Difficulties of understanding statutes, 
particularly due to their volume, piecemeal 
nature and frequent amendments 
volume of legislation (2.2.2) 
dynamic nature of legislation (2.2.4) 
need for stability in legislation  (3.4) 
Government drafters use Plain English writing 
styles 
Use of plain language (4.6) 
Legislation should be clear Intelligibility (chapter 4 generally)  
Legislation should be coherent Intelligibility (chapter 4 generally)  
consistency (3.6) 
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Legislation should be accessible Accessibility (chapter 2 generally) 
Complexity in legislation Why legislation is sometimes not predictable 
(3.1.1) 
Architecture of statute book Navigability (2.4) 
In particular, structure (2.4.4) 
Publication and improving navigation Navigability (2.4) 
Language and style Plain language (4.6) 
Good writing (4.8) 
Examples (4.9) 
Will reader be able to understand legislation Characteristics of the user (4.3) 
Content – how much detail Precision (3.3.2) 
 
Some points of Good Law do not find an analogue in this thesis (for example Good Law makes 
valid points about whether law is necessary).  But as this thesis deals only with drafting 
principles derived from the rule of law, those points are not relevant.  Equally, this thesis 
contains many points that Good Law does not make. Again, that is to be expected as Good Law 
comes from a different perspective.  
However, there is much common ground between Good Law and this thesis.  The drafting 
principles referred to in Good Law resonate with the drafting principles derived in this thesis.  
There is nothing in either work which flatly contradicts the other work.  We can therefore 
conclude that the conclusions reached by this thesis at the very least are not contrary to the 
conclusions reached by another source on the nature of legislative drafting principles.  This 
provides an additional layer of validity to the findings of this thesis. 
5.4 Benefits of the hypothesis: core values it supports 
I have proven the hypothesis and shown that it resonates with practice and the views of others on 
the rule of law and drafting.  I have also demonstrated that the rule of law is valued.  In this section, I 
go a step further and show that there are direct benefits to society in the hypothesis.  It isn’t simply 
a moot point about drafting styles, of interest only to those involved in legisprudence.  Instead, 
drafting legislation in accordance with the rule of law provides direct and tangible benefits to 
citizens.  The rule of law isn’t some dusty legal principle to which we presume adherence, it has to 
be constantly justified and validated.   
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This section sets out core values which are respected by legislation drafted in accordance with the 
rule of law.  These core values are protected if legislation is accessible, predictable and intelligible. 
5.4.1 Observance of rules 
One of the prime purposes of legislation is to regulate human conduct.  The reason why we pass a 
law outlawing theft is to stop people stealing.  But human conduct cannot be regulated by a law if 
humans don’t know what the law is.  This is at the root of Raz’s theory of the rule of law – if we are 
to obey the law, we must know what the law is.868  The vast majority of legislators want their laws to 
be obeyed, and the first pre-requisite for this is that those laws are accessible.   Austin changes the 
focus slightly on this point – accessible laws offer guidance and information for those who are bound 
to obey them.869  This is essentially the same point though – we can’t obey rules unless we know 
them. 
If citizens can’t understand the rules, then they can’t obey them.  Although sometimes it is enough 
for legislation to simply be left on the page, by and large, legislation is made by governments in 
order to have effect.870 If the function of legislation is to effect social change, to be observed by 
citizens, to be implemented by government, then this will be severely hindered unless the legislation 
is intelligible to those observing and implementing it.  Sitting behind the rule of law requirement of 
intelligibility is the practical need for legislation to be observed. 
5.4.2 Fairness 
If you are going to be held liable under a law, it is only fair if you know what that law is.  The citizens 
of Fuller’s Rex got very annoyed when they were subject to secret laws.  In Kafka’s The Trial, Joseph 
K is subjected to a travesty of justice when he is prosecuted under a law which is not disclosed to 
him.871  Inaccessible laws aren’t fair because people have no opportunity to modify their behaviour 
to avoid the consequences of breaches of those laws.  If you can predict the legal consequences of 
your actions, then it is fair to hold you to those consequences.  However, if it is difficult for you to 
know what those consequences will be, it is unfair to hold you to them.   
The Haw case provides a bad example of unpredictable legislation having an unfair effect upon a 
citizen.872  The legislation was s. 132 of the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 which 
made provision for regulating demonstrations in Parliament Square.  A person would be guilty of an 
offence if they didn’t do various things ‘when the demonstration starts’.  Unfortunately for the 
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prosecutor, Mr Haw ‘started’ his demonstration long before the Act was made.  Although the 
Divisional Court ruled that ‘starts’ meant ‘starts’,873 the Court of Appeal ruled that ‘starts’ actually 
meant ‘starts or continued’.  He was therefore convicted of the offence. 
The case is important for several reasons.  For present purposes though, it is the lack of 
predictability which is problematic.  A citizen is entitled to read the law and be reasonably able to 
predict its effect.  If an offence relates to conduct when a demonstration ‘starts’ then it is unfair that 
judges read this as meaning that it relates to conduct when a demonstration ‘starts or continues’. 
Particularly when it comes to criminal law, or tax law, it is unfair to suffer a detriment by virtue of 
law which is unintelligible.  As Leith said ‘a fundamental rule of law is that those governed by the law 
have the right to know what the law is’.874  If I can’t understand a law, it is unfair to hold me to 
account under it.  This is perhaps the source of the various interpretative rules against doubtful 
penalisation set out by Bennion.875 
5.4.3 Respect for human autonomy 
Accessible law treats humans as rational beings who can make decisions about their conduct based 
upon correct information.  Accessible law therefore respects the value of human autonomy and 
human freedom to choose.  If we know what a law is, we can properly plan our activities.  Bentham 
distinguishes us from ‘brutes’ because of our ability to plan for the future, and this is one reason for 
having a system of known laws.876  For Waldron, part of the dignity of legislation is that people ‘need 
to be able to plan around the law’s demands in the autonomous organisation of their lives’.877 
Predictable legislation means that we credit citizens with the ability to make up their own minds 
about their courses of action.  It also means that we credit them with the ability to read and 
understand legislation.  So predictable legislation respects human autonomy. 
5.4.4 Certainty 
Accessibility gives greater certainty to people about the content of the law.  The desire for certainty 
reflects the core values set out above, in particular the possibility of planning your conduct.  
Bentham cites this as the principle of security which ‘requires that events, so far as they depend 
upon laws, should conform to the expectations which the law itself has created’.878 
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There is a subset of certainty which is particularly important – economic certainty.  Accessible laws 
promote economic certainty which in turn promotes the economic wellbeing of a nation and its 
attractiveness to international investors.  The English courts recognised this a long time ago – ‘In all 
mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty; and therefore, it is of more 
consequence that the rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the 
other’.879  Bingham himself stated ‘the successful conduct of trade, investment and business 
generally is promoted by a body of accessible legal rules governing commercial rights and 
obligations.’880  The World Bank measures how open a country is to business.881  One criterion is that 
regulations are transparent, which it defines as regulations that are clear and accessible to anyone 
who needs to use them.882  A jurisdiction may have fantastic intellectual property laws for example, 
but if no one can read them, no-one will register IP rights there.  In the Isle of Man, Marsh-Smith 
could not be more explicit about why they were creating an online database of legislation ‘For a 
sophisticated jurisdiction like the Isle of Man looking to attract outside investment it was clearly 
unacceptable that Manx legislation was obtainable only by subscription and a trip to the Tynwald 
library.’883 
Predictable legislation allows for long term planning. If a company knows that the long term target is 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, then it can plan its energy policy accordingly.884  If a retailer 
knows there is a legal obligation that goods must be of a satisfactory quality, it can arrange its 
production processes accordingly.885  It is for this reason that major legal reforms are not taken 
regularly.  For example, the referendum on Scottish independence was seen as a ‘once in a 
generation’ activity.886  Certainty has also been enshrined in legislation.  For example, the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998 allows for a border poll to determine if the people of Northern Ireland want to 
remain in the UK or be part of the Republic of Ireland.  However, the Act provides that there must be 
at least 7 years between border polls.887 
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5.4.5 Constitutional check on power 
If the rules are known by the ruled, it is more difficult for the rulers to break them.  So, it can be said 
that accessible legislation is a check on state power.  This is Locke’s view888 as well as Fuller’s.889  
Ronald, in the context of executive legislation, viewed ‘publicity as a safeguard for holding the rule-
making officials in check’.890  Carr said that laws should be published ‘so that the public, in being 
informed of its ante-natal opportunity to criticise and the place where copies of the proposed rules 
can be obtained, is indirectly informed that legislation is impending’.891   Although, Carr’s argument 
is more about the value of consultations than the need for accessible legislation.  More recently 
Irresberger and Jasiak see publication of legislation as providing a measure of ‘democratic control’ 
over the government.892  For Shinar, the rule of law is ‘first and foremost about tempering official 
power’.893 
Our laws obtain their democratic legitimacy by being voted through by parliamentarians.  If the 
parliamentarians don’t understand what they are voting for, we lose a major part of that legitimacy.  
Furthermore, if the parliamentarians don’t understand legislation, they cannot effectively scrutinise 
it.  Intelligible legislation enhances democratic legitimacy. 
5.4.6 Democratic governance 
If legislation is uncertain, then at some point, someone will have to decide on its actual meaning.  
The two key actors who will most commonly make this decision are the courts and the executive. So 
if a word in a statute is vague and citizens are arguing over its meaning, the authoritative decision on 
meaning will generally be made by a court.  Or if the command contained in a statute is imprecise, 
then the executive, in implementing that command, will reach its own decision on meaning. The 
problem with this is that there is a lack of democratic accountability.  We vote for the legislature and 
they are meant to pass laws making the key decisions.  And if we don’t like those key decisions we 
can lobby to change the law, or vote out those legislators.  But citizens don’t have the same rights 
when it comes to judges or officials making key decisions.  Unpredictable legislation creates a 
vacuum which can lead to a lack of democratic power, as VanSickle-Ward states ‘policy-making by 
the bureaucracy and the courts poses a serious challenge for democratic governance’.894 
                                                          
888 Locke (n 8). 
889 Fuller (n 6). 
890 James Ronald, ‘Publication of Federal Administrative Legislation’ (1938) 7 Geo Was L Rev 52. 
891 Cecil Carr, Delegated Legislation (Cambridge University Press 1921). 
892 Irresberger and Jasiak (n 261). 
893 Shinar (n 46) 6. (advance access online publication).  
894 VanSickle-Ward (n 348) 6.  
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5.5 Extension of the hypothesis 
This hypothesis is capable of being extended beyond the parameters set out in this thesis in two 
ways.  Firstly, by reference to other elements of Bingham’s definition of the rule of law and 
secondly by reference to other jurisdictions.  However, there are some caveats to this. 
5.5.1 Extension to other elements of the rule of law 
As a reminder, Bingham’s full list of the 8 elements of the rule of law are: 
1. Law should be accessible, intelligible, clear and predictable 
2. Questions of legal right and liability to be resolved by law, not by exercise of discretion 
3. Law should apply equally to all 
4. Government should exercise powers in good faith 
5. Law must protect fundamental human rights 
6. Courts must be able to resolve legal disputes 
7. Adjudicative procedure of the state must be fair 
8. States must comply with international legal obligations as well as domestic ones 
The key limitation in extending this hypothesis is in the distinction between the form and the 
substance of the law.  When it comes to the form of the law, then there is a vital role for 
legislative drafting principles as there is a clear nexus between those principles and the way 
legislation is formulated.  Element one is directly concerned with the form of the law and is 
therefore appropriate to use it as a touchstone for drafting principles.  The other elements have 
much less to do with the form of the law and more to do with its content. 
Element 2 can be used to derive drafting principles - this is an aspect of predictability that I have 
already dealt with in this thesis.  So, we can have drafting principles that limit the number of 
times that officials have discretion, and we can also constrain the exercise of that discretion. 
Element 3 has one very important drafting principle which can be derived from it – gender 
neutral drafting.  If law is to be equal, then it must apply equally to all genders.  It is not enough 
to say “a man must do XYZ” and then in an Interpretation Act state that “a reference to a man 
includes a reference to a woman”.895 This excludes 50% of the population from the face of the 
                                                          
895 Christopher Williams, ‘The End of the “Masculine Rule”? Gender-Neutral Legislative Drafting in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland’ (2008) 29 Statute Law Review 139. 
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law.  It is now generally accepted that gender neutral drafting is the best drafting practice,896 
and the rule of law adds further weight to this argument. 
The other elements of the rule of law deal in the main with the content of legislation rather than 
its form.  Therefore, any derivation of drafting principles would be minimal.  This is not to say 
that the rule of law isn’t vitally important for drafters.  As has already been pointed out, they are 
a key cog in the legislative system and already regard themselves as guardians of the statute 
book.  So there may not be further drafting principles from the rule of law, but drafters should 
ensure that the content of legislation gives effect to the rule of law. 
5.5.2 Extension to other jurisdictions 
Although the focus of this thesis has been on the UK, it is possible to extend its conclusions to 
other jurisdictions.  This is subject to those jurisdictions being adherent to the rule of law and 
taking an approach to the rule of law which is generally in accordance with Bingham’s definition.  
Under the heading of the importance of the rule of law, much of the evidence cited came from 
outside the UK.  Respect for the rule of law isn’t just a UK, or even a Western fixation, and 
Tamanaha gives an impressive list of world leaders who all profess support for it.897  So it is a 
reasonable assumption that the conclusions in this thesis are able to be replicated in other 
jurisdictions.  Some of the drafting principles are jurisdiction specific (for example on the use of 
section headings) but most are of general import. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
The rule of law is a fundamentally important bulwark against the abuse of state power.  It 
provides protections to citizens which have been hard-won over the centuries.  Respect for it 
has to be refreshed every generation.  Legislative drafters have a unique opportunity to ensure 
that the protections given by the rule of law continue and are respected and developed in our 
legal system.  They can do so by standing up for the values of the rule of law, by ensuring that 
legislation is always accessible, predictable and intelligible.  This thesis has drilled down into 
those concepts and given specific tools and specific drafting techniques to protect the rule of 
law and ultimately make for a better society. 
  
                                                          
896 S Petersson, ‘Gender Neutral Drafting: Historical Perspective’ (1998) 19 Statute Law Review 93. 
897 Tamanaha (n 48) 2. 
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